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LIANG CH'I-CH'AO (1873-1929): A POLITICAL STUDY

by



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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend
to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled
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ABSTRACT

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was one of the intellectual heroes who led the Chinese people into a modern age. Although Liang made tremendous contributions as a journalist, writer, educationalist, political theorist, philosopher and historian, he valued his own political career above everything else.

In the late Ch'ing Dynasty (1890-1911), Liang was an advocate of constitutional monarchy, based generally on the principles of the British parliamentary system. From 1894 to 1898, Liang, as a member of the gentry-literati 'class,' went beyond the old Confucian tradition to advocate reform. He was convinced that just to learn Western technology in order to protect China from foreign aggression was inefficient. A thorough reform of Chinese political institutions, educational and social systems, and economic structure was the answer to the challenge of the West. For this Liang drew inspiration from the Emperor Meiji of Japan. Liang also advocated the introduction of a constitution into China in order to extend people's rights.

From 1898 to 1903, Liang advocated the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty through a revolution, and the establishment of a republic in China. This was because the failure of the Hundred Days' Reform (which resulted in Liang's own exile in Japan) brought him under the influence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries and also because he increased his knowledge of Western ideas.

After 1903, when he examined the Chinese situation in the light of international circumstances, Liang abandoned the idea of revolution

and republicanism. Because China did not have a democratic tradition, he advocated the 'rejuvenation of the Chinese people' through education, in order that they might prepare themselves for democracy. He also, in 1905, advocated enlightened despotism as a stepping-stone toward the realization of a constitutional form of government. From 1906 on, he returned to his former idea of a constitutional monarchy.

After the revolution of 1911, Liang became a prime mover of several political parties. In order to introduce reforms he participated in several cabinets. He supported Yuan Shih-kai and other warlords because he wished to use their military strength to unite China. He later led the opposition to Yuan's monarchical movement and to the Manchu restoration movement, in order to protect the constitution.

Throughout his life, through his voluminous writings, Liang introduced Western learning and political thought into China. In this way the change of an ethos in China was achieved. Liang's advocacy of nationalism--love of the country instead of love of the ruler--had tremendous effects. All the Chinese leaders in the Twentieth Century drew inspiration from him. Mao Tse-tung acknowledged that he, in his early life, was deeply influenced by Liang's writings. Even some of Liang's ideas sparked in the Great Cultural Revolution of the 1960's.

To make China strong again and to restore China to glory by way of a democratic system were Liang's aims throughout his life. The inconsistency in the means he advocated was a result of his response to the unstable circumstances in China. This study is an effort to relate Liang's political thought and activities to these changing conditions.

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INTRODUCTION

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was one of the most remarkable and influential theoreticians, one of the most widely learned scholars, and one of the best-known writers in modern Chinese history. His words and actions exerted great and profound influence over the political happenings, social changes and intellectual trends of modern China. His career may be divided into three phases: from 1890 to 1911 he campaigned for the reform movement and constitutional monarchy; from 1912 to 1919 he campaigned, first for the republican movement, involving himself in party politics; then for enlightened despotism, working part of the time as a government official; and from 1919 to his death, he was the dean or leader of the Chinese intellectuals and scholars, and the moving spirit of the modern student class. His political life may also be divided into two parts with the revolution of 1911 as the line of demarcation: eighteen years in the late Ch'ing period and eighteen years in the early Republican period. Throughout his life, he produced newspaper articles, research studies, and essays on a voluminous scale. He in the early twentieth century became the most influential of all Chinese publicists, the window of Chinese youth to the West.

When he first rose to fame during the Reform Movement of 1898, his thought had been in line with that of his teacher, K'ang Yu-wei. But after they had both escaped abroad into exile in that year K'ang made little change in his ideas, while Liang, coming in contact with the modern learning, made great progress. Instead of admiring Mencius, he now liked to talk about Rousseau and Montesquieu; instead of

urging the worship of Confucianism, he now tried in many respects to go beyond the scope of K'ang's ideas. Liang soon left his teacher far behind.

Liang began to participate actively in the political reform movement in 1895. Although devoted to the movement for constitutional monarchy, he also advocated the ideas of *min-chuan* (people's rights), and protection of the nation and the race. After the repeated failure of the *tzu-ch'iang* (self-strengthening) movements, Liang realised that not only must China's political institutions and social system undergo a change, but the Chinese people must basically be reborn or rejuvenated. Hence the theme of *hsin-min* (new people or the renovation of the people) became the major motif of his essays. It aimed to lead a patriotic new culture movement.

After the dismal failure of the Hundred Days' Reform Liang in a short period advocated a violent anti-Manchu movement, and a revolution, involving destruction and assassination. He even made use of the members of the secret societies to start an uprising. After his American journey (1903), his horizons were widened. He abandoned drastic measures and promoted moderation.

As the decade after the Boxer Uprising gave increasing evidence of the impending collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the way was opened for the rebel elements among the Chinese scholar class to develop their theories of reform and to try further to rationalize and to understand the disaster which had overtaken China's ancient society. In this period, Liang appeared to represent the more significant wing of the rebel reformers. While he was less of a political organizer than

Sun Yat-sen, Liang symbolized for the student class the great tradition of Chinese scholarship, face to face with the unprecedented problems posed by the West. His wide-ranging interests and eloquent style gave his writings great force, and there is little doubt that he taught his generation many lessons in the principle of patriotism.

Liang's hope for China lay in popular education for nationalism. He espoused an Anglo-Saxon ideal of self-respect, individualism, enterprise and public-spirited citizenship. He urged the transfer of loyalty from ruler to nation, from Confucian personal relationships to the principle of laws, and the establishment of a parliament, a responsible government, and other new institutions. Because he believed that the Chinese people were unprepared for representative democracy, he remained a constitutional monarchist, anti-republican and not actively revolutionary. The *Chen-wen shê* (The Political Information Association)¹ which he organized in 1907 advocated orderly political processes. It had great influence in the constitutional movement. It fell into the usual liberal position and both the Manchu nobles and the anti-Ch'ing revolutionaries attacked it though from opposite sides.

When the revolutionaries were organized, an intensive debate on the relative merits of constitutional reform versus revolution was carried on both in Japan and in China. With Liang then in Japan espousing the cause of reform, the debate was on a high level. There began immediately a keen rivalry between the revolutionary and the reform movements. Both were catering to the educated and respected,

at home and abroad. Those who abhorred violence were more sympathetic to Liang and the reformers. Those who had lost hope in the dynasty or who were otherwise endowed with a sense of national consciousness, were generally inclined to join with Sun Yat-sen. There was much confusion between the membership of the two groups. There was proselytizing of each other's adherents. On several occasions Liang himself sought to merge his following with that of Sun, though the attempts all ended in failure.

Liberalism was a catchword among the intellectuals in those early years. Individual freedom had been propounded by Liang at the beginning of the twentieth century. Liang's ideas seemed to be rather close to the traditional liberalism of England. He insisted that there should be a distinction between right and wrong, but he did not believe in the existence of an absolute truth. Liang himself frequently said he did not mind challenging his ideas of today with those he had held yesterday. He acted from his own convictions. Among all Chinese orators in the later Ch'ing and early Republican years, Liang was the one most rich in democratic attitudes. The revolutionists espoused the cause of *min-chuan* too, but their thoughts were rather closer to Rousseau than to John Locke or J.S. Mill. Furthermore, they preferred national freedom to individual freedom. This difference between Liang and the revolutionists made their permanent cooperation impossible.

Liang's espousal of enlightened despotism was in any case shaken by the death of the Emperor Kuang-hsü in 1908. The eventual failure of the adoption of an imperial constitution in April, 1911,

disappointed Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who, a staunch monarchist, obviously in an agony of despair, said, "Now the people can only turn to the other alternative." But he did not take any part in the Revolution of 1911. However, Liang's words and actions stimulated, directly or indirectly, the development of revolutionary thought. Thus, he still may be regarded as a *ke-ming hsien-chio-tse* (revolutionary forerunner).

After Liang returned to Peking from Japan to a hero's welcome, in October, 1912, he immediately became one of the leaders in the creation of republican politics, and generally supported the government in power. Liang's argument that the Chinese people would need an enlightened despotism and much popular education to prepare them for modern political life, led him to cooperate with Yuan Shih-kai. Liang had honestly intended to guide the *Peiyang* military clique onto the road of constitutional government, and to reform the Chinese system of local government. But Yuan had his own way. Liang had already been cheated by Yuan in the 1898 reform movement; he should have known him.

While Yuan was trying to revise the provisional constitution, Liang and the *Chin-pu tang* (the Progressive Party) still cooperated with him in every way, in the hope that by means of the constitution Yuan's enlightened despotism would save China. But Yuan's ambition was to progress from despotism to monarchy, not to enlightenment. He had soon achieved his aim. This drastic reversal of the hopes of the Chinese patriots caused even the most conservative leaders of the Progressive Party to turn against him. The failure of Yuan's

monarchical movement, resulted from many factors, but the precipitating factor was military opposition within China, sparked by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who was now an anti-monarchist.

Later, when Liang's teacher K'ang Yu-wei openly raised the banner of Manchu restoration, Liang published a prompt refutation of his argument. Because he feared that he would be unable to convince his teacher, he even asked the *Tutus* (military governors) of the four provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi and Kwangtung to issue a telegram denouncing K'ang's plan. Liang, an anti-revolutionist, who yet saw history as irreversible, now advocated the continuity of the Chinese Republic just as he had earlier advocated the continuity of the Ch'ing dynasty.

Before Yuan's death, Liang tried his best to consolidate the influence of the Progressive Party in South China and to build his headquarters in Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow. He wished to use the power of his former student, Ts'ai Ao (governor of Yunnan) to occupy these provinces as a field of experimentation for his political reforms as well as to establish a balance of power with North China. When Yuan died, however, Liang tried his best to establish close relations with Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui to abolish the military council. At the same time, he tried to support Tsao K'un to go to Szechwan to continue Ts'ai Ao's influence. When the power of the *Kuomintang* was at its height, the Progressive Party supported Yuan wholeheartedly in his fight against the *Kuomintang*. After the defeat of the *Kuomintang* in the winter of 1913 the political stage of China was monopolized by the *Peiyang* warlords and their politicians, the

Progressive Party under Liang then threw its support to the *Kuomintang*. When the *Peiyang* warlords decided to rely on the Progressive Party, the members of the Progressive Party then broke relations with the *Kuomintang*.

The upshot of the monarchical war amounted to political maneuvers through which both the Progressive Party and the moderate wing of the old *Kuomintang* tried to secure support from various warlords both in the South and in the North. In order to dominate the political situation, both these parties appeased the warlords and in so doing helped to extend the power of the warlords. Liang was one of the leaders who were to be responsible for the deterioration of Chinese political standards in the 1920's.

The struggle among the warlords, among the politicians in the parliament, and between the warlords and the politicians, went through a sequence of phases with a general trend toward the weakening of the parliament and fragmentation of the country. At the same time, Liang still hoped to make the *Peiyang* clique the pillar of China. He believed that a nation must maintain a central force, which he thought should be the *Peiyang* militarists. Unfortunately this pillar had long been rotting beyond repair. Liang had first tried to reform Yuan Shih-kai; then he tried to make Tuan Ch'i-jui a strong man and a national hero. Tuan refused to be improved. Liang could merely watch while Tuan was led by the *An-fu* clique to rely on Japan. The failure was a bitter disappointment to Liang. In frustration, he finally withdrew from the political scene.

After the Paris Peace Conference he was convinced of the

spiritual bankruptcy of Western civilization. He then led a wide-ranging 'reorganization of the national heritage' until his death.

Liang's writings did much to effect the change of the ethos in China, yet they never ceased to reflect it. His essays were widely read for their style in the schools of the Republic as late as the 1930's. Nearly every leader of the May Fourth Movement had read his writings and drew inspiration from them. Liang was a powerful and emotional writer, and his articles aroused a whole generation to formulate and meet new issues. Mao Tse-tung acknowledged that he was influenced by Liang's writings. His *Hsin min-chu chu-i* (New Democracy) is today a sort of semantic nephew of Liang's *Hsin-min* (new people or citizen). Whatever Liang's eventual place as a philosopher of change in modern China may be, Liang made an enormous contribution to the promotion of patriotism in the early part of the Twentieth Century.

In politics, Liang was never as important in the young Republic as he had been in the old Empire, but his ideas were to remain significant. While Sun Yat-sen was one of the early professional revolutionaries of modern time, Liang was a gentry-intellectual; a leader of thought more than action. Liang and Sun approached China's problems from opposite social contexts, with antithetic preconceptions, and through different media. While Sun built up the structure of the early revolutionary movement, Liang was expounding the ideology of Chinese nationalism. In modern China, probably no one except Sun Yat-sen, made so enormous a contribution to his own country as Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.

It is of interest that now Liang Ch'i-ch'ao is usually regarded

only as a scholar by his countrymen, perhaps because of his intellectual and educational career. But Liang himself regarded his own political career as paramount. He wrote in his article *Wo-ching-hou-so-i-pao-kuo-tze'* (What Should I Do For My Country From Now On), published in 1915:

I have devoted my last twenty years completely to politics.... I am particularly fond of discussing politics. Besides politics, I have discussed other subjects, but most of them are concerned with political ideas in the end. I want to write and to orate, thereby creating my ideal political activities.²

Therefore, if we do not understand Liang's political ideas, we will not be able clearly to recognize him for what he really is. However, to write of Liang's political thought and activities is not an easy task, particularly because of the confusing period of Chinese history he lived through. Such being the case, I have divided Liang's life of fifty-seven years into two periods with the revolution of 1911 as the main line of demarcation. Furthermore, I have divided the first period into three sections (chapters II, III and IV) in order to trace the stages of his political evolution. For the convenience of the reader to understand the cause of change, I have summarized his early political activities (1873-1911) in the first chapter and his later political and intellectual activities (1911-1929) in the fifth chapter. As far as the development of his political beliefs is concerned, the period from 1894 to 1911 was the most important, and I concentrate upon it. After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, Liang involved himself in practical politics. He joined several political parties and also was invited to participate in several cabinets. Although he wrote many articles and frequently made public speeches in this period, most of them were only political opinions

aimed at practical problems. There were few systematic and profound political ideas. After 1918, he devoted his later life to educational and cultural affairs and adopted a negative attitude towards politics. Therefore, this work mainly discusses Liang's political conceptions from 1894 to 1911 and emphasizes the causes of the change of Liang's ideas.

Throughout his life, Liang wrote unceasingly. His ideas and theories may be found in his *Yin-pin-shih-ho-chi-wen-chi* (Collected Essays of the Ice-Drinker's Studio,³ 16 vols., 4th ed., Taipei, 1960) and *Yin-pin-shih-ho-chi-chuan-chi* (Collected Works of the Ice-Drinker's Studio, 41 vols., Taipei, 1960) and in his other works. These above-mentioned two new editions of Liang's major collected works include much new material that was not contained in the old editions (*chuan-chi*, Shanghai, 1936 and *Wen-chi*, Shanghai, 1925).

But the most important material concerning Liang's political career is *Wu-hsü-pien-fa* (The Reform of 1898, edited by Chien Po-tsan, et al., 4 vols., 2, 491 pp. Shanghai, 1953) and Ting Wen-chiang's *Liang-Jen-Kung-hsien-sheng-nien-p'u-ch'ang pien ch'u-kuo* (First Draft of A Chronological Biography of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 2 vols., Taipei, 1959). The former has material from 175 works that include edicts, petitions, memorials and letters by Liang and other reformers as well as their opponents. Ting Wen-chiang, a close friend of Liang and an outstanding scholar in his own right, was trusted by Liang's children with all Liang's works (including those unpublished in *Chuan-chi* and *Wen-chi*) and, especially, Liang's voluminous correspondence with his comrades and friends in which they exchanged

their political ideas.

Liang's career is not unknown in the West. Some of his writings appeared in English translation early in this century, and of course, his travels in North America did not go unnoticed in the press of the time.

In 1966 there were two doctoral theses on Liang Ch'i-ch'ao: Chang Hao, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Early Intellectual Life, 1873-1903* (Harvard, September 1966) and Philip Chung-chih Huang, *A Confucian Liberal: Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in Action and Thought* (University of Washington, July 1966). My study has been confined to other aspects of Liang's career, particularly his political thought and activities.

There is one major published work in English on the life of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, namely, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* by Joseph R. Levenson, Harvard University Press, 1959. Professor Levenson has sought to explore the reaches of Liang's mind and to analyse the intellectual battles which Liang engaged in on all fronts.

I have chosen to concentrate upon Liang's political life. Much of the material I have used, indicated above, has only recently been published and was unavailable to Professor Levenson. This has enabled me to add detail and depth to a discussion of Liang's political thought and career.

CHAPTER I

LIANG'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN

THE LATE CH'ING DYNASTY

The latter decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century saw important changes in the political and intellectual climate in China. Much of the change resulted from the activities of reformers and revolutionaries. By far the most influential of Chinese publicist-reformers of the time was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.

Liang began as a monarchist and finished by becoming a supporter of the republic. Prior to examining the reasons for Liang's change of stand it will be necessary to give a brief outline of Liang's political life to 1912.

The Opium War led to a series of conflicts between China and the European powers. Because of China's reluctance to meet their terms, the great powers backed with military force their demands for concessions from her. Therefore, the Ch'ing Court and many Chinese believed that this was a world of guns and battleships. Those who wanted to save China and to strengthen China regarded the protection of guns and battleships "as the first and foremost priority."¹ They believed that "if China had cannons and warships, the hands of the foreigners would be tied."² They believed that as soon as the Chinese learned the secret of Western technology, China would become a rich and a strong country. Thus, they built arsenals and imitated Western technology. This was the so-called *tzu-ch'iang* (self-strengthening) movement.

The sporadic imitation of Western methods beginning with the

1860's finally brought forth a reform movement which culminated in the work of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Liang was born in Hsin-hui County, near Canton, on February 23, 1873. His father, Liang Pao-ying, was a well-to-do farmer with a considerable training in the classics. Liang's grandfather had earned the *hsiu-tsai* degree. At the age of four or five, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao began to take instruction in the traditional classics from his grandfather, and later, from his father. In 1884, at the age of twelve, he became a *po-shih-ti-tsu* (student of the national academy). Three years later, he entered the famous school *Hsüeh-hai-tang* in Canton for the study of the Han learning. Liang received the *chü-jen* degree in 1889 when he was only seventeen. He was the youngest and stood fifth on the list of the hundred successful candidates. Because he passed the civil examination on the provincial level with such distinction, the examiner Li Tuan-fen, later chief of the Board of Rites, arranged for Liang to marry his younger sister. The marriage took place in Peking near the end of 1891.³

Liang failed in the metropolitan examination in Peking in 1890. On his way home to Canton, he bought in Shanghai a copy of the *Ying-huan chih-lueh*, an outline of world geography compiled by Hsü chi-yu in the 1840's. Also in Shanghai, Liang was delighted by the translations of foreign books produced by the Kiangnan Arsenal.⁴ These made a great impression on him.

In the autumn of 1890 in Canton, Liang first met K'ang Yu-wei, whose initial reform project had just been rejected by the throne. Liang decided to forsake his former educational pattern, to quit the *Hsüeh-hai-tang* and to pursue his studies with K'ang.⁵ In 1891, at

the request of Liang and other disciples, K'ang set up his famous school, the *Wan-mu-ts'ao-tang* in Canton. In 1893, Liang took some of the teaching burden from K'ang. Early in 1894, Liang went to Peking with K'ang for the metropolitan examination. Each failed. K'ang returned to Canton, but Liang stayed on in the Capital.⁶

China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War had a profound influence on the reformers. They had helped the Manchu dynasty weather the Taiping insurrection in the 1860's, and now they felt impelled to take action for their own sake as well as for the sake of their country. K'ang Yu-wei and others had started the reform movement by trying to identify their cause with that of the nation by sending a petition to the emperor. When the effort was frustrated by the conservatives among the Manchu nobility and mandarins, they turned to a new course by trying to popularize the reform idea among the gentry-literati. K'ang and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao directed their efforts toward education to propaganda for the idea of self-strengthening.⁷

First, K'ang, Liang and their friends organized in the south the *Kuei-hsüeh-hui* (Kuangsi Study Society), which emphasized that without reform and self-strengthening, China could not be saved. In August, 1895 the scholars in Peking established the *Ch'iang hsüeh-hui* (Society for the National Strengthening). K'ang Yu-wei joined the society and soon dominated it. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao became chief secretary and took charge of journalistic activities. Publication began of a daily devoted to the spread of constitutional and democratic ideas. This was abandoned later, and Liang's *Chung-wai-chi-wen* (The Chinese and Foreign Record), a new paper with a daily short reformist essay by Liang,

took its place. However, hostility in high places put an end to the *Chung-wai-chi-wen*. The first reform society and its newspaper were finally suppressed by an edict of January 20, 1896.⁸

Liang left for Shanghai in April, 1896 to take the position of the general editor of the periodical, *Shih-wu pao* (Current Affairs Journal). This paper made its debut in August, 1896 and continued publication for two years. When Liang was in Shanghai, his whole attention was concentrated on this paper and on popularizing ideas of reform.⁹ The Journal was warmly received. It had a tremendous influence in stimulating the intelligentsia into organizational and subsequent publishing activities. In several provinces societies were founded for purposes of general or technical study, and for campaigns against social evils.¹⁰ Liang, serving as the editor of this paper, built up a good reputation. Such being the case, Chang Chih-tung, governor-general of Hu-kuang; Sheng Hsuan-huai, president of the Court of Judicature and Revision, and Wang Wen-shao, governor-general of Chihli in April, 1897 together recommended Liang to the throne. Liang was appointed assistant to the Minister of Railways, but he did not accept the post. He also refused Chang Chih-tung's invitation to be his private advisor.¹¹

In October, 1897, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao relinquished his editorial post in the *Shih-wu-Pao* because of Chang Chih-tung's interference in the editorial policy. This magazine had received heavy financial aid from Chang, who therefore felt free to interfere with its internal affairs. Chang's interference became serious, because of what he considered an excessive emphasis in its editorials on the concept of *min-chuan* (people's rights). Under this pressure, Liang left Shanghai for Changsha.

Hunan.¹²

By this time, of all the provinces, the one most affected by the reform movement was Hunan. Governor Ch'en Pao-chen himself was also committed to the principles of reform. Under his auspices a newspaper called *Hsiang-hsüeh hsin-pao* (New Journal of Hunan Studies) was first issued in April, 1897. For promoting a new academic spirit, the native scholars established the *Shih-wu-hsüeh-tang* (Academy of Current Affairs) at Changsha. They invited Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to be its director and chief lecturer.¹³ Liang stayed in Changsha about three months. He organized the *Nan-hsüeh-hui* which endeavoured to coordinate the political science studies of scholars in the southern provinces, but his main efforts were concentrated on the *Shih-wu hsüeh-tang* where Chinese and Western studies were combined.¹⁴

In the early spring of 1898, after suffering from a serious illness Liang went back to Peking.¹⁵ In April, he made his last attempt at the metropolitan examination, but he was never to earn a higher degree than the *chu-jen*.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the reform tide was reaching its height. The Hundred Days' Reform was ushered in by the imperial decree of June 11. It was a sweeping statement in favor of military and educational reform and for the nurturing of talent for an effective diplomatic service. By a decree of July 3, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was appointed director of a translation bureau.¹⁷ In these months, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang and others submitted several memoranda which sought to set up a constitutional bureau or some kind of central planning body.¹⁸ For some weeks K'ang had in secret been meeting with Emperor Kuang-hsü every night at the

palace. Liang had often accompanied him. Their enemies charged that their aims were to ruin the government. On September 11, Tseng Lien of the *Hunan shou-chiu tang* (the Hunan Conservative Party) submitted a memorandum asking the death penalty for K'ang and Liang.¹⁹

A series of bold decrees in August and September had abolished sinecures, reformed the army and introduced a budget system, but reaction was swift. On September 21, a coup occurred in the palace, and the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi reasserted her authority. The Emperor was put into the background, and new decrees revoked the reforms.²⁰

As for those who favored political reforms, after the coup, the Empress Dowager sought her revenge. On September 22, she issued an order that K'ang and Liang should be arrested.²¹ They were able to escape imminent danger with the aid of foreigners. K'ang was helped by the English Consul General at Shanghai and Liang was granted refuge in the Japanese legation. Although the city gates of Peking were closed to prevent the escape of the proscribed reformers, Liang managed to reach Tientsin and thence went to Taku. The Empress Dowager issued further decrees.²² He had not been caught. In the Japanese warship *Oshima* Liang Ch'i-ch'ao sailed into exile.²³

LIANG CH'I-CH'AO IN EXILE

After he settled down in Japan, the first thing Liang Ch'i-ch'ao did was found the *Ch'ing-i pao* (Pure Criticism Journal). It made its debut in November, 1898, with the financial backing of Chinese merchants in Yokohama. The major theme of this paper was restoration of power to Emperor Kuang-hsü. The leaders of the coup d'état of 1898, the Empress

Dowager, Jung-lü, Yuan Shih-kai were targets of Liang's attacks. Besides this, Liang also discussed Western political and social philosophy. The *Ch'ing-i pao* was the first in the series of journals which Liang published outside China. They exerted tremendous influence among Chinese overseas. Many Chinese intellectuals at home could also read these publications because copies of them were smuggled into China.²⁴

In June, 1899, in many foreign countries where they received help, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang established the *Pao-huang hui* (the Protest-the-Emperor Society).²⁵

Liang had become acquainted with many important Japanese figures, and there was no doubt that he was given Japanese government funds as long as Okuma's *Shimpōtō* (the Progressive Party) was in power. He himself took the Japanese name *Yoshida shih*.²⁶

Liang's Relations with Sun Yat-sen

Also in Japan, Liang first met Dr. Sun Yat-sen. When K'ang and Liang fled to Japan, Sun who had returned that summer to Japan after several years abroad propagating anti-Manchu ideas, treated K'ang and Liang as friends, because they too had failed in their attempts to reform the nation. At first Sun sought eagerly to unite his forces with those of the reformers. K'ang who opposed the Empress Dowager, but who supported the dynasty contemptuously, rejected the idea of a coalition. From then on throughout the period of their exile, the two parties struck out at each other in bitter conflict.²⁷

At this time, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was not so traditionally hide-bound and haughty as K'ang. Liang, associating himself closely with Sun, expressed himself as a supporter of the proposed revolution to

overthrow the Manchu government. Liang even discussed with Ch'en Shao-po, Sun's close friend, the idea of combining the two parties into one.²⁸ Upon receiving this news, K'ang, then in Singapore, immediately sent to Japan someone with money to urge Liang to go to Honolulu as promoter of the *Pao-huang hui*.²⁸

Before he left for Honolulu, Liang made another visit to Sun Yat-sen, at which time he still discussed the question of the consolidation of the two parties. Since Honolulu had been the cradle of *Hsing-chung hui* (Revive China Society), Liang asked Sun to write letters of recommendation for him. Without any hesitation, Sun complied with letters introducing Liang to his elder brother, Sun Te-chang, and to many merchant leaders of the Chinese community in Honolulu.³⁰

On December 20, 1899, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao left Yokohama for Honolulu. A Manchu imperial order issued on the same day offered a reward for seizure of K'ang and Liang, or for proof of their deaths.³¹

Liang, however, arrived safely in Honolulu by the end of the year. The Manchu consul at Honolulu wrote to the U.S. authorities asking for Liang's deportation. Through the good offices of the Japanese consul, Saito, Liang received permission to stay on. Liang paid tribute to the freedom guaranteed by U.S. law, which protected him from the designs of the Manchu government.³²

In January, 1900, the local government of Honolulu, under the pretence of preventing the spread of a fresh outbreak of bubonic plague, burned many Chinese dwellings and shops. Also, large gatherings were forbidden, so that Liang was prevented from speaking in public.³³ However, despite this handicap, Liang seemed to have made a great

impression on the Chinese community. Chinese nationalism was fed by the American action in burning their houses. Liang was able to persuade many that, if Kuang-hsü["] was restored to power, China could make a start toward greatness. He organized a branch of the *Pao-huang hui*. Before long, Liang's society rose to a commanding position in the Hawaiian Chinese community. By the time Sun Yat-sen had become aware of this, and had written a letter to Liang, reprimanding him for breach of faith, it was already too late to stop a large number of members of Sun's *Hsing-chung hui* in Honolulu from joining Liang's society.³⁴

In the summer of 1900 when Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was planning to make a tour of the United States, the uprising of the Boxers and the intervention of the Eight Powers took place in China. All kinds of rumors were reaching Honolulu, and letters and telegrams from Japan urged Liang to return.³⁵ On July 13, an important telegram arrived from Shanghai. Three days later Liang sailed for that city, because the revolt of his friend, T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang was impending.

Liang had become acquainted with T'ang, a man influential in the secret societies, when Liang taught at the *Shih-wu hsüeh-tang* in Hunan. In the winter of 1899, T'ang returned to China from Japan with more than twenty Chinese students. There they planned to initiate a great uprising along the Yangtse Valley in the section of Hunan and Hupeh. All expenses for T'ang's activities depended upon the money raised by K'ang and Liang in foreign countries. This was the first attempt the *Pao-huang hui* had made to recruit members from secret societies. This drastic measure was taken only after the dismal failure of the Hundred Days' Reform. Money to be remitted by K'ang

and Liang did not come, however, and the plan had to be postponed again and again. The plot was ultimately discovered by the Manchu government. T'ang and twenty other persons were arrested and executed. After these failures, K'ang and Liang made no further use of the members of the secret societies.³⁶

In his disappointment at T'ang's failure, Liang left Shanghai in August for Southeast Asia. He travelled in Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia for six months, and returned to Japan via the Philippines in late spring, 1901.³⁷

For the next few years, Liang was again active as a journalist and writer. In the summer of 1901, he founded the *Kuang-chih shu-chu* (Wisdom-Extension Bookstore) with the financial assistance from the Chinese in Japan. Chinese students were invited to translate Western books for publication.³⁸ Unfortunately, a fire in the printing plant in Yokohama, in the winter of 1901, put an end to the publication of Liang's *Ch'ing-i-pao*.³⁹

Liang reached thirty in 1905. His own fortnightly periodical, the *Hsin-min tsung-pao* (New People's Magazine) began to publish in Yokohama in January of that year. This journal dealt mainly with the problem of Chinese culture and Western learning.⁴⁰ From the academic point of view, Liang's writings were better than his earlier ones. From political and social points of view his essays appearing in the *Ch'ing-i pao* and in the *Hsin-min tsung-pao* between 1902 and 1903 were more influential. Although the two periodicals were published in Japan, they had an extraordinary influence on the intellectuals in China. Liang's progressive ideas suited young intellectuals and had

considerable influence in bringing on needed political and social changes. Except that he still referred to Kuang-hsü as 'My Emperor' or 'My Sacred Ruler,' Liang advocated a violent anti-Manchu movement, a revolution, involving destruction and assassination.⁴¹ Liang's colorful, emotional, and persuasive writings were exactly what his younger readers needed. Liang's contributions aroused them to take drastic action.⁴²

In October, 1902, Liang started a magazine entitled *Hsin-hsiao shuo* (New Novels). His novels in new style published in this magazine were full of revolutionary ideas. During the period 1902-1903, he published in Tokyo his *Yin-ping-shih-wen-chi* (Collected Essays of the Ice-Drinkers' Studio) which is a compilation of his articles and essays. But the publication of the *Hsin-min tsung-pao* was suspended in January, 1903, because Liang left Japan for North America.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao left Yokohama on February 20, 1903 and arrived at Vancouver on March 4. He travelled through Western Canada and visited Ottawa and Montreal. On May 12 he arrived in New York. Later, he made a trip to Washington, Boston and Philadelphia. In the American capital, Liang had an interview with John Hay, Secretary of State. President Theodore Roosevelt also received him in the White House. He then visited many cities including Baltimore, Pittsburgh, New Orleans, St. Louis, Chicago and Kansas City. He spoke everywhere with Chinese people, and went on to Seattle and to San Francisco. In Los Angeles, the warm treatment Liang received from the City Hall was more than he deserved. He stayed in California for a month and closed his North

American excursion in Vancouver.⁴³

Liang returned from America to Japan on November 11, 1903. The revolutionaries published articles in Hong Kong's newspapers in which they denounced Liang. Liang replied to these accusations in the daily press. Thus their dispute became a very heated one. The dispute between Liang's party and the revolutionaries actually started in 1902, when Chang Ping-ling and K'ang Yu-wei wrote articles in the newspapers to express their different views on the advantages and disadvantages of revolution. In November, 1904, the revolutionaries established *Min-pao* (People's Daily) to oppose Liang's *Hsin-min tsung-pao*. The dispute between these two parties continued till July, 1906 when *Hsin-min tsung-pao* ceased to exist.

It is probably true to say that before 1905 the views of the revolutionaries led by Sun Yat-sen had less following than those of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Although the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) tilted the balance in Sun's favour, Liang's message, that a constitutional monarchy was the best solution, was still listened to with respect overseas. Even the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi seemed to be veering round to the same way of thinking. If the effect of a constitution on Japan was to lead to victory over a European power, then it could be imagined what it would do to China. So in July 1905, a party of five Chinese ministers including a Manchu prince were sent abroad by the Manchu government to study the working of various foreign constitutions.

Liang's Constitutional Movement

After the five ministers had returned to China with the suggestion

that a constitutional monarchy be established, an imperial conference announced, on September 1, 1906, that the government was preparing a constitution and was initiating a reform of the administration.⁴⁴ Upon hearing this, Liang began to organize a party in 1906. The *Cheng-wen-shè* (the Political Information Association) was established next year to work for the constitutional movement. When the *Cheng-wen-shè* was banned in 1908, Liang joined other organizations to work for the constitutional movement until the revolution of 1911. During this period, Liang also wrote many articles to advocate constitutional monarchy. Among them were: *Cheng-wen shè huan-yen shu* (Manifesto of the Political Information Association) (1907),⁴⁵ *Hsien-cheng chien shuo* (An Easy Guide to the Constitutional Form of Government) (1910).⁴⁶ *Tzé-jen-nei-kuo yu chen-chih chia* (Responsible Cabinet and Politicians) (1910), 1947. *Chung-kuo kuo-hui chih-tu shih-i* (Private Discussion of the Chinese Congressional System) (1910),⁴⁸ *Lun cheng-fu-chu jao kuo-hui chih fei* (Discussion of the Evil of Government Interference in the National Assembly),⁴⁹ *Tzé-jen nei-kuo shih-i* (An Interpretation of Responsible Cabinet) (1911),⁵⁰ etc., Liang's idea of constitutional monarchy was generally in accordance with K'ang Yu-wei's. They both believed that the Chinese constitutional form of government should be established after the model of the English constitutional monarchy, with a responsible ministry, the parliamentary system, including a senate, and a house of commons, as well as a party system.⁵¹

In 1909, Liang published a magazine entitled the *Hsin-hsiao-shuo-pao* (New Fiction) with rather a radical tone.⁵² By this time the constitutionalists in all the provinces of China were more active than

before, because a provincial assembly was to be inaugurated in each province as well as a National Assembly in Peking. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao a theoretician or authority on constitution, published several long essays explaining the various problems concerning the organization and the functioning of a parliament and a cabinet. His articles had great influence on the activity of the constitutional movement in China.⁵³

In February, 1910, Liang published his last periodical to appear before the Wuchang Uprising of 1911. The *Kuo-feng pao* (National Spirit) was established in Shanghai.⁵⁴ Liang wrote many articles on parliamentary and constitutional problems. This magazine was suspended in August, 1911.

Early in 1911 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao made a journey to Formosa (Taiwan), then occupied by Japan. He went to study Japanese administration there because it was of interest to China, in view of China's future plans for Manchuria, Tibet and Sinkiang. He thought that Japanese experience with reform of the currency there might be useful for the reform of the Chinese monetary system.⁵⁵

After he had returned to Japan, revolution broke out in China. In October, 1911, the revolutionary successes at Wuchang stripped the Manchu dynasty of all but a vestige of power. Yuan Shih-kai, the new premier appointed by the last Emperor (Hsüan-tung) of the Manchu Court, announced on November 16 the names of his cabinet members. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was appointed as the Vice Minister of Justice. He did not accept this position.⁵⁶

The revolution of October, 1911, put an end to Liang's exile.

Liang made ready at last to go home. He, however, did not immediately go to Peking. He went instead to Fengtien, conferred there with friends who controlled some troops. In vain he tried to persuade them to control the outskirts of Peking so as to prevent Yuan Shih-kai from entering the capital.⁵⁷ Liang returned to residence in Japan and did not go back to Peking till October, 1912, when the political situation appeared more favourable.

CHAPTER II

LIANG'S POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ACTIVITIES BEFORE 1898

I. ORIGIN OF HIS THOUGHT

Traditional Classics

Liang's education was of the old style. Before the age of seventeen he had studied traditional classics, including the Four Books (The Great Learning, Confucian Analects, Doctrine of the Mean and Mencius), The Five Classics (The Book of Changes, The Odes, The Book of History, The Book of Rites and The Spring and Autumn Annals), Chinese History, philosophy and *belles-lettres*. All this study enabled him to gain a very accurate knowledge of the Chinese cultural tradition, but did little to develop in him independent thinking. Liang wrote later in the article *Hsia-wei-i yu-ch* (The Journey in Hawaii): "I did not visit other districts until I was nine years old and did not travel to other provinces until I reached the age of seventeen. At that time I did not have any lofty ambition and knew nothing about world affairs."¹ Liang received the *Chü-jen* degree in 1889. He was seventeen years old.

However, the next year he failed the metropolitan examination in Peking. His confidence in his own education was shaken, in the autumn of the same year, when he was introduced in Canton to K'ang Yu-wei. Liang recalled his meeting with K'ang in his *San-shih tsu-she* (Autobiography at Thirty):

I was very proud at that time because I had received the *Chü-jen* degree when only seventeen years old. I was

very good at writing commentaries and essays in the traditional Chinese style which was very popular then. But during my first interview with the Master [K'ang Yu-wei], he repeatedly criticized as useless the classical learning of the last several hundred years, and said that it should be done away with or reformed. I went to see him in the early morning and did not leave until late evening. When I left him I felt that I had lost all I had learned before and did not know which way to turn. I was amazed and also pleased.... I was suspicious and I was frightened.... From then on I decided to abandon the old learning and to withdraw from *Hsüeh-hai tang* (*Hsüeh-hai* School). Since then I pursued my studies with K'ang. It was the first time in my life that I knew what true learning was.²

Teachings of K'ang Yu-wei

At this time K'ang Yu-wei was thirty-three years old. He had already started to write *Ta-tung Shu* (Book of Great Harmony).³ In response to the attacks of the Christian missionaries on the weakness of the Chinese national spirit, K'ang Yu-wei attempted to make Confucianism into a true religion comparable to Christianity. He was convinced that religious faith was the reason for Western prosperity, and he intended to achieve the result for China by the Christianization of Confucius.⁴ K'ang thought that Confucius really had had a celestial mission and had wielded his spiritual power to reveal to the Chinese nation a set of ideological and institutional principles, which he then embodied in the classics. These should be treated just as the Holy Bible was treated in the Occident.⁵ He expanded his theory into two fully documented writings:

Hsin-hsüeh wei-ching k'ao (An Inquiry into the Classics Forged During the Hsin Period) and *K'ung-tsu kai-chih k'ao* (A Study of Confucius as Reformer).⁶ Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, because of his knowledge of the traditional classics, was able to assist K'ang in the compilation of

these two books in 1891 and 1892-97.⁷

K'ang became renowned throughout China. The essence of his writings was *i-ku* (suspicion of classics and ancient writings). He re-examined and re-valued all ancient writings and came to a conclusion that all classics discovered in the later Han Dynasty were forgeries. This conclusion shook the foundation of the orthodox 'ancient text school'.⁸ Liang, following K'ang, pursued the 'new text school' which emphasized the application of classical studies to the solution of contemporary problems.⁹ This change in the course of his studies had a tremendous influence on Liang. His willingness constantly to challenge his own ideas originated with this great change.¹⁰

One of K'ang's early writings which had a primary influence on Liang was *Ch'ang-hsing hsüeh-chi* (An Account of Study at *Ch'ang-hsing Alley*). It was written on the basis of the ideas of the Confucian Analects in order to preach Confucianism to the people for their salvation. Before 1898, Liang had followed his teacher in advocating the preservation of Confucianism and reverence for Confucius.¹¹ But this influence did not last very long. Liang soon began to express disagreement with his teacher on the preservation of Confucianism. In 1902, he openly rejected this concept. But the ideas of *chiu-min* (save-the-people) advocated in *Ch'ang-hsing hsüeh-chi* and of *chiu-shih* (save-the-world) discussed frequently by K'ang at Wan-mu-ts'ao-tang (Wan-mu School) had a more enduring influence on Liang.¹² Liang wrote later in *Nan-hai chi-shih shou yen* (K'ang Yu-wei's Seventieth Birthday): "When we received his instructions, we felt excited and frightened. We realized how great our responsibilities were and dared not neglect duty or fall into idleness."¹³

Liang's patriotic expressions and his *chiu-kuo* (save-the-nation) activities during his life had their origin in the early influences of K'ang.

Another work of K'ang's which had an important influence on Liang was *K'ung-tzu kai-chih k'ao*. In his book, K'ang maintained that Confucius wrote the *Spring and Autumn Annals* in order to advocate reform and that it was not solely a work of history. For K'ang, only *Kung-yang's* commentaries on *tung san tung* and *chang-san shih* actually caught the essence and the spirit of Confucius' intention in writing the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Thus, K'ang liked to discuss *tung san tung*. The so-called *san-tung* (three ancient dynasties) were Hsia, Shang and Chou. Although they succeeded each other, there were more changes than continuities among them. Each dynasty had its own laws which were enacted according to circumstances. K'ang also liked to discuss *chang san shih*. The so-called *san shih* (three ages) were *ch'u-luan shih* (the age of chaos), *sheng-ping shih* (the age of peace) and *tai-ping shih* (the age of great peace). In the transition of the world from 'chaos' to 'peace' and then to 'great peace', progress was made by reform.¹⁴ This is the basis of K'ang's political advocacy of reform and of modernization.

Liang was deeply influenced by this interpretation of the *Spring and Autumn annals* and *san-shih*. He believed that governments and societies had to pass through several stages in the transition from 'chaos' to 'peace'. When governments and societies had reached a certain age, their laws would change accordingly. No one could stop

the change. If they had not reached a certain age, the old laws should be obeyed. Liang wrote:

The theory of '*chang-san shih*' in the *Spring and Autumn Annals* is wide and deep. There are three ages of political development. The first age is that of many sovereigns. The second is that of one sovereign, the third is that of the people. The first age can be divided into two: (1) that of tribal chieftains and (2) that of feudal lords. The second age can be divided into two: (1) that of a monarch and (2) that of the collective rule of a monarch and the people. The third age can also be divided into two: (1) that of a president and (2) that of no president. The first age, that of many sovereigns, is that of chaos. The second age, that of one sovereign, is that of peace. The third age, that of the people, is that of 'great peace'. These three ages and their six divisions are related to the age of mankind on earth.¹⁵

This concept enabled Liang to believe that there is a close inter-relationship among a state's polity, a state's social structure, and the people's level of intelligence. This thought led Liang to advocate before 1898 the reform of the old-style examination system, the establishment of schools, and the promotion of education among the people. It also stimulated Liang in his later life to devote his abilities to educational and cultural work. This thought was also the basis for some of his conservative political theories.

Another of K'ang's works, the *Ta-tung Shu*¹⁶ influenced Liang greatly. The essence of *ta-tung* is the idea of tolerance towards other races.¹⁷ Therefore, Liang wanted "to do away with the distinction between the Han Chinese and the Manchus."¹⁸ Another important idea of K'ang in his books is the elimination of the difference between geographical regions. Thus, Liang emphasized throughout his life the concept that culture had no boundaries and that there was no distinction between Chinese and foreign cultures. *Ta-tung* emphasized the people's

rights. The government idealized in *ta-tung* is one that is elected by the people. Democracy was *ta-tung's* ultimate idea. Liang in following the ideas contained in the *ta-tung* advocated the rights of the people. These were radical ideas in China at the end of the nineteenth century. It can be observed that contradictions were appearing between Liang's later ideas and his early thought.

K'ang had great influence on Liang's early thought, but Liang in his later development moved away from K'ang's ideas. Even before 1898 Liang showed disagreement with his teacher.¹⁹ In 1895 he wrote:

Ch'i-ch'ao studied the forged classics and felt displeased about his teacher's arbitrary conclusions....His teacher [K'ang] liked to quote an appendix to the classics. Ch'i-ch'ao was not in full agreement with K'ang's religious and metaphysical views on Confucius. Ch'i-ch'ao believed that Confucianism had later split into two branches... led by Mencius and Hsün-tzu. Hsün-tzu preached *hsiao-kang* (peaceful era) and Mencius preached *ta-tung*. The teachers of the classics in the Han Dynasty... all came from the school of Hsün-tzu. All branches have undergone various changes in the last two thousand years but all changes took place within the school of Hsün-tzu. Confucianism had been declining since the extinction of the Mencian school.²⁰

Western Learning

Liang's first encounter with Western learning was in 1890. At the age of eighteen Liang acquired some knowledge of world geography by reading *Ying-huan chih-lüeh* compiled by Hsü Ch-yu in the 1840's.²¹ During Liang's study under K'ang, the latter taught him "the outline of Western learning,"²² but K'ang himself had a rather limited knowledge of it.²³ Because of this, Liang received most of his knowledge of Western thought through self-study.²⁴ At that time Liang did not know any foreign language. Thus, he had to depend on Chinese translations. Up until 1896, close to four hundred works of

Western authors had been translated into Chinese. But for Liang few were worth reading.

Most of the books translated by the Chinese official agency were concerned with military affairs. Those translated by the Western churches were concerned with medicine. Those by Kiangnan Arsenal dealt with technology.... Although the translations of natural sciences were not complete, we could find some. However, it was very difficult to find translations concerning Western politics, political structure, educational system and methods of agriculture.²⁵

Some of the books concerning Western political systems had too many defects. Some of them were translated from old editions which had already been abandoned by the Westerners. Other versions were not properly translated. Some lost their original sense.²⁶ Thus Liang obviously could not find those books that he was really interested in reading.²⁷

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's theories in the late 1890's were greatly influenced by the Yang-wu p'ai (Western-style experts). Liang's opinion on the protection and promotion of Chinese private enterprise, the revision of tariff policy, the recognition and application of international law, and the need to understand Western institution and to translate Western books, follow the same line as those of Ma Chien-chung who had studied in France.²⁸ Ma Chien-chung, Ma Liang and Wu Ch-ch'ing all thought that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was too young and immature at this time in Shanghai to enter into action. They advised him to study at least one European language before he could render his valuable service to reform. It was said that during his stay in Shanghai, Liang spent two hours every evening studying Latin under Ma Chien-chung. He also studied Greek philosophy under Ma Liang

and Ma Chien-chung. He read the manuscript of Yen Fu's translation of Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* before its publication.²⁹

In sum, the *Yang-wu p'ai* in Shanghai had a definite influence upon the second phase of the development of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's intellectual character, just as K'ang Yu-wei had his influence on the first phase. Liang recalled that after he had had contacts with a wide circle of people during his stay in Peking and Shanghai, he gradually became dissatisfied with the arbitrariness and mysticism of K'ang Yu-wei's ideology.³⁰ In 1896, Liang wrote to K'ang a letter in which Liang showed his dissatisfaction with the shallow knowledge of his teacher and suggested that the reformers should not take any action before cultivating their own true scholarship.

Whenever our comrades opened their mouths, they would advise others to preach reform. When a younger student had entered our academy for only a few months, they would ask him to expound the theories of his masters and preach them to others. How can one expound the theories of someone else before he has himself accomplished the learning? The result was that everyone merely echoed what had just been taught to him and pretended to be a scholar. Fifty or sixty per cent of our comrades seemed to fall into this trap.... I myself fell in the same trap last year when I was in Peking and almost stumbled into hell.... I don't know how we would be able to save the country without true scholarship.³¹

As a result of the cultivation of true scholarship, Liang gradually managed to comprehend the difference between Christianity and the rest of Western culture. The Chinese mind in the nineteenth century had been confused by this difference to such an extent that it retarded the process of "learning from the West."³² With this understanding, Liang became more dissatisfied with K'ang's efforts to make Confucianism a religion. In a letter to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in 1897, Yen-Fu pointed out

the futility of trying to create the Confucian religion. Yen argued that "even if the attempt was successful, the religion you succeeded in creating was no longer the one you had originally intended to project."³³ Liang agreed with this, saying that the canonization of an orthodox religion would infringe upon freedom of thought and deter the development of new scholarship.³⁴ In this we see how Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's thought deviated from that of his teacher, K'ang Yu-wei. This may help to explain why Liang's life in Japan after 1898 gave him a golden opportunity to cultivate his modern scholarship; while his teacher, K'ang who clung to his old formulations, had gradually become immured in a stubborn conservatism.

As mentioned above, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao did not have much taste for K'ang Yu-wei's Christianization of Confucius. He, however, found their Christian missionary societies were an effective means of encouraging a popular movement. In Christianity he found an inexhaustible energy and a powerful impetus to patriotic actions. It was in the Christian church that Liang first found the unbending devotion and the unflinching courage to struggle for a common cause. In a letter to his friend in 1897, Liang described the importance of public organizations.

The Westerners have organized societies for every political cause, every branch of study, and every trade or profession. It is easier for many people to use their wisdom to study a cause together. It is also easier for many people to band together to get to the realization of a plan. Therefore, they have societies of astronomy, societies of geology, societies of mathematics, societies of agriculture, societies of commerce, and societies of military affairs.... even societies for photographers and bath managers. The members of these societies include people from the upper class of empress, princes, and ministers, down to the lowest classes of the wage earners and the slaves. Therefore, each member of society has identified his cause with the nation and the nation also identifies her cause with society.³⁵

In order to save China, he thought that it was necessary for the literati to organize a *Pao-chiao kung-hui* (Public Society for the Protection of Confucianism) in which they would plan and work together for China's good. Its branch organization should be established wherever its members went so as to extend its influence among ever-widening sectors of the populace.³⁶ As a result, other reformers founded a number of societies throughout the country in the years 1895-1898.³⁷

Liang also wrote a series of articles on *Shuo-ch'un* (On Popular Movements) in 1897. He said in the preface to these articles:

Millions of people unite and thus make a state.
Billions of people unite and thus made a world. Those who are able to govern the state or the world have this ability because they can unite peoples. In governing the populace by an individualistic policy, the union is ruined. The ruin of our union is of advantage to the other unions. In this world, there are many different states because there are many different unions.³⁸

Liang then took up the solar system and the human body as illustrations to describe how a union functioned collectively or organically. From this collectivistic or organic theory, he went to depict the uniting forces as the underlying principle of natural selection. The world progresses, the stronger the uniting or organizing force comes to be. Those who fail to cultivate this force will, in the long run, be exterminated. This collectivistic or organic theory of the state is expressed frequently in Liang's essays of the 1890's. Here the value of the individual, so highly prized in the Western teachings, seemed to fail to find a place.³⁹

To sum up, Liang's knowledge of Western thought was quite limited. He had no understanding of Western democracy. However, before 1898, Liang obtained his knowledge of Western political and social systems

mainly from *Hsi-cheng tsung-shu* (A Collection of Works of Western Politics) which he edited in 1897. The collection included *Regulations of the German Parliament*, *A General Summary of Public Law in the Western European Countries* and *International Law*, *Political Principles of England and France*, Japan's 'New Policy.' He confessed that he "had not even heard of Rousseau's *Doctrine of the Social Contract*" at that time.⁴⁰ It is evident that there is a certain difference between the people's rights advocated by him in the early period and the rights of the people in Europe and America. His idea of people's rights before 1898 originated from the *Spring and Autumn Annals* and Mencian concept that people were the foundation of the state.⁴¹ He derived all of his ideas at this time from Chinese sources and almost nothing from Western origins. Western learning began to exert influence upon him after he fled to Japan in 1898.

III. LIANG AS AN EARLY REFORMER

The defeat of China in the war of 1894 with Japan, irritated the Chinese people more than any other defeat. They woke up to their danger and began to examine the cause of the defeat. Before the war of 1894, both China and Japan simultaneously began to imitate Western methods.⁴² After several decades of hard work China possessed more warships and weapons than did Japan.⁴³ China had also more manpower and resources than Japan. Why did China suffer the defeat? Many people began to suspect the effectiveness of the *Yang-wu yün-tung* (Westernization movement) under which old style reformers advised "the study of foreign technology in order to control foreigners."⁴⁴

A few intellectuals who grieved over the sorrows of the nation reacted more intensely. They felt that the biggest mistake of the past old-style reformers was that they missed the fundamentals of Western learning but picked up its incidentals. What the old-style reformers learned from the foreigners was only a superficial knowledge of the matter, they did not know the very spirit of Western technology. These intellectuals perceived that the richness and might of the Western powers did not result only from their warships, weapons and machines. The effectiveness of their political system and the advancement of their education were the most important factors. The intellectuals felt that Japan gained a victory over China because of Meiji reforms of the last three decades which had yielded good results in the reorganization of government, in the development of education and in social reforms. Therefore, many Chinese intellectuals suggested that to imitate Japan's reforms was the best way to strengthen and to save China. The discussion of political reform thus aroused the gentry-literati to a sense of duty. They advocated a more extensive and fundamental reform of the Chinese political, educational, and social system.⁴⁵

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was one of the patriotic intellectuals. He was concerned over China's defeat and saw "the danger of foreign aggression and the possibility of dismemberment of China."⁴⁶ He closely examined the causes of the defeat and thought about the ways to save the nation. Liang believed that the weakness of China resulted from the despotic monarchy that had lasted for several thousand years, from the decay of governmental institutions, as well as from ignorance of the Chinese people. He was convinced that the despotic form of

government under the Ch'ing Court must be reformed, that the Chinese masses must be educated, and that the democratic form of government should replace the present one. Therefore, he demanded that the Ch'ing Court undertake political and educational reforms in order to educate the people who would then become aware of the importance of their rights.

In the spring of 1895, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao began their campaign for reform by sending a petition to the Emperor Kuang'hsü. At that time, they were taking part in the metropolitan examinations in Peking. They heard that China would soon conclude an agreement with Japan in which China would cede Liaotung Peninsula and Taiwan, and pay an indemnity of two hundred million taels. In their petitions to the emperor, K'ang and Liang requested that the government refuse to conclude the agreement, that the government be removed to another city, and that it undertake reforms. K'ang and Liang considered the introduction of reforms as most important. But the officials concerned refused to submit the petitions to the emperor because of their radical tone.⁴⁷ K'ang's and Liang's reforms could not reach the emperor. However, they felt that there would be little hope of achieving their goal even if the reforms were received, because the emperor and the high-rank officials were too weak. Therefore, K'ang and Liang decided "to arouse public opinion and to stir up national feelings in order to preserve strength for future use."⁴⁸ To achieve this, they made public speeches, published articles and tried to work together with other intellectuals in order to introduce their ideas to the people.⁴⁹

During his stay in Peking (that is from about October, 1895

to February, 1896), Liang served as Chinese secretary to Dr. Timothy Richard, General Secretary of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge.⁵⁰ Liang never mentioned his experience as Richard's secretary, but without doubt the English missionary did exert an influence upon him. The two characters *chuan-chiao* (to preach the teachings of Confucianism) a term used specifically to translate the missionary preachings, were frequently employed by Liang when referring to his 'save-the-nation' activities.⁵¹ In a letter to K'ang Yu-wei in 1896, Liang even went so far as to advocate concentrating on the religious mission at the expense of saving the nation. He wrote:

Our mission is a missionary one, not a political one. It is for the salvation of the whole world and the entire human race, not for the salvation of one nation. The doom of one single nation has nothing to do with us.⁵²

Liang As A Publicist

In 1895, Liang together with other intellectuals established *Chiang hsueh hui* and published *Chung-wai kung pao* (The Chinese and Foreign Public Daily) in Peking. The main purpose of *Chiang-hsueh hui* was to introduce European and American learning into China.⁵³ Liang was responsible for the editing of the *Chung-wai hung pao*. It recorded important Chinese and foreign news and had a daily editorial written by Liang himself.⁵⁴ This was the first time that Liang's ideas reached the public. The writings of Liang and his reform friends were full of newly important terms such as electricity, heat, astronomic bodies, cells and blood-circulation. Even their poems were replete with scientific terms and religious quotations. Because the *Chiang hsueh hui* was banned and *Chung-wai kung pao* ceased to publish

after less than half a year, Liang's influence upon the reading public did not last.

However, in July of the following year, Liang became editor of the *Shih-wu pao* in Shanghai. He wrote long articles on politics, and engaged in a controversy with other scholars and with Western missionaries. In his article *Pien-fa t'ung-i* (A General Discussion of Reform), published in *Shih-wu pao* in 1896, Liang criticized those who only knew how to speak the *Yang King Pang* (Pidgin) English, or to emulate the foreigners' outward behavior, while actually knowing nothing about Western civilization.⁵⁵ He suggested that those who were interested in Western learning should pursue their studies under the care of Western scholars, not under compradors or foreign merchants.⁵⁶

In his *Pien-fa t'ung-i*, Liang also argued that China need not fear any foreign invasions if she could only renovate herself by reform:

Mencius said, "A country must have disgraced herself first before any other countries disgrace her." He also said, "I have never heard of any country with a territory of one thousand miles which would be frightened by others," and, "when a country is well governed, who ever would dare to insult her?"⁵⁷

In an article entitled *Lun chung-kuo chih chiang ch'iang* (China Will Become Strong), written in 1897, he maintained that although the Manchu mandarins remained stubborn and blind, the common people were already aware of the coming danger to their nation and that among the younger generation of Chinese there was no shortage of talent.⁵⁸ He emphasized that China would never be subjugated. On the contrary, China would become strong in the future. At the end of this article,

he urged that the Chinese officials, gentry and common people join in launching a great reform movement in order to revenge the insults to the nation.⁵⁹

At this time, the Western missionaries were ardently advocating that China must have an alliance with Britain and Japan against Russia, while Li Hung-chang tended to prefer an alliance with Russia against Britain and Japan. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao rejected both ideas because he strongly opposed the idea of placing China under an Allied protectorate. In an article *Lun Chia-shui* (On Raising the Tariff) published in *Shih-wu pao* in 1896, he criticized both Russia and Britain as unfriendly to China.

Now those who talked about foreign affairs either proposed an alliance with Russia against the British or preferred an alliance with the British against Russia. In the Sino-Japanese War, the British had stood by and refused to interfere while Russia spoke for justice and compelled Japan to return the Liaotung peninsula to us. This is why the first proposal was made. The British officials, merchants and missionaries in China, day after day, made their speeches, published their writings, and translated their articles in Western newspapers. They all said that there had never been on earth a country as benevolent and upright as Britain, no one so kind to China and so anxious to preserve her sovereignty. The Chinese listened to them. That is why the second proposal was made.⁶⁰

Those who proposed an alliance with the British or the Russians should consider the situation of India and Poland.⁶¹

Besides these controversial articles, Liang also published an important book during his stay in Shanghai. With his extensive reading of Western books, he was able to write *Hsi-hsüeh shu-mu piao* (Bibliography and Annotated Introductory Notes of Western Learning) in October, 1896. This book is a thorough examination of contemporary

Chinese scholarship on Western learning. In the preface to this publication, Liang pointed out particularly the superiority of Western theoretical and pure sciences over applied sciences, and emphasized the importance of studying Western institutions rather than practical technology.⁶²

Liang's *Hsi-hsueh shu-mu piao* served as a milestone in the development of modern scholarship; his article *Pien-fa t'ung-i* served likewise in the cause of modern patriotism. Both marked a step away from the old-style culturalism of his teacher K'ang Yu-wei.

Meanwhile, Liang submitted a letter to Ch'en Pao-chen, governor-general of Hunan, requesting him to adopt reforms in Hunan independently of the central government interference.⁶³ Thus Liang drew a sharp distinction between the cause of the nation and the cause of the Manchu dynasty.

Thus, we see that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in the 1890's held a somewhat critical opinion of Westerners, but he should not be labelled a cultural traditionalist or a conservative. In his writings, Liang sanctified the principle of change, progress and evolution. He had also a high opinion of Western civilization and Western scholars, although he thought that a Chinese should first be loyal to his own nation, and thus suspected the original motives of those foreigners who claimed to be loyal or friendly to China. Liang joined with other reformers to advocate economic reforms, such as railways, mining, trade, etc. Here we see in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao the first inklings of the modern patriotism which was emerging from the old-style culturalism.

Reform of the Examination System

In the late 1890's, Liang became renowned for his ideas of reform. In intellectual circles, he was as famous as his teacher K'ang Yu-wei.⁶⁴ At this time Liang's main interest was in reforming the old-style examination system and to establish a new school system.⁶⁵ He believed that the examination system itself was not a bad system, but that this system, which had carried on for more than one thousand years without change, was in decay already during the Mīng Dynasty.⁶⁶ Under the Ch'ing Dynasty, this system was breaking up.⁶⁷ Only those who were good at the 'eight-legged essay' and 'eight-rhyme poetry'⁶⁸ could be successful.

In order to distinguish oneself under the old-style examination system, the scholars were preoccupied day and night with writing essays and poetry and did not pay attention to problems facing the nation.⁶⁹

Liang believed that the old-style examinations resulted in the crippling of one's intelligence and in narrow-mindedness. In preparing for the examinations, the scholars were losing the power to distinguish right from wrong.⁷⁰ They wasted months or years in studying useless things and finally ended up in becoming worthless men.⁷¹ Therefore, Liang had come to the conclusion that "the eight-legged essay examination was the origin of the backwardness of the Chinese civilization."⁷² Liang warned the Ch'ing Court against continuing the examination system.⁷³ He believed that the Chinese people could not defend the nation from foreign aggression because they were infatuated with the old-style examination system. This system had attracted the attention of all talents in China.⁷⁴ It was

very difficult to find anyone capable to fill positions in the civil services, the diplomatic corps, the military, finance, even in agriculture, industry, commerce or medicine. Liang was deeply disturbed by the shortage of qualified people in these fields.

If some one would propose a new reform, everyone would discuss it and would regard it as perfect. But it could not be carried out because no one would be capable of doing so. Even if it could be carried out, there would be criticism. The measures which did bring about some good results were usually carried out with the assistance of foreigners.⁷⁵

Liang was convinced that this examination system must be changed. The most important measure was the establishment of new schools. Liang had two particular themes. One was to "imitate the three ancient dynasties---Hsia, Shang and Chou; the other one to accept the Western school system."⁷⁶ He believed that among all the systems in Chinese history, the one in existence under the ancient three dynasties was the one most complete.⁷⁷ Each family had a family school. Each village of five hundred families had *hsiang* (a county school). For a district of 12,000 families there was a *hsü* (a district school). In the capital there was a *hsüeh* (a national school). Furthermore, there were schools for girls, normal schools, schools of agriculture, engineering, commerce and military training.⁷⁸ This system was similar to the Western school system. Liang's proposal for educational reform was outlined in his article, *Hsüeh-shiao tsung-lun* (A General Summary of School Systems), Liang listed a general outline in eighteen points

of the system which he regarded as being in accord with the age. There was to be elementary and secondary education, higher education, teachers training, vocational training, education of women, social education (including library, museum, newspapers, translation and publication), religious education and special education including reformatory education for criminals.⁷⁹

In his outline of the new educational system, Liang gave particular attention to the education of children. He felt that the education obtained in childhood was the foundation of one's learning and career as well as the foundation of a nation.⁸⁰ But, at that time, children were only requested to recite the 'Four Books' and 'Five Classics' in the private family school. This kind of education only destroyed the creativity in children, and was not suitable to the development of innate abilities of the child. Therefore, Liang advocated the spread of *hsiao-hsüeh* (primary schools) everywhere in the nation.⁸¹ The textbook for *hsiao-hsüeh* should be re-written and should include materials from all over the world. The textbooks were to be of two categories: (1) one for recognizing Chinese characters; (2) the other for the development of the child's intelligence. The first should include books on characters, on grammar, on folklore. The second should contain a dictionary and bibliographical guides.⁸²

Liang considered the training of teachers for *hsiao-hsüeh* as most important.⁸³ In Liang's time there were many teachers in the private family schools. But eighty or ninety percent of them did not study all the six ancient arts as set out by Confucius (propriety, music, archery, charioteering, writing, and mathematics) and the Four Books.

"They did not even know that there were 'five continents and four oceans' in the world. How could a teacher with such qualifications teach others?"⁸⁴ Therefore, Liang advocated the establishment of normal schools. He believed that it was necessary to establish the normal schools at the same time when *hsiao-hsüeh* would be established and even before the establishment of the *ta-hsüeh* (college or university). In the normal schools, the future teachers would be taught "(1) to study the six classics; (2) to do research in history of the successive dynasties; (3) to be familiar with the origin of Chinese characters; (4) to have a general knowledge of the existing conditions in all countries; (5) to study the natural science; (6) to study foreign languages."⁸⁵

Liang believed that the success or failure of education of children was not only closely related to qualifications of teachers but to the home environment as well. Liang wrote:

The Westerners have close to a hundred courses included in the elementary school curriculum. Among these, about seventy percent should be taught at home. A child is closer to his mother than to his father. Therefore, his character and habits are shaped by his mother. Thus, if the teachings of one's mother are good, the child would become a good citizen. Otherwise, he would be a burden to society.⁸⁶

Education for women was the basis of the teaching of one's mother.

Liang therefore also advocated the establishment of girls schools.

Liang's interest in education was such that he paid not only particular attention to the education of children, to normal schools, to the education of women, but also advocated any kind of education which would increase people's general level of knowledge.⁸⁷ Besides encouraging the translation of Western books, he also participated in the organization of various societies. Among these one was the

anti-foot-binding society. Liang encountered opposition to his activities, some of it in the form of physical threats.⁸⁸

From the above account, it seems that the center of Liang's concrete advocacies and plans was to educate a new kind of government official equipped with new knowledge and new ideas. The new schools would be established to take the place of the old examination system and to develop the talents of the students in order to save the nation. The object of all Liang's undertakings was to reach the gentry-scholar class. The gentry-scholar's aim was to enter an official career after having achieved his reputation in the intellectual circles. The reason for Liang's emphasis on the equal importance of Chinese and Western learning was his search for the best way of ruling the nation. Liang wrote in the introduction to his *Hsi-cheng tzung-shu* that "there is no difference in ruling [a nation] either in China or in the West."⁸⁹ One must consider which way is the best, then select the best one and use it skillfully.

However, Liang was not unaware of the importance of education for the common people. The reason for narrowing his objective to the gentry-scholar class, was to make a compromise with the existing situation. Otherwise, the work of the popular education of the people, from his point of view, could not be carried out. Furthermore, the gentry-scholar class in China had great influence over the people. Liang seemed to believe that if the literati would obtain new knowledge and new ideas, then they could educate the common people. Liang's conception of the state was that the stage was an accumulation of people. The strength of a nation depended on its intelligence.⁹⁰ "In starting

the self-strengthening movement, the first and foremost way is to educate the people.⁹¹

In order to devote his energy to work in the fields of education and publication, Liang declined offers of work both at home and abroad. In the autumn of 1896, Wu Chih-yung was appointed minister to the United States. Wu invited Liang to go with him and offered Liang the position of second secretary of the legation.⁹² Liang did not go to the United States with Wu because he felt that he was needed in China.⁹³ In the spring of 1897, Liang declined an offer of a position in the Ministry of Railways. Chang Chih-tung, Governor of Hunan and Kuangtung invited Liang to join his general staff, this too Liang declined.⁹⁴ In the summer of that year, Wu Hsiao-tsun, district magistrate of *Ch'ien-ta'ng Hsien* persuaded Liang to study foreign languages at Hsi-hu (West Lake) and was willing unconditionally to cover the expenses for three years.⁹⁵ Although realizing the importance of knowledge of foreign languages,⁹⁶ Liang declined Wu's offer.⁹⁷ In October of 1897, Ch'en Pao-chen, governor-general of Hunan invited Liang to teach at *Shih-wu hsueh-tang* (Academy of Current Affairs) in Hunan. Liang was happy to accept the position.⁹⁸ It was for him an opportunity to enter upon a teaching and journalistic career. Liang hoped that his position would make possible the work towards the abolition of the old examination system and the establishment of new schools.

III. LIANG'S CONCEPT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS

In addition to the spread of education, Liang had another purpose.

This was to preach the doctrine of 'save-the-world.' In 1896 Liang often mentioned *Chuan-chiao* (to preach the teachings of Confucius) and 'save-the nation'. He wrote to his teacher K'ang Yu-wei: "We should reach our goal by teaching.... First we have to devote all our time to prepare the students. Having obtained good results, we would proceed to promulgate our doctrine. This would be one way to save-the-nation."⁹⁹ Liang accepted the teaching appointment at *Shih-wu hsüah-tang* in Hunan because of the prevailing atmosphere of reform in that province.¹⁰⁰

Both Liang and K'ang wanted to preach Confucianism, but their approaches were different. K'ang wanted to preach Confucius' meaning of *hsiao-kang* (peaceful age). K'ang felt that his time "was in the *ch'u-luan* (chaos) state. Therefore, the next age would be *hsiao-kang* but not *ta-tung* (great harmony age)."¹⁰¹ Liang, however, wanted to preach Confucius' meaning of *ta-tung*.¹⁰² The meaning of *ta-tung* was different from that of *hsiao-kang*. Liang believed that "in the *hsiao-kang* age, to venerate sovereignty of the king would be the principle."¹⁰³ In this age, from Liang's point of view, "the whole world would belong to the royal family. The King would have the exclusive rights to make rules to guide the relationship between the monarch and the ministers, father and son, husband and wife."¹⁰³ Therefore, "*hsiao-kang* would be the age of despotism." However, "in the age of *ta-tung*, to venerate people's rights would be the principle."¹⁰³ In this era,

The whole world would belong to the people. The officials would be elected by the people on the basis of their knowledge and ability. One would not only respect one's own parents but also respect the parents of others. One would not only love one's own children but also love the

children of others. The elders would have a place to stay. Everyone would have a job. The children would receive proper education.¹⁰³

Therefore, *ta-tung* would be an age of equality. Liang concluded that "Confucianism was the principle of equalitarianism and not of despotism."¹⁰³ Liang determined to preach the meaning of *ta-tung*. But, under the despotic form of government, he realized that he had to be very cautious in doing so. He first tried to expose the defects of the despotic monarchy. He pointed out that the Chinese emperors of the successive dynasties except Yao, Shun and Yu¹⁰⁴, treated the nation as their own private property.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, "the laws and regulations were enacted to protect the royal families and not to protect the people."¹⁰⁵ Ways and means were taken to enhance the sovereignty of the monarch and to prevent the rebellion of the people. The burning of the classics by Ch'in Shih Huang, the creation of a list of arts for the Chinese people to study by Ming Tai-chu and the re-establishment of the old-style examination system by the Ch'ing Court, had some common purpose.¹⁰⁶ These emperors used rank and title as bait to turn the People's attention away from practical politics in order to safeguard the royal power and to limit people's rights.¹⁰⁷ Liang believed that since the three ancient dynasties (Hsia, Shang and Chou) the royal power had been expanding and people's rights had been declining. From his point of view, this was the origin of China's weakness.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, the power and prosperity of the Western great powers resulted from the extention of their people's rights.¹⁰⁹ In order to convince the people to believe that people's rights must be promoted, Liang repeatedly quoted K'ang Yu-wei's

philosophy of history-- the principle contained in the *san-shih* (three ages) in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Liang made use of Confucianism to explain that the transition from monarchy to democracy was natural.¹¹⁰ China had been in the *sheng-ping* (peace) age, under one sovereign, for several thousand years. Liang believed that from now on, China would be in the *ta-tung* (great peace) age which would be the age of democracy. In order to arouse his countrymen's interests in people's rights, Liang emphasized that the expansion of people's rights was one way to save-the-nation.¹¹¹ "The strength or weakness of a nation can be traced to democracy."¹¹² He repeatedly interpreted the words of Confucius and Mencius with which the Chinese were familiar. Liang wrote: "The teachings of *Spring and Autumn Annals* and *ta-tung* all discussed people's rights because they were compilations of the essence of the Six Classics concerning people's rights."¹¹³ Again, he wrote:

Mencius said that people had priority over state and society; that the matters concerning people should not be ignored. The so-called *jen-cheng* (a good administration), *wang-cheng* (the perfect way of ancient rulers)...discussed in the whole book of Mencius all revered the people. The present form of government of the Western powers is very close to Mencius' theory.¹¹⁴

Liang believed that Mencius' theory 'for the people' was Confucius' theory of *ta-tung* and the democratic form of government in the Western nations was partly a practical application of Confucius' and Mencius' theories of *ta-tung*.¹¹⁵ From Liang's point of view, Confucius and Mencius were the earliest theorists of the principle of democracy. They were the saints who venerated people's rights.

K'ang Yu-wei declared that Confucius utilized the lessons of

antiquity in the work of reform. Liang praised Confucius and Mencius in the same way. However, K'ang and Liang both tried to make use of Confucianism in formulating their own ideas. Liang accepted that *ta-tung* included *min-pen* (the people are the foundation of the state)¹¹⁶ but in addition he emphasized *min-shiang* (for the people). Not included in Liang's ideology were the Western democratic idea of *min-yu* (of the people) or *min-chih* (by the people). Liang consistently interpreted *min-shiang* in the context of the old Chinese thought. He did so because of his limited knowledge of the Western democratic theories.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Liang seemed to be making a compromise with the existing situation. It was not easy to promote people's rights under the despotic form of government. Therefore, Liang had "to make use of the ideas of *Kung-yang* and Mencius to spread the political theory of people's rights."¹¹⁸ The people would then accept his ideas by paying respect to the 'national heritage.' Thus, it would be difficult for the Ch'ing Court to blame Liang for preaching 'foreign ideas.'

Liang thought that the establishment of parliament was the practical means for the realization of democracy. He wrote *Ku-i-yuan kao* (Examination of the Ancient Parliamentary System) in 1896. In this article he explained that the Chinese ancient political system contained the spirit of the parliamentary system although without its name.¹¹⁹ He praised highly the European and American parliamentary system. He wrote:

If the prerogatives of the monarch would be combined with people's rights, then the communication between the monarch and people would be much easier. If the power of the legislation would be separated from that of the executive, then all things would be easy to be done. Both of these would strengthen the nation.¹²⁰

However, Liang did not advocate the immediate establishment of parliament in China. He thought that the pressing need in China was to establish schools. "Parliament is the foundation for the strengthening of the nation. School is the basis of parliament."¹²¹ James Bryce thought that education was the foundation of democracy.¹²² T.V. Smith emphasized that democracy was a way of life.¹²³ How could China under despotic rule for three thousand years be converted suddenly into a democratic state. Although Liang's knowledge of Western democratic theories was rather shallow, his realization that the education of people was the first priority indicated that he was a man of foresight. Therefore, Liang advocated the use of the power of the monarch for the extension of people's rights.¹²⁴ His intention was to use the power of the monarch to stabilize society, to establish a sound educational system and to introduce reforms. He felt that the Chinese people should never resort to revolution if there was any other alternative.¹²⁵

Ke-ming (Revolution)

However, after assuming the teaching position in October, 1897 in *Shih-wu hsüeh-tang*, Liang became more of a radical. This was made possible because of lack of progress in K'ang Yu-wei's movement in Peking for reform and modernization. Thus, Liang thought that there was no hope for peaceful reform.¹²⁶ Furthermore, Germany's occupation of Kieu-chou-wan,¹²⁷ and the influence of T'an Ssu-tung and T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang's radical ideas¹²⁸ helped to alter Liang's ideology. In his book *Ch'ing-tai hsüeh-shu kai-lun* (Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Dynasty) written in 1910, Liang recalled his pronouncements and activities at *Shi-wu hsüeh tang*. He wrote: "Ch'i-ch'ao taught four hours

everyday.... All that he discussed was the theory of people's rights popular at that time. He also discussed Ch'ing history and always pointed out the defects of the Manchu government. He frequently advocated *ke-ming* (revolution)."¹²⁹ In the introduction to his own *Shih-wu hsüeh-tang ta-chi ts'an chüan hsü* (The Introduction to the Remains of Notes at *Shih-Wu Hsueh Tang*), he wrote: "at that time we were infatuated with the theory of *ke-ming*. We discussed it day and night, and often mentioned it in our notes and comments.... This was an important factor which caused the 1898 Coup d'état."¹³⁰ Liang's comments on the notes of his students were proof of what he said. "Among all emperors of the last twenty-four dynasties, no one had the qualifications of the ideal monarch as defined by Confucius. There were some dictators among them. Most of them were robbers of the people."¹³¹ Although "the costume is a small thing, it is very close to one's body. Therefore, those who advocate reform usually change the style of the clothing. If the style of the costume can be changed, why can not other things [such as the dynasty] be changed?"¹³¹ And again, "To rule the country by virtue is very important. Only the one who is like Washington is a ruler of virtue."¹³¹

In the book *Yang-chou Shih Erh Chi* (Ten Days in Yangchou) is recorded the ruthless rule of the Manchus who after they invaded China slaughtered the inhabitants of the captured cities. This book aroused the Han Chinese's anti-Manchu emotions. The Manchus also forced the Han Chinese to change their style of dress. Liang emphasized here that "reform must be preceded by the change in the style of dress"¹³¹ and that "everything could be changed if the costume could be changed."¹³¹ Was there in his writings the idea that the overthrow

of the Manchu Empire was the condition for reform and modernization?

However, Liang at that time still thought that *ke-ming* was "the most dangerous method and the most inferior means." Furthermore, he stayed at *Shih-wu hsüeh-tang* for only three months.¹³² When K'ang Yu-wei was entrusted by Emperor Kuang-hsü to introduce certain reforms, Liang left *Shih-wu hsüeh-tang* and went to Peking to assist K'ang. For Liang, this was an opportunity to make use of the power of the emperor to extend people's rights.

Liang became an ardent advocate of the *min-chuan* (people's rights) and parliamentary government in 1897. This was his response to the racial discrimination between the Manchu and the Chinese which had so far been delicately camouflaged by a claim for the cultural mission of the ruling class. But Westerners coming to China were aware of the racial problems involved and tried to take up the issue. Now, as gentry dissatisfaction with the government increased, the younger generation of Chinese again grew conscious of this racial discrimination. In his article *Lun pien-fu pi-chih ping-man-han-chih-chiai shih* (Reform Should Begin With The Elimination of the Distinction Between the Manchus and the Han Chinese) written in 1897, Liang depicted in full range the evil practice of racial discrimination and advocated equal treatment of the two races.¹³³

Once this racial discrimination was recognized, the sacred cultural mission of the Manchu became suspect, and Western ideas of democracy and constitutional government gradually came into vogue among the reformers. In an essay written after the lease of Kieu-chou-wan to Germany in November 1897, Liang argued that in order to save China the promotion of the people's rights or at least the

gentry's rights was necessary. The people should take the initiative in saving the nation and should map out a course independent of government control. They should join together in societies and carry on the struggle for their rights after the Manchu dynasty had perished or been dismembered.¹³⁴

IV. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HAN CHINESE AND THE MANCHUS

As mentioned above, the purpose of Liang in his teaching and journalistic work was to preach Confucius' teachings of *ta-tung*. In addition to advocating people's rights, the teachings of *ta-tung* also contained the idea of harmony among various ethnic groups. In order to erase the distinction between the Manchus and the Han Chinese, Liang took two different approaches to the problem. He first warned the Manchus not to suppress the Han Chinese, then, persuaded the Han Chinese not to look on at the Manchus with enmity. Liang believed that the distinction between the Manchus and the Chinese was created by Manchus.¹³⁵ He warned the Manchus that their excessive oppression of the Han Chinese would lead to the latter's rebellion, even *ke-ming*.¹³⁶ *Ke-ming* would lead to the defeat of the Manchus because the Han Chinese were superior in talent to the Manchus.¹³⁷ He wished that the Manchus would carry out an anti-discrimination policy towards the ethnic groups.¹³⁸ He pointed out that the co-operation between the Han Chinese and the Manchus would stabilize the Chinese internal situation, would help to maintain the rule of the Manchus.¹³⁹ He wrote:

In the era of Spring and Autumn Annals, Ch'in, Chu, Wu, Yüeh were called *I Ti*... Ch'in was the present Shensi; Chu Hunan;

Wu Kiang-nan; Yueh Chekiang...the people in those areas were different from the people in China proper at that time. They did not communicate with each other. Their situation at that time was not much different from the present situation of the Han Chinese and the Manchus. But since the Han Dynasty, the quality of the Chinese had gradually been improving because of the combination of various ethnic groups.⁴⁰

Liang believed that the world he lived in was a world of intense racial competition. The Chinese who wished to sustain their existence on earth and to compete with the English, the French, the Germans and the Russians had to improve their qualities as a people. He further predicted that the world in the twentieth century would be a world of most intensive competition among races.¹⁴¹ Therefore, Liang wished that all distinction among the yellow ethnic groups should be eliminated and that these groups should co-operate in order to compete with the white races.¹⁴² Liang tried to divert the hostility of the Manchus from the Han Chinese to the white races.

Because of the invasion of the great powers and the danger of dismemberment of China by them, Liang felt that the internal unity was the only way to resist the foreign aggression; that only the elimination of differences between the Manchus and the Han Chinese and the co-operation between the two ethnic groups in the movement for reform could save China from ruin. He repeatedly told the Manchus that if China could be saved, the Chinese would preserve their existence and the Manchus would maintain their rule in China.¹⁴³ Liang warned that when the Manchus and the Han Chinese would fight each other, the foreign powers could achieve their aims.¹⁴⁴

Liang suggested four methods to remove the differences between the Manchus and the Han Chinese:

First, the Manchus should be settled in China proper:

According to the customs, the Chinese usually declared that they belonged to certain *Fu* (district) or certain *Hsien* (county) and the Manchus to certain *Chi* (banner). The *Chi* is a symbol of military registration. Before the establishment of the Ch'ing Dynasy, the Manchus were all soldiers. They were nomads. They were divided into several *Chis*. However, the situation changed since the establishment of the Manchu Empire in China proper. The former nomads have settled down. Many of them have not become soldiers. Therefore, they did not need to keep the *Chi* in order to distinguish themselves from the Chinese masses. The Manchus should be registered in their place of settlement as their native place, just as the Han Chinese have done. Then the boundaries separating the ethnic groups would automatically disappear.¹⁴⁵

Secondly, the Manchus should intermarry with the Han Chinese.

During the first year of *Hsun Chih* (1644), Prince Regent *Jui* issued an order to encourage the inter-racial marriage between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. It was a policy of foresight....If this policy could be carried out as it was hoped, then all peoples would become the members of one family after three hundred years. There would not be any so-called Manchus and the so-called Hans. But distinction between them resulted in the abandonment of this policy. The boundary between these two ethnic groups was deeply rooted. Inter-racial marriage is the one way to break it.¹⁴⁵

Thirdly, the appointment of government officials should be reorganized.

During the establishment of the Ch'ing Court, an order was issued to divide positions in all governmental institutions equally between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. As a result, the number of government officials under the rule of the Ch'ing Court was greater than under the former dynasties. The Han Chinese population is several hundred times the population of the Manchus. Yet, they shared an equal number of positions with the Manchus. The Han Chinese felt that they were wronged.... This defect should be cured by selecting a superior in ability to fill the position disregarding the distinction between the Manchus and the Han Chinese.¹⁴⁵

Fourthly, the Manchus should be free to select their own profession.

According to the law of the Ch'ing Court, all the Manchus had to register for military service. They were provided with rations and not allowed to enter any other career. They wanted to keep a strong military force in order to maintain order in the country. However, they became too

lazy to fight after a long period of peace. They were forbidden by order to be scholars, farmers, craftsmen or businessmen.... Several million of the Manchus who were dependent on the government rations became a speical class. In order to treat the Manchus and the Han Chinese equally, the Ch'ing Court should dis-continue their rations and allow the Manchus to enter any kind of profession.¹⁴⁵

Liang made use of the great teachings of *San-shih* (three ages) as expressed in the *Spring and Autumn Annals* to explain that China was entering the age of *ta-tung* in which there should be no distinction between the various ethnic groups.¹⁴⁶ When certain Han Chinese made use of the *Spring and Autumn Annals* as proof to extend the theory of 'driving out the *I* (barbarians)', Liang argued that they did not understand either the *Spring and Autumn Annals* or the times they lived in. How could they, Liang asked, discuss the rule of *tai-ping shih* on the basis of the teachings of *Sheng-ping sheh*?¹⁴⁷ The Chinese should not only treat *I Ti* on an equal basis but also recognize the cultural heritage of the *I Ti*.¹⁴⁸

Liang was afraid that some people would disagree with him in thinking that China had entered the *tai-ping* age and that they would insist on 'driving out *I Ti*' and rejecting the Manchus on the basis that China was really in the *Sheng-ping* age. Therefore, Liang made use of interpretations of the *sheng-ping* age to explain the reason why the Manchus should be accepted. He believed that the theory of distinction between *I Ti* and the Chinese in the *Spring and Autumn Annals* emphasized only aspects of their differences in political affairs and customs and not racial and geographical differences.¹⁴⁹ Liang pointed out that the so-called 'driving out *I Ti*' mentioned in the Chinese classics really meant to drive out the races who had

barbaric habits or practices. Even the Chinese who had such habits should be treated as *I Ti*. And the *I Ti* that had accepted civilized behaviour should be treated as gentlemen.¹⁵⁰

What were these barbaric habits or practices. Liang believed they were those which conflicted with the teachings of *ta-tung*. He wrote:

According to the theory of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, the world would be regarded as public property. All government officials would be elected by the people. They would trust each other and treat each other kindly. All attacks and invasions would be forbidden. The officials would work hard for the welfare of the people and love the people. They would encourage commerce and pay attention to industry and labor. All land would be opened up.... Fields would be tilled. Schools would be established. Human relations would be regulated. Roads would be built. The vagrants would be few. The cripples would be supported by the government. Thievery and banditry would disappear. The country that could carry out these teachings of *ta-tung* would be called *Chung kuo*. Otherwise it would be called *I Ti*.¹⁵¹

Therefore, Liang requested the Ch'ing Court to reform the old style examination system and to establish new schools. Liang asked for political reforms to extend people's rights, to select officials according to their ability. Whether the Manchus or the Chinese would be the rulers was not important.¹⁵²

At that time, some Chinese advocated the ideas of separation of the Manchus and the Han Chinese, as well as the theory of revolution. Liang immediately pointed out the danger of their theories. He argued that "if revolution would occur in China, the result of it would not be as satisfactory as that of the United States, but would be more devastating than the French Revolution."¹⁵³ Liang wrote: "As to the separation of the Manchus and the Chinese... those people who advocated this idea do not comprehend the fundamental principles

of human behavior.... As the teachings of *ta-tung* indicate, things are moving towards unity and not towards separation."¹⁵⁴

In his articles *Lun pien-fu pi-chih ping-man-han-chih-chiai shih* (Reform Should Begin With the Elimination of the Distinction Between the Manchus and the Han Chinese), written in 1896, *Chun-chiu chung-kuo i-ti pien hsu* (Introduction to the Distinction Between China and *I Ti* in the Spring and Autumn Annals) and *Fu-yu-jen lun pao-chiao shu* (Reply to Friend on the Subject of Protection of Confucianism) both written in 1897, Liang preached the teachings of *ta-tung* calling for the cooperation of the Manchus and the Han Chinese to resist foreign encroachment and to work together to save China.

However, according to Ti Chu-chin's record *Jen-kung hsien-sheng shih-lioh* (The Activities of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao) Liang had discussed *tsung-chu-ke-ming* (racial revolution).¹⁵⁵ Liang later wrote that at *Shih-wu hsueh-tang* he taught his students the problem of extension of people's rights and "the distinction between the Chinese and the Manchus."¹⁵⁶ He also made comments on such anti-Manchu books as *Yang-chou shih-erh chi* and distributed them secretly in order to spread the ideas of *ke-ming*.¹⁵⁷ His views were rather radical at that time.¹⁵⁸ But they did not last very long. His stay at *Shih-wu hsueh-tang* was short. He left Shanghai for Hunan in October 1897 and started teaching there in November of the same year. He took ill in January and left for Shanghai. In February he went to Peking to assist Emperor Kuang-hsü in the work of reform.

To sum up, Liang's ideas during the first period, from 1895 when he entered on his journalistic career to August, 1898 when he

fled to Japan after the coup d'état, except the three months period of his stay in Hunan, were moderate. His aim during this period of his life was to save China through the work of reform and modernization. Liang believed that in order to save China it was necessary to educate the people, to extend the people's rights and to treat the Manchus and the Han Chinese without distinction.

CHAPTER III

LIANG'S POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1898-1903

I. CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

Before 1898, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao devoted much of his time to the task of saving China by means of publishing newspapers and delivering public addresses. His main idea was to educate the masses and to advocate people's rights. After the *coup d'état* of 1898, Liang fled to Japan. There he founded the *Ch'ing-i pao* (Pure Criticism Journal)¹ with the purpose of further discussing the ways and means of saving the nation. He pointed out the unique features of this newspaper when he wrote:

The *Ch'ing-i pao* has several purposes: (1) to advocate people's rights; (2) to formulate a philosophy; (3) to examine the situation of the country; (4) to perceive the sense of national humiliation.... In a word, to broaden people's intelligence and to strengthen public morals.²

As to the advocacy of people's rights, he emphasized particularly:

Holding to this principle throughout as the only aim. Although we have discussed all kinds of means and have tried to find various ways, a hundred changes will not alter the original course. The seas may dry up and rocks may decay, but our comrades should work uninterruptedly until these principles will spread among our people.³

He was confident that people's rights were the basis for making the nation strong.⁴

What is a state? The state is a collective body of people. What is polity? National affairs should be administered by the people themselves. Why should the people love their country? Because they should love themselves. Thus, if the people's rights are extended, the national sovereignty will be established. If the people's rights are to be extinguished, the national sovereignty will perish.⁵

In the period from the *coup d'état* of 1898 to the insurrection led by T'ang T'sai-ch'ang in July 1900, Liang continued to work for reform.⁶

Because he had fled from China with a price on his head,⁷ one might expect his ideas to become more radical and for him perhaps to join forces with those Chinese revolutionaries in Japan who sought the overthrow of the Manchu regime.⁸

However, although he and the revolutionaries shared a common distaste for the Empress Dowager, Liang did not agree that the Kuang-hsü Emperor was equally dispensable. So strong was his conviction that a constitutional monarchy was the proper form of government for China,⁹ and so great was his respect for the imprisoned Kuang-hsü, that he deemed restoration, rather than revolution, to be the correct approach.¹⁰

For this reason, Liang, soon after he had settled in Japan, began to write *Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi* (Record of the Coup d'état of 1898) and *Kua-fen wei-yen* (On the Danger of Dismemberment) as well as other articles in which he denounced Tz'u-hsi and praised Kuang-hsü. He hoped to arouse the righteous indignation and sympathy of the masses which in turn would force Tz'u-hsi to transfer the authority to Kuang-hsü. Liang also established many *pao-huang hui* overseas and led the 'aid-the-emperor with-military-force' movement.¹¹ The revolt of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang in 1900 was one of the examples of his action.¹² It failed because the plot was discovered by the Manchu Government.¹³

Why did Liang have such faith in constitutional monarchy? Because he was convinced that it was fundamentally better than constitutional republicanism and was adaptable to China's national characteristics and to the conditions prevailing in the country.

Liang pointed out in his article *Li-hsien-fa i* (on the introduction of a Constitution) written in 1900, that constitutional monarchy was the best political system and had advantages that other political systems had not. He divided the political systems in the world into three categories:

(1) despotism; (2) constitutional monarchy; (3) constitutional republicanism.¹⁴

He pointed out the defects of the despotic system of government:

Under despotic monarchy, the imperial court looks down upon the people as bits of straw, and guards itself against people as against bandits and thieves. Also, the people's attitude toward the imperial court is similar to the prisoner's attitude toward the goaler. The people hate it as their enemy. Thus, under this system, the people suffer in great distress, and the monarch and his ministers live in great danger.¹⁵

Moreover, under despotic monarchy, the struggle for power among the members of the royal family, the cruelty and tyranny among the generals and ministers of state and the rebellion of the people often lead to chaos.¹⁶ However, constitutional monarchy had no such worries. Under this system, the succession to the throne, the advancement and retirement of ministers, and the enforcement of all orders proceed according to the law.¹⁷

The monarch has his rights, but these are limited. The ministers have their rights, but these too are limited.¹⁸ The people have their rights, but they are also limited.... All these rights of the monarch, the people and the ministers are clearly regulated by the constitution so that they do not encroach upon each other or conflict with each other. Thus, constitutional government is the best form of government which prevents disorder.¹⁹

Liang criticized constitutional republicanism: "The scheme of administrative activities under the republican form of government changes too often. The fiery presidential election campaign is an indirect obstruction to national welfare."²⁰

In a poorly educated country, the situation would be worse. Assassinations and riots frequently result from presidential election campaigns. Under a constitutional monarchy, the political situation remains stable because the monarch upholds the executive authority and sovereignty, and the people are not being disturbed by the shift of political power.

His words which praised constitutional monarchy can be found in many articles. In examining the general scope of his ideas on this subject, it is evident that he believed that despotism could be avoided by the establishment of a constitutional government and the struggle for political power among the extremists could be avoided by maintaining a figurehead, the monarch.

In the last several thousand years, China had been ruled by a monarch. The people were used to being governed. They had only the concept of loyalty to the throne and had no idea of democracy. Liang thought that if China should suddenly "destroy the imperial family and establish a republic,"²¹ the result would cause confusion. For this reason and on account of the traditional custom and habit, it was better to support the monarch, to act in accordance with the trend of the time, to draw up a constitution in order to establish a constitutional monarchy. Moreover, the present Emperor Kuang-hsü was a man of virtue and goodness who could promote the people's rights.²² Thus it was the best time to establish a constitutional monarchy.

Now, we have in the country a great emperor who loves the people as his sons and is determined to govern this nation. There are also many friendly civilized countries abroad that can be our teachers and models. Thus, is it not the best time to establish a perfect constitution?²³

Liang examined thoroughly Chinese history. He witnessed the mushrooming of constitutional government everywhere in the world. Moreover, he was profoundly convinced of Emperor Kuang-hsü's sincerity in furthering people's rights. All these arguments were proof to him that his advocacy of a constitutional monarchy was right.

However, Liang also realized that a constitutional government could not be established in a short period of time. "This type of government can be carried into effect only if the people are well educated."²⁴

Because of the illiteracy of the masses, he objected to the immediate introduction of this system of government. He proposed to introduce the constitution gradually. He mentioned four steps in the introduction of a constitution. These were: (1) to dispatch officers to study constitutional governments abroad; (2) to draw up and to study the draft of the proposed constitution; (3) to publish the draft in order to let the citizens discuss and debate it openly; (4) to set a limit of twenty years as a period of preparation before the promulgation of the constitution.²⁵ These four points were based on the method adopted by the Japanese Emperor Meiji in the introduction of a constitutional government in Japan.²⁶ Liang originally wished that Emperor Kuang-hsü, after being restored to the throne, would follow the example of Emperor Meiji.

But in advocating constitutional monarchy, was Liang contradicting his views on 'people's rights?' He perceived that 'democracy' was contrary to 'absolutism' but 'people's rights' did not contradict the idea of the 'monarch's authority.' In order to explain this point, he drew examples from the political life of England:

The function of the people's rights is totally different from that of monarchism. In England, the people's rights developed very early. The principles of her civil administration were most advanced. Many nations in Europe and America followed England's example. Her present Queen, Victoria, enjoying wealth and respect, is one of the happiest human beings in the world.²⁷

Thus, when Liang tried by tongue and pen to advance the people's rights and, at the same time, to protect Kuang-hsü's throne, there was, according to him, no other political system better than constitutional monarchy.

It made no difference who the Emperor was.

The present Emperor is not [sic.] a Manchu. I respected him as my parent. Thus, those who have special knowledge and love for their country should pay attention to the possibility of the success of people's rights, not to the question concerning to whom the throne belongs.²⁸

Yet, before the insurrection of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang Liang tried to unite his forces with those of the revolutionaries.²⁹ In the autumn of 1899 he associated himself closely with Sun Yat-sen and Liang's statements became radical.³⁰ Some people suspected that under Sun's influence Liang had abandoned constitutional monarchy and, instead, advocated an anti-Manchu revolution and the establishment of a republican form of government. It seems that this assumption was wrong.³¹ True, ever since he came into contact with Sun his articles contained radical undertones and could have indicated that Liang was coming close to acceding to a revolution. Yet, at the same time, he still was continuing his 'aid-the-emperor' and 'constitutional monarchy movement.'

What was his intention then in uniting with the revolutionaries? The reason for it seemed to have been based on the concept of 'enlarge our party' and 'enlist courageous and brave men of outstanding talents.'³²

It was obvious that Liang and Sun had conflicting opinions on the subject of revolution. Liang wrote to Sun on March 29, 1900, asking the latter to abandon the 'careless and stupid' revolution which would be costly in human lives and property, and to join in his 'aid-the-emperor' movement.³³

Since the end of last year when the question of deposing Emperor Kuang-hsü and selecting Hsüan-tung as his successor arose, the people had shown great interest in the affairs of the nation. They expected the 'aid-the-emperor' troops just as they would long for rain after a long drought. If we seize the opportunity, under the banner of 'aid-the-emperor', double results may flow from half the work.... To overthrow the Manchu Empire in order to establish the republican form of government is just, but, assuming the name of 'aid-the-emperor' to advocate the democratic form of government is the most suitable course in the present circumstances.... I think that we should slightly adjust ourselves to the times. In the initial stages we should elect the Emperor President.... Otherwise we would have many elections which would waste money and talents. That is what I would not choose. I hope that you will accept my proposal. Please delay the revolution for a period of about half a year, then we will enter China together. That is my sincere hope.³⁴

His persuasion was of no avail. It proves that the purpose of Liang's plan to unite his forces with the revolutionaries was to restore Emperor Kuang-hsü, who would grant and expand the people's rights.

The reason why Liang's words at that time were contrary to his actions and basic ideas seems to be related to his personality. His teacher K'ang Yu-wei often reproved him for his personality as being "liquid which transforms easily."³⁵ He himself often said that he was a man of 'sentiment and emotional impulse.' As to his personality, he said he was a man who "had no pre-conceived ideas."³⁶ He often altered his course of action in order to comply with certain changes. He expressed his views as soon as he had any new idea. He himself said: "My discussion of politics was often stimulated by my personal emotional impulse which, in turn, would stimulate other people's sentiments and emotions."³⁷ He did not always consider the contradiction between the result and effect of his opinion and the fundamental idea which he held. Thus, in 1899 when he associated with Sun Tat-sen, although they debated constantly the different approaches to revolution, he was excited by new ideas from which his radical views intentionally or unintentionally emerged. But as soon as he departed from Sun and arrived at Honolulu, he kept his balance. Again, he continued to work very hard for the 'aid-the-emperor' and 'protect-the-emperor' movement.³⁸ In March, 1900 he wrote again to Sun Yat-sen persuading the latter to give up revolution and to join in his 'aid-the-emperor' movement. It is evident that, before the failure of the revolt of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang in 1900, his actions and his aims were to 'aid-the-emperor' in order to initiate reform, and to realize a constitutional monarchy in order to extend people's rights.

From the above account, it is clear that during the period from the Hundred Days' Reform (August, 1898) to the insurrection of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang (July, 1900), Liang certainly had expressed radical opinions and

his ideas had seemed to become unsteady. It is obvious that he was remembering with fondness the favours which Kuang-hsü had bestowed upon him and he was grateful to the Emperor for promoting the people's welfare. Liang felt that constitutional monarchy was the perfect form of government and suitable to the national characteristics of the Chinese people. He believed that the 'aid-the-emperor' movement was growing. The hope of its success seemed to be unlimited. His advocacy of establishing a constitutional monarchy under the banner of 'aid-the-emperor' resulted naturally from this hope.

III. THE PROPOSAL FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EMPIRE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

In 1901 and 1902, there was a great change in Liang's thinking. Before 1901, his ideas centered on reform, compromise with the Manchus, and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. But, in the period from 1901 to 1902, he was to advocate *po-huai* (destruction of the empire), 'opposition to the Manchus' and a constitutional republic.

The reasons for this radical change in Liang's thought are many. His personality,³⁹ new knowledge, close contact with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the change of situation in China, all were contributing factors. Of these, the change of situation was the primary reason why he turned radical.

Since his arrival in Japan, Liang had studied Japanese language and literature. His knowledge of Western learning gradually improved by the study of Japanese versions of Western publications. Thus, his comprehension of Chinese and foreign histories became deeper. He discovered that the progress of the great powers in Europe and America resulted from vast upheavals in the past. He attributed the weakness and decadence of China to the bondage of despotism and of traditional

thinking over the last several thousand years. He thought that a *po-huai* was needed before China would become a progressive and strong nation.⁴⁰ This kind of thinking can be traced back to 1899, when he openly called for *po-huai-chu-i* (the need for destruction).⁴¹ In addition, because of his close relationship with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Liang was under the influence of the revolutionary movement.

But in 1899, in spite of the contradictions that appeared in his words and actions,⁴² he was still very interested in constitutional monarchy and still appreciated Emperor Kuang-hsü's favours. Moreover, the spirit of 'aid-the-emperor' was growing in China, and the movement of 'aid-the-emperor-by-military-force', prepared by Liang and his teacher K'ang Yu-wei was also spreading abroad. There was, then, a great hope of restoring the Emperor to the throne and of establishing a constitutional monarchy by way of reform and modernization. Thus at first the ideas of *po-huai* and revolution which he expressed were only deviations from the main body of his ideas. His thoughts still were centered on his original ideas of modernization, reform and constitutional monarchy.⁴³ But, with the failure of the uprising of T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang in 1900, the military force which Liang had supported for more than a year, was totally destroyed. The campaign of 'aid-the-emperor-by-military-force' was no longer feasible. Liang lost the hope of an immediate change towards a constitutional monarchy. Again, he saw that the Boxer Uprising, encouraged by the Ch'ing Court, resulted in the tragedy of foreign invasion.⁴⁴ To Liang, the stupidity of the Ch'ing Court, which brought the humiliation to China, was beyond comprehension. With the suppression of the Boxers and the return of the Manchu Court to Peking, the old policies reappeared. The Court still lacked sincerity and determination in carrying out reform and in strengthening China.⁴⁵ Liang had reached the point of despair.⁴⁶

His idea of *po-huai-chu-i* and 'opposition to the Manchus' resulted from his anger and disappointment.

In a letter to K'ang Yu-wei, he wrote:

There has been no remedy for the Manchu Court for a long time. Now we wish that the Empress Dowager return the authority to the Emperor Kuang-hsü and the latter be restored to the throne. How can we achieve these aims? Even if we should be able to achieve these, the Manchus are our enemies. Everything has been rotten for a long time. Even if our party would be called to organize a government, I am sure that we would not be able to carry out our resolutions. You, sir, are afraid of destruction. I too am not without fear of destruction. But I feel that destruction will be eventually inevitable.⁴⁷

He considered the Manchu Court as being too decadent. It was a hopeless kind of government.

It is noted that a withered old tree can not put forth fruit and a rooster can not lay an egg.... As to the present government, stubbornness is its substance, and falsehood and treachery are its means. To co-operate with it in protecting the nation is like covering the dunghill with embroideries and making sand into rice. If its essence does not change and its corrupt practices are not reformed, anything that the government does will only make the situation worse.⁴⁸

Liang wrote further that a government, as bad as this one, could not do anything good for its people, but could do a lot of harm. It is not true that this sort of government destroys everything, but it is undertaking a very dangerous course which will ultimately lead to senseless destruction. It is not necessary to mention what had happened a long time ago. What happened by the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty was a good example.

Ten years ago [1892] the drought in Shansi province resulted in the death of more than a million people. The bursting of the Yellow River at Cheng-chow caused the death of more than one hundred thousand. During the interlude of winter and spring, the people in the North who died of hunger and cold amounted to a hundred thousand every year. In Kuangtung, the people who died of disease amounted to several hundred thousand every year. And those who were killed by bandits and thieves or those who were executed for banditry and thievery caused by cold and starvation in the whole of China amounted to no less than one hundred thousand every year.⁴⁹

If this kind of senseless destruction continued, added to the aggression of the foreign powers, the nation would be destroyed sooner or later. Therefore, rather than letting this senseless destruction continue, it was better to carry out an artificial and intentional destruction. "After destruction, construction follows."⁵⁰ Then, the nation might be saved.

Hence, Liang determined to destroy the decadent despotism.⁵¹ He suggested two methods: "First, destruction without bloodshed; Second, destruction with bloodshed. What happened in Japan belongs to the first category; the French revolution, to the second."⁵² Can a bloodless destruction be carried out in China then? He thought that if it could be done, it would have been done already. Since it could not be done, the so-called second principle, 'destruction with bloodshed', would be the inevitable choice. There was no other way to save the nation. He was determined to advocate openly 'destruction'.⁵³ It is evident that his idea of 'destruction with bloodshed' was put forward in a desperate and hopeless situation.

Although he did not use the word 'revolution' in his article '*Po-huai chu-i*', the idea of revolution emerged in all his writings belonging to that period. He intended to imitate the modern Italian hero, Giuseppe Mazzini. In his article, '*Shih-Ke*' (An Interpretation of Revolution), Liang clearly remarked that there was no other way but revolution to save China.⁵⁴

But he translated 'revolution' into '*pien-ke*' (drastic change) in order to avoid the term '*ke-ming*'. He did this intentionally to distinguish his ideas from those of the revolutionaries and to avoid the confusing of his radical ideas with those of the Boxer Rebellion which to him was a 'careless and pointless' Uprising.⁵⁵

In order to emphasize the distinction between 'destruction' and 'revolution', he imposed upon 'destruction' many conditions.⁵⁶ For example, regarding 'destruction', one should bear in mind that he was going to do this only because there was no alternative and it was the only thing possible.⁵⁷ He was going to undertake 'destruction' for no other purpose than reconstruction.⁵⁸ Destruction was not "an instrument for pleasure and not an object of one's anger."⁵⁹ Men who were going to be responsible for the undertaking of the task of 'destruction' must be the educated, the just, and the stable who could not bear to see the result of the 'destruction'.⁶⁰ On the other hand, Liang's purpose in saying that 'destruction' could be achieved by *pien-ke* but not by *ke-ming* was to pacify the conservatives in the *Pao-huang hui* in order to alleviate his colleagues' uneasiness and fear about his radical opinions.

He wrote:

Pien-ke is simply that the people in the whole country completely change, or get rid of, the undesirable situation.... The *pien-ke* in the world in the last hundred years was incompatible with a monarchical system. However, some monarchs who complied with the change of the times, had survived, and those who did not had simply suppressed it.... People's *pien-ke* and dynastic revolution should not be confused. They differ from one another in degree.⁶¹

He further wrote: "Some people are frightened at the sound of the two words--*ke-ming*, but do not know that *ke-ming* in essence is really *pien-ke*. If they are frightened at *ke-ming*, would they be frightened at *pien-ke*? No, because they do not look closely at these two terms."⁶²

Why did Liang create such confusing terms as *po-huai* and *pien-ke* in order to express his radical ideas rather than use terms such as *ke-ming* (revolution), *kei-ke* (radical change) or *wei-hsin* (reform)? Irrespective of how confusing his terms were, it is apparent that his main aim was the overthrow of despotism and the deposition of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi,

the despotic 'Mo-Wang' (The King of the Devils).⁶³

Liang even hinted at this in his novel *Hsin-ro-ma-chuan-chi* (Story of New Rome) written in 1902:

It does not matter whether one comes from the upper class or lower class, or from the nine classes or three religions, as long as he has patriotic urges, he should come. Whether it is aristocracy, a government ruled by one man, a government ruled by several men, constitutional government or republican form of government, as long as the despotic king of Devils is deposed, why do we not try any form? No matter what we call it, Old Brother Society, Triad Society, Big Knife Society, Small Knife Society, etc., as long as it can give rise to revolutionary troops, 'aid-the-emperor' troops, independent troops, or national troops, then any society is a good society.⁶⁴

What kind of government would he have liked to see established after the overthrow of the despotic rule of the Ch'ing Court? Was it to be a constitutional monarchy or a democratic republic? It is apparent that at this time his ideal form of government was democratic republican government.⁶⁵ In his novel *Hsin-chung-kuo wei-lai chi* (The Future of New China) published in 1902, he called the new order *Ta Chung Hwa Ming Chu Kuo* (Great Chinese Democratic State). "The name of his first ideal president was to be Lo Chai-tien; the second president was to be named Huang Ke-⁶⁶ chiang." The two names indicated that Emperor Kuang-hsü, the descendant of Ai-hsin-chio-lo would be the first president after his abdication, and an independent descendant of Huang-ti (Yellow Emperor) would be the second president.

In addition, in his article *Hsin-min-shuo* (On New People or Citizen) written in 1902, Liang advocated such democratic principles as liberty, equality, people's rights and self-government. He also outlined the important conditions for the establishment of a state such as to be independent, to make progress and to 'run a risk.'⁶⁷ He was convinced that despotism was unable to resist foreign encroachment and to compete with

other great powers. He was also convinced that it was impossible for a democratic republican government, not based on moral principles, to conquer a world guided by the Darwinian Doctrine of natural selection. He denounced those who opposed the republican idea. He called for those intellectuals, who had the will and ambition to take up the responsibility of establishing democratic republicanism to act together.

I have heard of Montesquieu's political theory. He said that the essence of a despotic state originated in its military strength; the essence of a constitutional state originated in its reputation or honesty; and the essence of a republican state originated in its morality. That morality is everywhere, and can not be rejected or despised. However, in China's past one man was strong and all others were weak. They stayed together as a group through coercion but not through public approval. China is in decay.... Thus, if today's gentlemen, who apparently know that this situation can not last very long in such a world oriented towards the theory of natural selection, intend to change it, how can they achieve it without a perfect morality? I know those who are stubborn would use this as an excuse. They would say that in today's China, we can not discuss republicanism; we can not talk parliament; we should not mention self-government. All those discussions would only confuse the mind of the public and lead them to fight with each other. Why do not we maintain the several-thousand-years despotism to control the nation and to drive her forward, thus, avoiding catastrophe?

I hate that sort of reasoning.... Alas! should not our party do some self-examination? Should not our party discipline its members? If what they said would come true, that still is not important. But, if we sit and watch the results, those perfect and noble principles such as liberty, freedom, equality, rights, independence and progress would be despised by the world. The people in the following generations will become pale when they speak about the liberal ideology. They will say that during the early twentieth century, the intellectuals imbued with new ideas, new knowledge and new learning in China had failed, and that they should be held responsible for the destruction of China. Alas! even if we die, we would not be able to cleanse ourselves of our guilt.⁶⁸

In 1903 when Liang changed his attitude, to a conservative one, he himself admitted that he had advocated democratic republicanism. He said: "I was devoted to republicanism for years, and many patriots in China have for years shared my views."⁶⁹ In 1901 and 1902 his teacher

K'ang Yu-wei had reprimanded him heatedly for his favorable opinion on 'destruction' and 'democracy', but Liang did not retreat.⁷⁰ However, after his journey to the American Continent where he went on the invitation of the *pao-huang hui* in Canada and in the United States, there came a drastic change in his views.⁷¹

III. THE IDEA OF NATION AND STATE

Liang adhered for some time to his teacher's (K'ang Yu-wei) theory of *san-shih* (three ages). He praised the teachings of *ta-tung* (universal harmony) and declared that his times were those of *ta-tung*. "All under heaven, no matter how far or near, how large or small, are the same."⁷² There should not be any distinction between the Chinese and the foreigners. Liang also advocated the elimination of racial distinctions in China between the Manchus and the Han Chinese. They should strive united against foreign aggression in order to save China from destruction. But during the period from 1901 to 1902, he had completely abandoned the idea of obliterating the distinctions between the Han Chinese and the Manchus. Instead, he advocated the incitement of *min-tzu-ching-shen* (National spirit) by means of the anti-Manchu movement,⁷³ to establish a nationalistic state in order to save China.⁷⁴

In 1901, Liang began to speak loudly about nationalism. He wrote: "Nationalism is the most brilliant, upright, fair and honest principle in the world. We can not let other nations violate our freedom and we also will not violate other nation's freedom."⁷⁵ He continued: "In today's Europe, even a blade of grass or a stone benefits by nationalism. One who has read the history of the nineteenth century knows that the man who originated this idea contributed no less than Yu."⁷⁶

Liang held that nationalism possessed great power, that it was the basis of a nation, and that it created the motive force for the modern state. He wrote:

This great nationalism flames in the brain of the people in the whole world. The one who goes along with it will benefit, otherwise, he will be burned to death. Even a great, outstanding man, (rare in the world's history), such as Napoleon Bonaparte, who did not care about other nations when he marched to conquer the world, stumbled again and again and at last was himself imprisoned. His grand undertakings of ten years disappeared as bubbles and dreams because his attempts offended the tide of nationalism.⁷⁷

Liang pointed out that there was no reason to explain those various grand attempts which took place in almost every country in recent centuries, other than "nationalism, which burst with force in the brain of everybody who would rather die than live under the yoke of a foreign people."⁷⁸ Therefore, nationalism was actually the motive force which created the modern state, because

The people of the same race would be attracted to each other and gather together. Those belonging to a different race would oppose each other. Those who were forced to submission or were oppressed by an alien people took the risk of death in attempting to restore their freedom. Germany and Italy, where the people of the same ethnic origin established states of their own, and Hungary which as an alien people separated from Austria, are good examples.⁷⁹

Liang thought that nationalism was at first a great, upright, brilliant 'ism', but that this 'ism', after reaching the peak of its development in the late nineteenth century, became nationalistic imperialism. He wrote: "When nationalism advanced to its extremity, it could not but attempt to expand beyond its own boundary because its internal strength grew and its resources were insufficient to provide for its own people."⁸⁰ Therefore, nationalism became nationalistic imperialism, which concentrated its power on the acquisition of colonies and encroachment

upon other peoples.⁸¹

In the late nineteenth century, all nationalistic imperial powers, after fiery competition in plundering colonies in other parts of the world, assembled in China. They "came with their new strength to compete with us."⁸² To look back at China's history, "so-called nationalism is non-existent."⁸³ China was not even a modern state.⁸⁴ The idea of state was yet unborn. The Chinese only were aware of themselves, the dynasty, the world under the heaven, but were unaware of the state.⁸⁵ Therefore, China was too weak to compete with other powers and she was in a very dangerous situation. Liang acknowledged that "there was no other way to save China but through the establishment of a nationalistic state first."⁸⁶

Before the establishment of a nationalistic state, the people must develop national or racial consciousness. The Chinese possessed neither nationalism nor racial consciousness. How then were the Chinese to go about establishing nationalism? Liang outlined the important conditions for the establishment of a nationalistic state and started to work on its fundamentals. As to nationalism, Liang first emphasized the importance of the state. He seemed to follow Aristotle in that he too regarded man as a social animal. Men could survive only in a society. Thus, in order to be self-sufficient and self-protected, men must establish a state. The safety and happiness of one man was dependent on the state.⁸⁷ He wrote:

Why are men superior to other creatures? Because of their ability to live together in great numbers. If man had stood alone on the earth, he would have been extinguished a long time ago, because he can not fly as well as a bird, nor can he run as fast as other beasts. Among themselves, the people in time of peace exchange production and labour. They do their own business and help each other. No one alone possesses all the crafts. Through their relations with other peoples, united in strength and wisdom, they can defend cities and drive

foreign aggressors out. One man can not achieve this. This is the reason for the creation of a state. The establishment of a state is the only thing possible to protect the people. As soon as everybody knows that one can not do all things alone, he will unite with others, help others, and come to others' aid. This is the way leading to mutual-benefit. In order to guarantee a permanent affiliation, ceaseless support, continued aid, everybody should know that there is something much greater and more important than himself.⁸⁸

Secondly, considering that the Chinese are loyal to the sovereign, but know nothing about patriotism, Liang argued clearly that a government was not a state. In comparison, he treated a state in a similar manner as a company; a government as the office of business of such a company; the executives of a government as the managers of the business office. Therefore, continued Liang, the nationals should love the state over the government. Only when the government had done something good for the people, then, it would be loved and respected by the people. In this case, to love the government is equal to the love of the state. On the contrary, if the organization of the government is bad and its officials are corrupt, then, this should be reorganized, and the government should be replaced. In such action one can see the true love of the state.

Liang contined:

It is true that a state can not exist without a dynastic court. Thus, when the people love their state the affection extends even to it.... Those who have the idea of nationalism usually love the dynastic court but those who are loyal to it do not necessarily have the idea of nationalism. A regularly constituted dynastic court is the representative of a state. In this case, to love this kind of dynastic court is equal to love of a state. But, if the dynastic court is not regularly constituted, then it is not the representative of the state. In this case, this kind of monarchical administration must be changed in order to develop patriotism and love of the state.⁸⁹

Furthermore, Liang tried to stir his countrymen's national consciousness by discussing international relations. He was the first in China to put forward the theory that a nation was a natural unit. Different

languages, customs, thoughts and legal systems result in different nations. The safety and happiness of an individual was wholly dependent on the safety and well-being of the individual's state. Therefore, when the state was invaded by other powers, the individual had the obligation to defend his state. The defence of the state was equal to the defence of the individual's own body. He wrote:

The state is a term used in its relation towards other countries.... The competition of one state with another creates the concept of 'our' state and 'your' state. Mankind since millions of years ago, lived and developed separately. The different quality and spirit of languages, customs, thought and legal systems, could not but result in various different states. Following the universal rule of natural selection and the survival of the fittest, man could not but clash with each other and one state could not but clash with another. The name of 'state' was created to differentiate one group from another. A true patriot, although having shared the same idea and philosophy as a foreign sage would not surrender to foreign authority. He would rather let the people of the whole state bleed or die than give up any right to other people. He would die rather than witness the destruction of his nation.⁹⁰

Finally, Liang also criticized the idea of *ta-tung* and the concept of 'all under heaven are one family.' He regarded competition as the mother of human civilization, and a state, the acme of the development of the competition of human societies. The nation that is unable to keep up with the competition is unable to be self-sufficient and self-protected. But, too much competition will lead mankind to primitive barbarism. He wrote:

The theologians always mentioned the kingdom of heaven, universal harmony and equality of all living beings. Are the so-called *po-ai-chu-i* (philanthropy), *shih-chiai-chu-i* (internationalism) not the highest expression of love and humanity? Although the theories of these 'isms' have left the idealistic world and entered into the realistic world, have they turned out as were expected? These, perhaps, will be realized thousands or millions of years in the future, but I myself dare not expect it.... But competition is the mother of civilization. If competition stops, the progress of civilization ceases immediately. One man's

competition leads to family competition; a family's leads to a village's; a village's leads to a nation's. A nation is the biggest group and it is there that the competition reaches its peak. Someone may say why should not one break the nation's boundaries? We do not have to say that it is impossible. Even if it is possible, competition will stop and civilization will come to a halt.⁹¹

Therefore, "a state is the basis of *Shih-ai* (self-love), and the apex of *po-ai* (love without distinction), shortage of this is barbarism, surpassing this is also barbarism."⁹²

The above-mentioned 'idea of state' seems to be Liang's opinion expressed after he had studied and combined the Western thoughts of democracy, tribalism and theory of evolution. Although it is not a creative theory and there is plenty of contradiction,⁹³ to the Chinese at that time who had never heard of Western political and social thought, these were quite new ideas.

In order to arouse national consciousness, Liang, besides directly praising nationalism, incited national spirit by attacking the Manchus, and advocating the extermination of the Manchus.

He wrote in a letter dated October 1902 to his teacher K'ang Yu-wei:

Today is the time when nationalism is flourishing. Without this spirit, no state can be established. I, your humble disciple, swear to advocate it by argument and writing and will never give it up. In order to call forth the national spirit, I can not but attack the Manchus. To attack the *Shogunate* was the best way for Japan, to attack the Manchus is the best for China. From your humble disciple's point of view, no other way is more easy than this. There has been no remedy for the Manchus for a long time. Now we hope that the sovereignty could be reverted to the Emperor and that Emperor Kuang-hsü could be restored to the throne. How could we achieve this? Even if this could be achieved and our party be called to power, we would not be able to do as we would have wanted to because there are so many enemies⁹⁴ in the Ch'ing Court and much decadence for a long period.

Liang's attack on the Manchus in fact started much earlier.

From the time when he fled to Japan in 1898, he wrote articles continuously attacking the Manchu Court.⁹⁵ The object of his attack during the first period was the Empress Dowager and other leaders such as Jung-lü["] and Kang i.⁹⁶ His purpose was to arouse the people's anger and hatred in order to get their support to restore the Emperor Kuang-hsü to the throne, and was not to call forth nationalism or racial consciousness.⁹⁷ During the period from 1901 to 1902, the target of his attack was the whole Ch'ing Court. His purpose at that time was to call forth the national spirit and to overthrow the Ch'ing Dynasty. Since the invasion of the Allied troops of the Eight Powers, he maintained that the government under the Empress Dowager was the root of China's disease. He declared publicly that the Manchus were his irreconcilable enemies and he swore that he would do everything to overthrow the Manchu government under the dictatorship of the Empress Dowager.

The root of China's disease is the Empress Dowager's government. Our comrades are irreconcilable enemies of her government not because of private malice, but because her government is our China's public enemy and is also the enemy of all foreign governments. Therefore, we, compelled by the public, will not live with her under the same sky. Only after the root of the disease is eradicated, will China be safe as will other nations.⁹⁸

In 1901 Liang wrote further that the Ch'ing Court was the devil who brought poverty and weakness to China.

The Chinese soil is not poor, but the nation is poor. The Chinese people are not weak, but their troops are weak. This is a very strange phenomenon.... There must be a devil who is playing mischief with us. Our people should find out where this fiend is and expel him. Then the world of the twentieth century could be exclusively ours.⁹⁹

In order to arouse Chinese national spirit, Liang, besides attacking the Manchus, also examined the sad history of the Chinese people. This sort of examination was a very easy way to incite race consciousness.

In his *Hsin-min shuo* he had already expressed that China was destroyed when the Manchus entered the *Shan-hai-kwan* (a pass where the Great Wall touches the coast) in 1644.

Since the Chou dynasty, China has suffered the attack of the Northern tribes.... From Ming Dynasty on, the strength of China decreased. First Emperor *Cheng-tung* (1436-1450 A.D.) was captured by *Yeh-hsien* of the *Wa-na* tribe, Mongolia, then China was conquered by the Manchus. Alas! From *Ch'in* Dynasty on there passed more than two thousand years. However, the descendants of *Huang-ti* (Yellow Emperor) have been controlled by foreign tribes for more than three hundred years, and our brothers in the North have been controlled by foreign tribes for several hundred years.¹⁰⁰

In the article *Ching-kao wo kuo-min* (Let Me Tell It Sincerely To My Countrymen), he also expressed that since the death of Cheng Chen-kung (Koxinga) in Taiwan, 'The Chinese People' had lost all territory.¹⁰¹

In his novel *Hsin-chung-kuo wei-lai chi*, he made again clear that there was no such thing in the world as that 'four-hundred-million masters' should be controlled by a 'five-million guest' tribe. Through the words of the protagonist, Li chü-ping (the last two words mean to do away with the disease), he expressed his ideas:

Brother, I do not have to tell you about nationalism. I do not have to explain it to you. Please tell me is our China's present sovereignty in our own hands or in other race's hands? Napoleon could not stand still in the early nineteenth century because he opposed this 'ism'. Now you, brother, oppose it, how can you stand still in the early twentieth century? I do not want to have enmity against any race. But, according to the universal principle of political science, the government should be in the hands of the majority, then, the state will be safe and in peace. There is no such thing in the world that four-hundred-million masters should be controlled by five-million foreign guests. Ordinarily, to put one's benefit first and other's benefit later is human nature. Therefore, if the rule is in the hands of the minority, the minority naturally will benefit and the majority will suffer. If the sovereignty is in the hands of the guests, the guests of course will benefit and the masters will suffer.¹⁰²

He wished that the Chinese people should look straight at the relations between the Manchus and the Hans. The Hans should unite to take over the political power and rule. He also wished that the great shame and disgrace of the destruction of the state by foreigners should awaken the national consciousness among the Chinese people.

Why did Liang want to pour the idea of 'state' into his countrymen's minds and work so hard to develop the national spirit? Because he wished that the idea of the state would produce patriotism in his countrymen. He also wished that racial consciousness would unite the Chinese people and give the country internal strength. Then the Chinese people could establish an independent 'nationalistic state' to compete with European and American powers so as to reach the goal of saving China and strengthening China.

At this time, this nationalism advocated by Liang was rather narrow. His so-called 'Chinese Nation' was the Hans, which did not include the Manchus. The nationalistic state which he expected to establish was a national state built by the Hans only. Its political power and sovereignty belonged to the Hans. The Manchus would have no position in this new state.

During the period from 1901 to 1902, he lost all hope as far as Ch'ing Court was concerned. He thought that reform and other slow methods could not save China. He, at this time, advanced the idea of destruction with bloodshed to overthrow the Manchu dictatorship in order to establish a democratic republican nation. Furthermore, since he had studied European and American history, Liang gradually came to understand world politics. He found out that the great powers became powerful because of the spirit of nationalism and of the idea of state.

He imported into China the idea of patriotism and called forth nationalism and racial consciousness. He aroused the national spirit by attacking the Manchus and proposing the establishment of a nationalistic state in order to save China and to make China strong.

CHAPTER IV

LIANG'S POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1903-1911

I. ANTI-REVOLUTION AND ANTI-REPUBLICANISM

In January 1903, Liang made a tour of the American Continent where he went on the invitation of the *Pao-huang hui* in Canada and the United States. He returned to Japan in October of the same year. There came a drastic change in his views. In 1901 and 1902, Liang was an advocate of revolution, of an anti-Manchu movement and of democratic republicanism. After his return from America, Liang, instead of advocating revolution, was now opposed to revolution. He also changed his attitude towards the Manchus. Instead of attacking them, he opposed the anti-Manchu movement. Not only did he withdraw his support from republicanism, but he also rejected this political idea.

Shortly after his return to Japan, Liang published an advertisement in his own *Hsin-min tsung-pao* in which he made it known that he would never again advocate revolution and that he rejected republicanism.¹

In December, 1903, Liang published in *Hsi-min tsung-pao* a long article *Cheng-chih-hsueh-ta-chia pe-lun-chih-li chih-hsueh-shuo* (The Theory of the Political Scientist Bluntschli). In discussing the theories of Bluntschli,² Liang wrote that "republicanism which grows from habits will guarantee peace. Republicanism arrived at through revolution will be accompanied by danger."³ Liang further emphasized the fact that both democratic republicanism and the monarchical form of government had good and bad qualities. Liang believed that the republican form of government was not as adaptable as the monarchical form of government to the circumstances in China at the time in question. A

republican form of government established with reluctance would lead only to a tragedy such as the French Revolution. This would be followed by a succession of reactionary regimes and revolutions, or it would be as unstable politically as the regimes in Latin America where no nation could live in peace and security. Therefore, Liang declared that he would advocate neither revolution nor republicanism.

I have been involved with the idea of republicanism for many years. Many patriots in China have shared my views on the republican form of government for a considerable period of time. But, after I read the theories of Bluntschli, I became frightened. Suddenly the basis upon which my ideas were founded was lost. I was so disturbed that I did not know which way to turn. Contrary to what this gentleman has said, my countrymen do not possess the qualities that the people of a republic should have.... The warnings of history are frightful.... History teaches us that if it [republicanism] should not bring us wealth, it would bring chaos and ruin. What we will get is not freedom but despotism.... Alas! Republicanism! Republicanism! I love you, but I love my Fatherland more. I love you, but I love Freedom more.⁴

Why did Liang suddenly change his ideas again? In addition to the influence of the theories of Bluntschli there were several other factors. For example, there was what he had learned from his trip to Canada and the United States. In addition, he feared that revolution would lead to the division or ruin of China. Moreover, the conflict between his own followers and the revolutionaries, the relations between himself and K'ang Yu-wei, the influence of his friends such as Huang Kung-tu, not to mention his own personality, all contributed to the change in his ideology.

The journey to America. The sweeping change in his views began when he returned to Japan from America. In order to look for the cause of the change, one must first examine his observations in America and the stimulation which he received there. He was convinced that the success of the republican form of government in the United States of America had

to be attributed to her mother country, England, where the system of self-government was firmly established. The people in the United States had early in their history put to good use the parliamentary system and were accustomed to self-government. Furthermore, the democratic system in the United States possessed the conditions regarded by Rousseau as indispensable. The United States of America was a union of many small republican states. Self-government was the basic political system in every city. The states and the cities had legislative, administrative and judicial powers. Therefore, "the republican form of government in the United States was not only established by the various states but also by those cities.... Only those countries who possess these conditions can follow the American example."⁵

American democratic republicanism was the most successful among all republican governments in the world. But what about the politics in the United States? Liang was rather disappointed in what he saw there. Most of the presidents of the United States were men of mediocre talents. First rate talents were rare among them. The reason for this was that the people were afraid that a man of superior talent might appropriate executive rights for his own benefit and deprive people of their rights.⁶ When the administrative power was transferred from the old president to a newly elected one, the officials in the federal administration were also replaced, because these positions were used as rewards to those who supported the president in the election campaign.⁷ The whole process resembled transactions in a market place. Furthermore, the election had many illicit practices. The candidates often used every kind of abuse to gain their ends.⁸ The democratic republicanism in the United States could not rid itself of such abuses. It was easy for anyone to see what kind of chaos and danger would result in the country that did not possess

the basic conditions for a democratic system.

During the journey in America, Liang saw the chaos and lawlessness in the Chinese community in San Francisco. This led him to think about a similar situation in public offices and public organs associations and study societies in China.⁹ This in turn led Liang to analyze the characteristics of the Chinese people. He came to the conclusion that the Chinese had four defects. "First, they have the qualifications for being *tsu-min* (people of a tribe) but have none of those of citizens. Secondly, they have the idea of loyalty to a village but lack the feeling of loyalty to the nation or state. Thirdly they accept despotism and do not know the concept of liberty. Last, they have not a high aim in life."¹⁰ These four characteristics were in conflict with the qualities required of a citizen in a republic. Therefore, he dared not advocate republicanism in China.

The fear of division or ruin in China. Liang regarded the late nineteenth century as the era of imperialism. China, surrounded by other powers, was in constant danger of dismemberment. Without internal upheavals the ruin of China might be delayed. China could be saved through constructive reforms. If internal chaos should occur in China, other powers would take advantage of the opportunity to plunder the country and to bring about the downfall of China. Liang wrote: "I am afraid that if internal strife came to China, the ultra-radicals would rise in rebellion. Even the revolutionaries would not be able to restore order...."¹¹ In his article *Ching-kao wo-kuo kuo-min*, he wrote:

This is an era of competition among all powers. They would not allow disorders to continue for very long.... If the government could not restore order, the two forces that could do it are the Chinese people and the foreigners. Would the Chinese people be able to take advantage of the opportunity to restore order? I have my doubts about it.... It would

be nice if the government would have the capacity to restore order. If the government would not be able to do so, my countrymen would be bound to restore order. If my countrymen should not possess the capacity for doing so, then we would have to depend on foreign powers. I doubt that the foreign powers would not take advantage of the opportunity to work for their own benefit. The dependence on the foreigners to bring order into the country should fill our people with shame.¹²

In 1901 and 1902, Liang comprehended deeply that the invasion of the Allied troops of the Eight Powers resulted from the stupidity of the Ch'ing Court in encouraging the Boxers. Therefore, he advocated revolution and the anti-Manchu movement because of his hatred of the Ch'ing Court. But when Liang examined the Chinese situation after his journey in America, he found that China was in a very dangerous situation. China, concluded, Liang, must not have more internal disorders, because internal disorders would be used by the foreign powers as pretext for intervention. Foreign intervention would lead to dismemberment, even ruin.¹³ His grief and patriotism made him take an anti-revolutionary stand and naturally led him to advocate the establishment of a strong and sovereign central government, and a united, orderly and independent nation.¹⁴

Liang had the idea of distinction of race throughout his life. He was unlike his teacher K'ang Yu-wei who thought that the Manchu and the Han Chinese belonged to the same ethnic group.¹⁵ Liang had advocated in 1901 and 1902, 'the attack of the Manchus' and 'the rejection of the Manchus'. But now, he regarded that the anti-Manchu movement would widen the division in China. For, as a result of the anti-Manchu movement, the Manchus, in desperation, would seek foreign support to maintain their power over Manchuria. The Mongolians and the Tibetans because of the Han Chinese' rejection of other ethnic groups, would take alarm at it and would seek the help of foreign powers to safeguard their position. In such an event, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang would separate

from China and eventually would be dominated by foreign powers. China would fall into parts and collapse. Therefore, Liang ceased to advocate the expulsion of the Manchus on the basis of difference of race.

On December 20, 1911, he gave an address to the press in which he said:

The bad news of the separation of Tibet and Mongolia makes me feel sad. This matter has been in my mind day and night. That is the reason why I ceased to advocate a revolution. That is also the reason why the *Hsin-min tsung pao* since 1903 has concentrated on political revolution only and has ceased to advocate the racial revolution. To put it bluntly, on the question of nationality,¹⁶ I stand for the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Conflict with the revolutionaries. In the summer and autumn of 1899, Liang and Sun Yat-sen were in close contact with each other and even had discussed matters such as co-operation among their followers toward a common end. By the end of that year, Liang went to Honolulu to carry out K'ang Yu-wei's order of expanding the *Pao-huang hui*. Shortly after his arrival in Honolulu, Liang wrote to Sun. In one of the letters, Liang explained that he made this journey against his will and that he was convinced that a way must be found to bring their followers to work together. But, as time wore on, in addition to the distance between them and their different approaches toward the way of saving China, their contact gradually lessened.¹⁷ When Liang collected a large sum of money in Honolulu, Sun was very irritated because the Chinese community in Honolulu was the most important base for Sun's revolutionary movement and the funds collected by Liang constituted previously an important part of Sun's financial resources. The dispute between Liang and Sun formally started during Liang's stay in Honolulu. When Liang made the journey to the American Continent in 1903, he drew away many members of the Chinese

community in America from the revolutionary movement to his own *Pao-huang hui*. As a result of this, Sun Yat-sen publicly declared that Liang was the enemy of the revolutionary movement. In a letter to Huang Chung-yang, Sun called Liang '*Liang ch'iu*' (Liang, the tribal chieftan) and pointed out that Liang was more malicious than his teacher K'ang Yu-wei.

Liang's stratagems are quite cunning. I have heard that he collected more than one million dollars in San Francisco and other places. More than half of the sum came from those who had supported the revolutionary movement and the anti-Manchu stand. Liang, while pretending to work for revolution, defrauded the Chinese in America in order to protect the emperor and to establish a constitutional monarchy in China. His undertaking would turn the four hundred million Chinese into the permanent slaves of the Manchus.... I am now in Honolulu to fight against the *Pao-huang hui*.... But its members are very cunning. Now when they see that a great wave of revolutionary ideas is arising they declare here that they, under the banner of protecting the emperor, are actually working for revolution. When Liang was in the United States, he even called his *Pao-huang hui* a revolutionary party. He made a fool of us. Most of the overseas Chinese, could not distinguish between the truth and the false, they were being cheated. Liang's stratagems are more cunning than that of K'ang Yu-wei who, at least, advocated protecting the emperor in a straight-forward manner.¹⁸

Because of the dispute over financial matters, the relations between Liang and the revolutionaries deteriorated drastically until it reached the point of no return. Throughout his travels, Liang had exacerbated the conflict between the revolutionaries and reformers. In 1904, in a letter to a friend, Sun Yat-sen wrote:

I have been engaged in a hard struggle against the reform party in the United States and have overcome them in five or six places. I intend to travel wherever there are Chinese and I believe that in three or four months I should succeed in overcoming them all. I do not think it will be difficult for me to do this, because their influence was at its height when Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was there but now the movement has gradually lapsed into decadence.¹⁹

In fact, the factional struggle after Liang returned to Japan, grew more intense as the years passed by. After the founding of *Tung-meng hui* (United League), Sun Yat-sen's newspapers in Hong Kong, Honolulu, and San Francisco carried on arguments against the journals owned by the *Pao-huang hui*. All these arguments, however, had little effect on the Chinese intellectuals in the interior of China. But when the *Min-pao* (the People's Tribune or The People) was published in November, 1905, by the *Tung-ming hui* as an organ for debate with the *Hsin-min tsung-pao*, edited by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the arguments between the Revolutionary Party and the Constitutional Monarchist Party became increasingly vehement. Liang had now met a formidable enemy and his predominant position in the journalistic world was gradually shaken by Wang Ching wei and Hu Huan-min, editors-in-chief of the *Min-pao*.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was frequently challenged by Wang, and their arguments grew more and more heated. The heated argument between them included the whole scope of Sun's Three Principles of the People. The general readers, however, were mainly interested at this time in the debates concerning democracy and nationalism. The *Min-pao* made a greater impression on the youth than did the *Hsin-min tsung-pao*. The younger generation applauded innovation and opposed any form of conventionalism or conservatism. The *Min-pao* was consistent in propagating the Three Principles, whereas the position of the *Hsin-min tsung-pao* fluctuated.

The theory of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was that a newspaper should serve as a guide to the people and should change its stand according to the needs of the time. His readers, however, regarded this flexibility as contradictory and opportunistic.

Liang himself frequently claimed to be a follower of Wang

Yang-ming's principle of conscience.

If my viewpoint guided by my conscience today is like this, then I do according to my conscience of today; If my conscience of tomorrow receives some further enlightenment, then I will do according to my conscience of tomorrow.²⁰

What Liang did not realize was that conscience has no absolute standard, that it is vacillating, and that the conscience of the masses could not always be consistent with his own. Young people tend to see present evils clearly, but are slow in discerning the evil which may come in the future. Thus it was easier for them to be swayed by the revolutionaries than by Liang.

The *Min-pao* attacked the Manchu government for its corruption, the insincerity of its reforms, the falseness of its constitutional monarchy, and the malign intent of its anti-Chinese actions. They were facts understood by everybody. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao criticized the government for its corruption too, but he, by this time, stood for constitutional monarchy. He predicted bad effects from a revolution and a republic--such as internal dissension, struggle for power among the revolutionary leaders themselves. To people having no previous experience of such a radical change, such effects were inconceivable.²¹

Nevertheless, Liang's words sometimes served to promote the idea of revolution. For example, Liang wrote in 1905:

If the nation is doomed it would be better to have a revolution with the hope that the nation may be saved from destruction.... If the revolutionists are truly punishable, the government should be punished first.... The government still seems unaware of its corruption: the ruthless slaughter of the people continues and some government officials still use the murder of revolutionists as a short cut to promotion. The government has even requested that revolutionary leaders be returned from the foreign countries where they are seeking refuge, thus breaking the precedent of international law, which offers asylum to political offenders. Alas, can this be stopped.²²

Liang also revealed his strong resentment against the Manchus.

I have no affection for the Manchus. Whenever I read the "Ten Days in Yang-chow" and the "Massacre of the City of Chia-ting" by the Manchu conquerors, my eyes overflow with warm tears. Therefore, several years ago, I advocated anti-Manchuism; even though my teacher and friends reprimanded me every day, I refused to change my mind. Even today my feeling is still the same.... If there is a way which can save the nation and at the same time help us to take revenge against the Manchus, I would certainly be delighted to follow it.... Unfortunately, the two, the saving of the nation and the revenge, are incompatible. To take revenge it is necessary to have violent revolution, and a violent revolution must... necessarily terminate the life of the nation.... I prefer to bear humiliation under the Manchu regime rather than to become a man without a nation.²³

This is the reason why he stood for constitutional monarchy. Liang intended to admonish the people for their anti-Manchuism, but unconsciously he admitted the existence of a racial prejudice and hatred which would not be entirely eliminated - a fact which the revolutionists wished to have reiterated constantly and loudly.

His relations with his teacher K'ang Yu-wei. At the time when Liang openly advocated revolution and supported the anti-Manchu movement, his teacher, K'ang Yu-wei wrote and denounced Liang's ideas. Later when Liang recalled this matter, he said:

When I advocated the idea of revolution, 'anti-Manchuism' and republicanism, my teacher, K'ang Yu-wei disagreed with me intensely. He first reprimanded me, then tried to convince me [to change my views]. Within the period of two years, he sent me many letters in which there were several hundred thousand words.²⁴

Liang respected his teacher and therefore he paid great attention to his reprimands. In his letter to Hsü Chun-mien, dated March 4, 1903, Liang wrote that in order to avoid offending his teacher he would never mention revolution.²⁵

My teacher reprimanded me severely in his long letter of last October. In that letter he said that he was so ill that he nearly died because of our support for revolution. I was frightened when I read this letter. I sent two telegrams to him. One stated, '[I am] to repent and make a new start'; another, 'we will repent and reform. Please take care of yourself.'²⁶

In his letter to Hsu Chun-mien on March 31, 1903, Liang mentioned that he was very pleased that his teacher was getting better. In July of the same year, he wrote to Hsu again.²⁷ In this letter, he seemed to be saying that he had already confessed to his teacher and that he honestly acknowledged his errors and repented.²⁸ Then, after he had received a long reply from his teacher, Liang felt more at ease. On his teacher's orders, he also wrote letters to his colleagues in which he acknowledged his errors.²⁹

The influence of his teacher was a contributory factor in the change of Liang's views from radical to moderate. Why did his teacher have such influence on him? One must remember that Liang was a man educated in the old Chinese tradition. The teachings of Confucianism were deeply ingrained in Liang's mind. It seemed to him that openly to disobey his teacher would be regarded as rebellion and would meet with general disapproval. In his letter to Hsu Chun-mien he expressed the view that "I can not in all conscience do anything to disobey my teacher "³⁰ "had prejudices," that his teacher had made no progress in his learning, and that he (Liang) had different views on politics and scholarship, Liang throughout his life treated K'ang with great respect in the traditional way.

The influence of his friends and fellow-scholars. Huang Kung-tu was a very important leader of the reform movement. His views were very close to those of K'ang Yu-wei except for their difference on the treatment of

Confucianism as a national religion. In a period of six years after the 1898 Coup d'état, Huang had exchanged with Liang a great deal of correspondence. Liang was profoundly influenced by Huang's views and concepts.³¹

In November 1902, Huang wrote Liang a long letter in which Huang repeatedly explained that the theories of liberty, freedom, people's rights, revolution, 'anti-Manchuism,' separation of the executive and the administrative functions and sovereignty, were not applicable to China at that time. Huang advocated the idea that China should imitate Great Britain in adopting a constitutional monarchy as a future form of government. Huang thought that it would be useless to discuss matters with people who had no understanding of the concept of rights, nationhood and the problems mentioned above. With the armed intervention of the foreign powers, the best way for the Chinese people was to unite all forces against foreign aggressors, to abandon the idea of revolution and of the separation of the executive and the administrative powers. Huang thought that the best way to save China at that time was to strengthen the sovereignty of the emperor first, and only then to introduce the people's rights. The first thing to do was to stabilize the current situation by maintaining the *status quo*, then to educate the masses.

Huang believed that the people's rights would develop naturally day by day after the people were educated and their morale strengthened.³² Huang's examination of the Chinese situation supported by examples from Chinese history was a guide to Liang when Liang was searching for the best way of saving China. Now, Liang, under Huang's influence, decided to abandon the idea of revolution and the anti-Manchu movement and returned to his old idea which he had advocated before the year 1900.³³

Such changes of views are possible in someone like Liang whose personality was "as liquid which transforms easily."³⁴

II. ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM

Liang's article, "The Theory of the Political Scientist Bluntschli," published in late 1903, was doubtless a clear statement of the change of his political views. He abandoned the ideas of republicanism and also, of constitutional monarchy. His solution to the political problems of China lay in the system known as enlightened despotism.³⁵ Liang gave several reasons for his abandonment of the idea of the republican form of government.

Republicanism could not succeed in a nation which lacked the tradition for the establishment of a republic. Liang supported his argument by quoting Bluntschli's views. In a republic, "there is no other independent sovereignty over the people."

The duty to compromise conflicting interests could not be imposed on the people by themselves.... In a nation whose people were accustomed to the system of self-government this duty could be fulfilled freely without restraint. But the people who were under the rule of a despotic form of government for a long time, who lacked the experience of self-government, did not care for the public welfare. Everyone would hold by the principle of individualism and would only be concerned with himself. Therefore, social conflicts would arise more and more frequently. The people would find no peace. Ultimately, they would have to entrust their political power to one man and to become his slaves again. This kind of government is known as democratic despotism. It was in existence in ancient Rome and eighteenth century France. The new 'Executive' produced by democratic despotism, was either a generalissimo, or an emperor, a despot in politics.³⁶

The Chinese people did not possess the qualifications that were necessary for citizenship in a republic. Liang thought that there were similarities among the nations where the republican form of government was successful. Liang established a major premise: "Only the people who are capable of making good use of parliamentarism possess the

qualifications to become republican citizens."³⁷

Liang thought that

Under a parliamentary system the criticism of inefficiency of government depended on the support of the majority of the members of parliament. Most of the members of parliament have a general knowledge which all people should have in order to criticize the government. This is the first important condition.³⁸

He also thought that "under a parliamentary system the task of control over the government depended on the co-operation of the members of parliament.... The existence of a well-developed party system or pressure groups is the second important condition."³⁹ But, if republicanism was to be established in China at that time, the members of its parliament would consist either of the stubborn elderly people or of the new generation with very limited knowledge. If the majority consisted of the elderly people, "the bill to restore 'the-eight-legged essay' would be passed;" if the majority consisted of the new generation then "the bill to obliterate all the Manchus would be passed."⁴⁰ How could a parliamentary system be established with such elements? As for parties, China at the time in question actually did not possess the conditions which were indispensable for the formation of parties.⁴¹ It was often said that China "did not have any group which consisted of more than three people and no party in China could survive more than a year."⁴² Liang estimated that if a five-hundred-seat parliament was to be established in China, the largest party would occupy only twenty or thirty seats. The rest would be taken by many splinter parties. It seems that a parliament such as this, with many small parties and different views, could not become a commanding organization for control of government. Such being the case, China had neither people qualified to be members of parliament nor pressure groups, or organized parties.

Liang believed that it was impossible to convert people into republican citizens overnight. He cited the United States and France as an example. As to China, she had been under the rule of despots since ancient times. How could she succeed in imitating other republics in ten or twenty years?⁴³ Without doubt, this meant that the Chinese people could not be converted into citizens of a republic in a short period. Thus, Liang opposed the hasty establishment of a republic.

Liang also believed that the period of revolution was not a good time to develop the qualifications for republican citizenship. He stated that on examining Chinese and foreign history, it was obvious that a society made progress in times of peace. Sometimes, progress could be made in times of war. But war could only bring forth the moving powers of progress. The result of progress could only be seen long after the war had ended. Liang was convinced that the only way at that time to change despotism to republicanism in China would be through revolution. Revolution would lead to war. War would bring disorganization in agriculture, in industry and the decline of commerce. In turn, the people would be unable to support themselves; then, they would not care for education and for progress. The qualifications for republican citizenship would not develop. The ideas of republicanism would be far, far away.⁴⁴ He opposed the idea to seek republicanism through the means of revolution, and in doing so abandoned the idea of republicanism.

Liang also believed that Rousseau's "General Will" and Montesquieu's "Separation of the Legislative, Executive and the Judicial Functions" could not be realized in China. Therefore, republicanism was not suitable for China. Liang believed that Rousseau's "General Will" was the fundamental spirit of constitutional republicanism.⁴⁵ But

Liang thought that the national general will could not be found among the Chinese people.

Liang introduced three reasons to make his point:

First, among the nations that had the parliamentary system, the views of the elected were not necessarily exactly the same as those of the voters. It was incorrect to say that the views of the representatives were the expressions of the national general will. The only way to express the national general will was to have direct ballots in every legislative and administrative elections. Rousseau drew the conclusion that only the nation which had the same form of government as that of Switzerland could be called a Republic. However, even in a small nation such as Switzerland, there were twenty-two small units in her federation. It was impossible sometimes to carry out direct balloting in the Swiss elections. Therefore, it would be more difficult for a big country to have direct voting by the people. This was one of the reasons why the expression of general will could not be realized.⁴⁶

Secondly, even if the vote by direct ballot was possible, fairness and liberty must be guaranteed. In the event that the people vote against their own will due to invisible or visible threat or deceit, then the general will would be abused. This was another reason why the expression of general will could not be realized.⁴⁶

Liang continued:

What is the general will?... The people... agree absolutely among themselves on a certain matter. If one of them disagrees then it is not the general will.... Can one find a nation in which all people agree among themselves and no one dissents? It is impossible.... This is the third reason why the expression of the general will can not be realized.⁴⁶

At the same time, Liang was also convinced that the theory of the separation of the legislative, executive and the judicial functions could

not be realized, because, from Liang's point of view, each nation had its own sovereignty. That sovereignty was the only one and could not be divided. If sovereignty was divided, then none of the three organizations would represent the sovereignty. Does that mean that there was no sovereignty? One might say that the people were the sovereignty, then this theory would lead to the original theory of the general will. "In this case the national general will is equal to sovereignty."⁴⁷ Liang thought that if it was impossible to find the national general will, and that if the separation of the legislative, executive and the judicial functions could not be realized, then the system of constitutional republicanism naturally could not be achieved. Especially in a nation as big as China which had been under the control of despots for so long, the realization of constitutional republicanism was beyond any hope.

What Liang used in his arguments was Rousseau's 'the General Will' but not the 'Will of All'.⁴⁸ "Theoretically, Rousseau's theory was contradictory. His theory was impossible in application."⁵⁰ Therefore, it was very rare that the advocates of democracy would adopt lines advocated by Rousseau. Most of them followed the parliamentary system offered by John Locke.

In order to establish a republic through the means of revolution, ruthless men might use the chaotic situation to introduce despotism and then bring about the ruin of the nation. Liang believed that a national system of monarchical despotism had been well established in China for ages. There was no other way to convert the despotism of republicanism but by revolution.⁵¹ If the old government could be overthrown by a stroke of revolution, the responsibility to found a new republican government, to protect national sovereignty would be on the shoulders of the people who had been under the control of despots for ages and who

lacked the concept of self-government. They would not know how to use their rights. Party strife would result. The central government would become weak. The society would be thrown into disorder. Nothing could change all this except 'a strong sovereignty'. Finally, a dictator, such as Caesar or Napoleon, would gather by military force, all powers in the nation in order to establish 'republican despotism'.⁵² If there were not such a man, and if the central government were too weak to pacify the disorders, the bandits would appear everywhere and no one would live in peace. If the foreigners would not take advantage of the opportunity, in a few decades, someone like Liu Pang (the founder of Han Dynasty) and Chu Yuan-chang (the founder of Ming Dynasty) would re-establish monarchical despotism. If the foreign powers would decide to intervene, they would not wait until the rise of someone like Caesar, Napoleon, Liu Pang or Chu Yuan-chang to dismember China. In this case, the ruin of the nation would be inevitable.⁵³

From the above account, one may easily see Liang's argument. Only those who were capable of making good use of the parliamentary system would be able to carry out a constitutional republican system. But he was convinced that the Chinese people were not capable of making good use of the parliamentary system. They did not possess the qualifications for citizens in a republic. These qualifications could not be nourished in a short period or be acquired through revolution. If one searched for republicanism through revolution, ruthless men would use this situation to establish despotism. Even further, the nation could be ruined. Therefore, Liang concluded that "constitutional republicanism was not adoptable in the Chinese political situation."⁵⁴

If Liang had abandoned his advocacy of constitutional republicanism, would he then support constitutional monarchy? His answer

was no.⁵⁵ He said, "nowadays China is not ready for a constitutional monarchy."⁵⁶ Up to this time, constitutional monarchy was the platform of the *Pao-huang hui*, then why did Liang say that China was not ready for it? Liang gave the following reasons for his stand: Presently there were no governmental institutions which could be adapted to a constitutional monarchy.⁵⁷ Parliament, essential to this system, could not be convoked. In order to establish a constitutional monarchy, the Chinese people would have to wait for ten or twenty years until governmental institutions would be modernized.⁵⁸

If Liang believed that the Chinese people did not possess the qualifications for citizens of a republic and that both republicanism and constitutional monarchy could not be realized in China, then what form of government did he consider as best for China? His answer was: "enlightened despotism."⁵⁹

Liang's article *Kai-min Chuan-chih Lun* (On Enlightened Despotism) published in *Hsin-min tsung-pao* in 1905 explains his views on the ideal form of government. From Liang's point of view, there were two different systems of government: despotism or 'non-despotism.' What was despotism? Under a despotic form of government there were the rulers and the ruled. The rulers laid down the law to regulate the activities of government organs, because they had the exclusive rights which the ruled did not possess.⁶⁰ Despotism could be divided into three categories: First, monarchical, such as China in late Ch'ing period, Turkey and Russia; secondly, aristocratic, such as ancient Sparta and Rome's autocracy; thirdly, democratic, such as England under Oliver Cromwell and France under Marat, Danton and Robespierre.⁶¹

The 'non-despotism' kind of government was, from Liang's point

of view, that kind where everyone was both the ruler and the ruled. The 'non-despotisms' could be divided into three categories: First, the monarch, aristocrats and the people united into one; Secondly, the monarch and the people united into one; Thirdly, the people.⁶²

Liang believed that the good or evil of despotism depended on whether the despot governed the people according to established laws.⁶³

It is important for a nation to have laws because laws can mediate internal competition and can encourage competition abroad. Both would help each other. The form that develops according to laws is good. Otherwise, it is bad. The laws are aimed to limit individual's liberty and to keep him from being in conflict with others. That is the best side of it. Although the law imposes limitations on the individual's liberty, it still leaves him some freedom for proper competition. That is also one of the best sides of it. Sometimes, a nation establishes a law which would hinder proper competition, or take most of an individual's freedom or even all of his freedom. But if it did so in order to protect the nation in time of peril, it is still a good undertaking.⁶⁴

Liang therefore divided despotism into two categories: barbaric despotism and enlightened despotism.⁶⁵ "Despotism... which aims at the benefit of the ruler or rulers only, is barbaric despotism. The one which aims at the benefit of the people and the nation, is enlightened despotism."⁶⁶

Liang believed that an enlightened despotic form of government would be more effective than other forms of government.⁶⁷ A strong and powerful central government under the leadership of an enlightened despot could unite internal forces and could maintain the peace. It could also protect the independence of the nation and expand its strength to compete with other powers. During the era of imperialism, enlightened despotism was a good form of government and was suitable to the current spirit of the age.⁶⁸

To sum up, it is evident that enlightened despotism as advocated

by Liang possessed two important factors: First, it had to be based on law. Secondly, it had to be of benefit to the state and to the people. The excellence of enlightened despotism lay in that it would be of great benefit to the people even if the people were devoid of intelligence; that it would strengthen the nation but would not bring harsh government with it.⁶⁹ Therefore, a nation in which the aristocrats acted in an overbearing tyrannous manner, a nation which had been under the control of barbaric despotism for ages, or a nation in danger of destruction, should adopt enlightened despotism. Especially those states whose people's level of intelligence was low, or whose territory was too large, and whose races were various, should adopt enlightened despotism.⁷⁰ In other words in 1905 Liang thought that enlightened despotism was the most ideal form of government for China.⁷¹

Liang believed that both republicanism and constitutional monarchy would fail in China. The only way was to continue the maintenance of the present despotic form of government, and then, to 'persuade' the ruler to adopt the policy of enlightened despotism.⁷² The government should educate the people and nourish people's strength in order to prepare for the establishment of a constitutional form of government.⁷³

Liang valued very highly enlightened despotism as a form of government.⁷⁴ However, it seems that Liang had doubts as to the possibility of enlightened despotism succeeding in China at that time. He wrote that without the ministers of state such as Kuan Chung, Shang Yang, Chu Ko-liang and Wang An-shih and rulers such as Caesar, Cromwell, Peter the Great, and Frederick II of Prussia, enlightened despotism could not be attained. Among the rulers and officials in China at that time, no one would be capable of carrying out the system of enlightened despotism.⁷⁵

Therefore, as soon as the Ch'ing Court issued an edict to prepare for the introduction of a constitution in July, 1906, Liang gave up the idea of enlightened despotism and worked very hard for the constitutional monarchy movement. He decided to organize a party. He intended to use the constitutional movement as a means of breaking up the Manchu monopoly of political power. He believed:

In free political competition, whoever has superior ability must occupy the superior position. Since the political ability of the Chinese is far greater than that of the Manchus, there will be no problem whether the Manchus or the Chinese will have the predominant position under a constitutional government.⁷⁶

Since the Manchu regime had adopted as its platform the preparation for constitutional government, the constitutional movement seemed to be in a more advantageous position than the revolutionary one. The most popular and influential man in the constitutional movement was certainly Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. In September, 1907, he and his confreres organized the *Cheng-wen she* (Political Information Association)⁷⁷ and issued a declaration based on the following four major points: (1) organization of a parliament to establish a responsible cabinet system; (2) collation of laws and strengthening the independence of the judicial authority; (3) establishment of a sound local self-government with a clear-cut division of authority between central and local governments; (4) equal rights for the Chinese empire among foreign powers.⁷⁸

Liang also enunciated his methods and expectations in this declaration:

The methods of the *Cheng-wen she* are proper petitions and orderly actions without the slightest intention of violating the dignity of the imperial family or disturbing the peace of our society. That is the normal behavior for citizens of any constitutional state. Now the decree for constitutional monarchy has been proclaimed and the freedom of public assembly

has been proclaimed and political organization has been recognized as the right of the people.... If some government officials do not obey this imperial decree and stubbornly object to constitutional rights, then such officials are not responsible either to the people or to the emperor.⁷⁹

In order to avoid governmental interference, he used "the freedom of assembly" to intimidate meddlesome officials and to encourage his followers to work together toward their aim of a constitutional government. Despite Liang's statement that he had not the slightest intention of violating the dignity of the imperial family, the rumor that he wanted to restore power to the emperor, not the Empress Dowager, and to preserve China, rather than the great Ch'ing dynasty, was widespread. This dreadful rumor had deeply impressed the Manchu nobles. No matter how hard Liang tried to assure them of his loyalty, they did not trust him. Liang also had to face attacks from the revolutionaries. Even the inauguration meeting of the *Cheng-wen she* (the Political Information Association) in Tokyo was interrupted and ended in confusion due to a deliberate interference by the revolutionaries.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, the influence of the Association spread widely. Everywhere in China, pro-constitution societies patterned after the Association mushroomed. Before long the platform of the Association had been circulated in China. The Manchu regime could no longer tolerate its existence. A series of repressive orders were issued in 1908.⁸¹ Under official oppression the *Cheng-wen she* melted away.

III. BROADER NATIONALISM

Before 1902, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was much disappointed in the Ch'ing Court's undertakings. But after he had examined Chinese problems in light of the unstable world situation, he changed his mind.

After his return to Japan from American in late 1903, Liang felt that it was an imperialistic era. Even the United States, where freedom was more worshipped by the Americans than by other peoples, entered the road of imperialism.

By late nineteenth century, the materialistic civilization was highly developed. Dozens of nations fought each other. Thus, imperialism spread over the whole world.... Even the United States changed her policies according to the changed world situation. Authority was centralized in the federal administration in order to compete with other great powers.⁸²

Having plundered other continents, all great powers now concentrated on China.⁸³ They were waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of the Chinese weakness for their own benefits.⁸⁴ Liang felt that the people in China had to realize the dangerous situation which they were in and they had therefore to unite in order to protect their nation and only then would there be a ray of hope of survival. For this reason, he said: "I decide to abandon completely the *po-huai chu-i*, revolution and the anti-Manchu movement."⁸⁵ In order to warn the Chinese people, he pointed out the many effects of revolution and anti-Manchu movement.

As soon as the revolution would start internal strife would be intensified. This sort of natural internal strife often possessed "historical heritage," and "had the inevitable anti-foreign nature," which would not lead to an "orderly revolution." It would result in anti-foreign massacres, or in the disregard of other countries' rights in China, in humiliating other religions, in endangering foreigners' lives and properties, and finally, in the intervention of foreign powers.⁸⁶ The intervention of other powers would result in the dismemberment of China.⁸⁷

When the old government would face the threat of the revolutionary armies, the former would make great concessions to the foreign powers

in order to obtain their military support. Because the Manchus already had the intention of giving China to the foreigners rather than giving it to the slaves (the Chinese). To maintain its authority in China, the Ch'ing Court would grant anything to other powers in return for help.

Liang wrote:

The present government under the Manchus knows that they can not survive any longer. When it would have no other choice, it would seek foreign protection from other powers. The peace-loving countries would not answer its call. Thus, it would have to beg the imperialistic powers for help. Do you think that the imperialistic powers would not take advantage of the opportunity? I do not know which power would come first. But Russia who used to apply a cunning kind of diplomacy would be pleased to come to offer her support.⁸⁸

Then, the balance of power in China would be jeopardized. In order to avoid the imbalance, other powers certainly would intervene.

After revolution would have broken out, the old things would be destroyed and reconstruction would be halted. The old central government would be overthrown and the new republican government could not be established. Even if a new republican government could be temporarily established, it would be followed by further conflict. The central authority would be in chaos. The provinces would experience ravages of soldiery and brigands. The people would be the ones who would suffer most. Furthermore, the internal strife would excite the people's second characteristic---trouble-making. Trouble would spread everywhere. The foreign powers would support any member, no matter how far or how close in their relation, of the royal family who had been in exile to establish a puppet government in their concessions in China. Since then, the puppet's destiny would be controlled by the foreigners. China then would become another Egypt.⁸⁹

When revolution would occur, great powers would station troops

in their concessions under the pretext of proper protection according to international law. What the Japanese and the Russians did in Manchuria, the Russians in Mongolia, the Germans in Shantung and the French in Kuangsi and Yünnan were good examples. They would also use local disorders as an excuse to establish military governments, or establish civil administration.

Even after old government would be overthrown and military matters would be settled.... Big or small local riots would break out successfully. If the new government would ask all powers to withdraw their troops from China, the cunning one would use any excuse such as local disturbances to maintain its forces. Russia is a good example.⁹⁰

At that time, "irrespective of whether the new government would require the withdrawal of troops, the great powers would insist the right of international protection in order to maintain their spheres of influence." Thus, this delicate situation could not be settled except by war. If the war would break out, "the new government would be defeated and China would be in ruin." Moreover, "If the new government would avoid direct military conflict with this power, it would have to bear the humiliation and would loose sovereignty over a part of the land."⁹¹ Therefore, revolution could result in the ruin of the nation, or the loss of a part of territorial sovereignty.

Even if the policies of great powers towards China would not be the policies of a dismemberment, they would intervene in order to protect their commerical interests in China.⁹² They would make an agreement based on the principle of equal opportunity for all. "As a result of this sort of agreement, they would make the same arrogant demand as they did after the Boxer Rebellion."⁹³ Even if China would not be dismembered by the great powers after the revolution, China's

national economy would be badly damaged.⁹⁴

Liang felt that his past advocacy of revolution and support of the anti-Manchu movement would unwittingly lead China into danger. He repeatedly pointed out the above-mentioned arguments in his several publications in order to persuade his countrymen not to follow his former advice.⁹⁵

The fear that revolution and the anti-Manchu movement would produce bad effects was one of the reasons why Liang changed his views. At this time, he also believed that the relation between the Han Chinese and the Manchus had gradually improved so that the Han Chinese should change their hostile feelings toward the Manchus. Liang, based on the interpretation of *min-tzu* (nation or people) by the sociologists cited many facts to prove that "the Manchus actually have assimilated with the Han Chinese" and that "the Han Chinese and the Manchus had the prerequisites to complete a composite nation."⁹⁶

Liang believed that "a nation has six elements: (1) the same blood; (2) the same language; (3) the same dwelling-place; (4) the same customs; (5) the same religion; (6) the same spirit and physical characteristics."⁹⁷ Liang examined the relation between the Han Chinese and the Manchus in the light of these six elements. He first examined the language. "Although the Manchus have their own language they have not used it for a long time."⁹⁸ Furthermore, "The Manchus who are now living in China proper seldom speak their own language."⁹⁹ As a matter of fact, "all Manchus can now read and speak Chinese. Those who can read or speak the Manchu language constitute less than one percent of the people. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Han Chinese and the Manchus have the same language."¹⁰⁰ Thus the two ethnic groups possess the second prerequisite to constitute one

nation.

As for the same dwelling-places. "The Han Chinese are settled in eighty or ninety percent area of Manchuria. The Manchus also are settled in Peking and in the internal eighteen provinces. It is very difficult to point out territory exclusive to the Manchus."¹⁰¹ Thus, the Han Chinese and the Manchus had the same third prerequisite.

As for the same customs,

The Manchus have assimilated generally with the northern Han Chinese in their customs except for a few differences. The Manchus who live in other provinces have already assimilated with the Han Chinese in those provinces. This is a fact that no one will deny.¹⁰²

This is the fourth prerequisite.

As for the same religion, "nowadays most of the Han Chinese are Buddhists. So are the Manchus. Some of the Han Chinese profess the 'Confucian religion.' So do some of the Manchus." This is the fifth prerequisite.

As for the same spirit and physical characteristics, Liang thought that this element should be further examined by the anthropologist. But, in examining the external figures of the Manchus and the Han Chinese, continued Liang,

It seems to me that there is not much difference. Even if there are differences, these are small. When comparing the Chinese with the Japanese, the difference is apparent.... Even if the Chinese and the Manchus do not belong to the same ethnic group, their relation must be very close. The assimilation of these two groups must be very easy.¹⁰³

As for the first prerequisite--the same blood, Liang felt this element too must be further examined by the historians. He pointed out that

During the period of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, when *Chi* and *Yen* negotiated with *San-yün*, during the period of *Ch'in*

the period of Wang Mang and the period of Three Kingdoms, a great number of people moved to Manchuria in order to escape internal disorders. There were so many historical facts to prove this.¹⁰⁴

Thus, Liang believed that not all Manchus were unrelated by blood with the Han Chinese.

After Liang had examined the relation between the Han Chinese and the Manchus according to the six prerequisites, he concluded that these two ethnic groups had at least four similarities. As for the other two, Liang could not come to a definite conclusion but he believed that they were very closely related to each other. He declared that the Manchus had already assimilated with the Han Chinese and that they both had the prerequisites to complete a composite nation. From now on, there should be no anti-Manchu movement.

After his return from America, Liang became wiser and more broad-minded. He believed that revolution and the anti-Manchu movement were bad for all ethnic groups in China and for the future of his Fatherland. He raised his voice against the narrow-nationalism as advocated by some Han Chinese in their attitude towards other ethnic groups. Liang now advocated "broader-nationalism" in order to unite all ethnic groups in China against "other races outside of China." He not only advocated assimilation of the Manchus to expand the internal strength of the country but he also wanted assimilation of the Mongolians, Tibetans, *Miaos* and *Huis*, in order to save China. Liang suggested to his countrymen that they should adopt a new national policy in the future in which they should abandon narrow "national vengeance." They should "recognize the times and the circumstances and unite all ethnic groups in China in order to maintain a superior position of the one-third of mankind on the five continents."¹⁰⁵ It is evident that

his concept of broader nationalism was the foundation for the establishment of a strong China. The principle of "The Union of the Five Races in The Chinese Republic" advocated by the new governments after the revolution of 1911 was actually in accord with Liang's views.

CHAPTER V
LIANG CH'I-CH'AO AND REPUBLICAN POLITICS

I. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

While Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was waiting in Japan for a favourable time to return to China, the political situation changed drastically. On January 1, 1912, the Provisional Government of the Republic of China was established in Nanking. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was elected as the provisional president. In the first ten days of January, an agreement was reached during secret negotiations under which, given certain favorable conditions, the Manchu Emperor Hsuan-tung would abdicate. After this Dr. Sun Yat-sen would resign his position as provisional president and be replaced by Yuan Shih-kai. Under Yuan's pressure, the Manchu emperor relinquished his throne on February 12. Yuan thus became Provisional President of China three days later. Before long, the dispute about the location of the capital of the Republic between Yuan and the revolutionaries broke out. In favor of Peking, Yuan argued that the combined menace of the latent danger from Japan and Russia and the divided opinions in the north was too great to ignore; that the transfer from Peking to Nanking would cause a great deal of inconvenience to the diplomatic missions; and that the border regions such as North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia might fall into the waiting hands of the neighbouring powers such as Japan and Russia. The revolutionaries, on the other hand, regarded Peking as the symbol of all the evil customs of the Manchu bureaucracy. On this subject, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao sided with the revolutionaries. He agreed that:

The capital (Peking), has become the hotbed of all evils. Not only has the land lost its auspicious features and the water its sweet taste, but a thousand crimes, a myriad scandals, weird carbuncles and chronic diseases of this sinful world are also concentrated there. If the political centre stays there, China will never see a single day of clean government.¹

But the provisional government and the provisional parliament were transferred to Peking on April 4, 1912. This was a great triumph for Yuan Shih-kai. The effective weapon with which the revolutionaries could fight Yuan was the parliamentary system which had been provided for in the provisional constitution. Meanwhile, the members of the *Tung-meng kui* under the leadership of Dr. Sun became increasingly aware of their ability to dominate the parliament. The members of the other political parties, fearing that the parliament might fall entirely into the hands of the *Tung-meng hui*, attempted to create strong parties of their own to fight against the *Tung-meng hui*.

While he was still in Japan, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's influence over the political activities in China was profound. The *Kung-ho chien-she t'ao-lung hui* (Association for Discussion of the Establishment of a Republic) and *Kung-ho l'ung-i lang* (Republican United Party) had evolved from the pre-revolutionary *hsien-yu hui* (Friends of the Constitution), whose theology had been near Liang's and fed by his writings. The members of the former regarded Liang as their moving spirit.²

The conflict among the parties and cliques in the provisional parliament became more keen after the removal of the provisional government to Peking. The *Tung-meng hui*, because of their strong organization, dominated the provisional parliament. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao received from his friends and followers a lot of letters urging him to return to China

as soon as possible. He was persuaded to organize a large party in order to fight against the *Tung-meng hui* in the provisional parliament.³ He told them in replies that he would like to unite those small political cliques and groups and suggested that Li Yuan-hung should be made the leader of the united party.⁴ Liang also wrote to Yuan Shih-kai, the then provisional president, discussing the relations between those parties.⁵ This letter marked the beginning of their brief cooperation.

In May, 1912, the *Kung-ho tang* (The Republican Party) was formed by the fusion of the *Min'shè* (People's Society) with several small groups. Yuan Shih-kai fostered this. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao took part in the policy-making of the party. He urged amalgamation with parties near it in principle. The *Kung-ho tang* praised him publicly as the architect of the new China, announced that the party followed his precepts, and claimed to recognize that he was at one with them in spirit.⁶

In opposition to the *Kuomintang* which was formed in August 1912 by a combination of the *Tung-meng hui* and the *T'ung-i kung-ho tang* (United Republican Party) together with other small groups, other parties were also reshaped. Under Liang's direction, the *Min-chu tang* (the Democratic Party) was formed in October 1912 by the amalgamation of the *Kung-ho chien-she t'ao lun hui*, *Kung-ho t'ung-i tang*, *Kung-ho chu-chin hui* (Association for Utmost Advancement of the Republic), *Kung-ho ta'u-chin hui* (Association for Promoting the Republic), *Kuo-min hsin-cheng shè* (Society for a New National Government), and *Min-hsieh hui* (People's Association). Thus, the members of the parliament were divided into three parts; the *Kuomintang*, the *Kung-ho tang*, and the *Min-chu tang*.⁷

In October, 1912, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao finally decided to come back to China. By this time Dr. Sun Yat-sen had retired from the provisional

presidency and Yuan Shih-kai was the single legal chief-executive of the nation. Both Sun's and Yuan's factions had sought in the beginning to win Liang over, but for a time, Liang would not commit himself in any way.⁸

When Liang arrived at Peking on October 12, several hundred people were gathered at the Cheng-yang railroad station to greet him. Among those present were a representative of Provisional President Yuan, ministers and vice-ministers, members of the National Council, and of all political parties. In the following days, he was publicly hailed everywhere. In his speech at a welcoming meeting of the *Kung-ho tang*, Liang publicly declared that the establishment of the Republic of China was the result of the efforts of the Republicans. On February 14, 1913, Liang formally entered into the *Kung-ho tang* and before long, became its life and soul.⁹

Although the might of the opposition to the Kuomintang was strengthened, the results of elections for parliament which were held at the end of 1912 and the beginning of 1913, disappointed Liang and his followers. A majority of the seats in the first formal parliament were occupied by the Kuomintang. Facing the superior position of the Kuomintang, the three parties, the *Kung-ho tang*, the *T'ung-i tang* (the Unification Party) and the *Min-chu tang*, in May, 1913, were combined into the *Chin-pu tang* (the Progressive Party) under Liang's direction. Although Li Yuan-hung was nominally elected chief, it was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who formulated important *Chin-pu tang* policy and drafted the party's suggested permanent constitution of the Republic of China.

In the article *Chin-pu tang ni Chung-Hua Min-Kuo hsien-fa chao-an*

(the Draft of a Permanent Constitution of the Republic of China Proposed by the Progressive Party) written in 1913, Liang outlined a constitution including a bicameral legislature, freedom of belief and compulsory military service.

There was to be no legislation by presidential decree; all laws would have to be ratified by the legislative assembly. The president could veto, but a two-thirds vote in both houses would overrule him. The party stood for nationalism, a strong central government, and an open-minded awareness of world trends. It would encourage education on a mass basis and develop universities in the interior of the country. Suffrage would be limited by certain educational and property standards. The government would conduct civil-service examinations and reform tax and monetary systems.¹⁰

In general, Liang and the members of the *chin-pu tang* supported Yuan Shih-kai for the presidency because they believed that only Yuan, who had the backing of the *Pei-yang* military clique, would be able to unite the country. The *Kuomintang* members who set themselves squarely in opposition to Yuan, regarded Liang as their enemy. When Sung Chiao-jen, one of the top *Kuomintang* leaders, was murdered in Shanghai on March 21, Sung's followers charged that Yuan was responsible. Liang, however, did not agree. He also supported Yuan's policy of soliciting a huge loan from the foreign powers in order to reorganize the governmental structure and the armed forces. The *Kuomintang* considered the huge loan as a personal fund for Yuan, thus, objected to it. To Liang and the members of the *Chin-pu tang*, the proper use of this borrowed money was the only concern.¹¹

Anti-Monarchical Movement

Dr. Sun Yat-sen led the anti-Yuan campaign in 1913 which had resulted partly from the Sung Chiao-jen murder case, (which in its turn derived from the fact that the *Kuomintang* members dominated the parliament),

and partly from Yuan's Reorganization Loan of 25 million pounds. The so-called Second Revolution in the South led by Sun failed. Sun fled to Japan. This outbreak brought Liang and the *Chin-pu tang* closer than ever to Yuan. Under Yuan's policy of bribery and pressure, the *Kuomintang* partially disintegrated. The center of gravity in the parliament was thus shifted to the *Chin-pu tang*. Fundamentally, Yuan had no particular affection for them. Nevertheless, in order to control the *Kuomintang*, he had to make use of them for the time being.

On July 31, Hsiung Hsi-ling was formally appointed premier by Yuan because Hsiung was exactly the man to have close dealings with the *chin-pu tang*. Still retaining his office as governor of Jehol, Hsiung declined again and again to come to Peking. After repeated urging from Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Hsiung was finally installed as premier on August 28. Hsiung's plan had been to head his 'First-Class Cabinet' with Liang, whom he wished to appoint minister of finance so that he might fulfill his plan of financial reorganization, but Yuan put a veto on the proposal. Liang, in his turn, firmly refused the education portfolio. Chang Chien and Wang Ta-shi, the second and third most capable persons on Hsiung's list, refused to enter the cabinet unless Liang did so. Many members of the *chin-pu tang*, hoping Liang would lead the party, opposed his entry into the cabinet. After much persuasion by Hsiung and Yuan, Liang finally accepted the Ministry of Justice.¹²

Liang's tenure of office was uncomfortable. The *Kuomintang* planned to overcome Yuan by constitutional restraint and by the presidential election. The articles governing the presidential election were just one part of the constitution; it was a normal procedure to draw up the

constitution first and elect the president later. Liang favored this procedure. Nevertheless, the people at large considered the recognition of the Republic of China by the foreign powers to be the big problem. If the Republic were not formally recognized by the foreign powers, it would not have legal standing in the international family; and unless there was a formally elected president, it would not be easy to gain this recognition. Yuan Shih-kai, utilizing this popular opinion, ordered his partisans to advocate the necessity of electing a president before the drawing up of a constitution. The *chin-pu tang* members of the parliament preferred to confirm the leading position of Yuan. They feared that postponement of the election might give the *Kuomintang* members of the parliament the opportunity to cause more trouble. The situation changed Liang's mind. He now supported Yuan's stand.¹³ The *Kuomintang* members, unable to insist on their original situation, had to yield. Yuan Shih-kai, who had hitherto acted as provisional president of China, was elected president on October 6, 1913.

Yuan, however, was determined that he would like to be a president with power as great as that of an emperor. Liang now understood that Yuan would not trust him and the *chin-pu tang*. They tried to limit Yuan's power, but their efforts came too late. On November 4 came Yuan Shih-kai's coup d'etat. The order of the president, co-signed by the premier was issued for the dissolution of the *Kuomintang* and the cancellation of its parliamentary membership. Before the order came into being, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao went to see Yuan and asked him to recall it. Yuan declined his request.¹⁴ In January, 1914, Yuan dissolved the parliament altogether. Centralized personal government had emerged. The cabinet had no role left.

In February, Hsiung Hsi-ling, the premier and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao resigned in succession.

Liang and other leaders of the *chin-pu tang* still cooperated with Yuan Shih-kai in every way in the hope that by means of the constitution Yuan's 'enlightened despotism' would save China.¹⁵ One of Liang's concerns at this time was the reform of the Chinese monetary system. When he served as a member of the National Monetary Commission from 1912 to 1913, he came to the conclusion that the silver standard was the only practical system for China. Thus, when he was appointed the first director of the Monetary Bureau, in March, 1914, Liang suggested that the silver dollar should take the place of the 'hopelessly indeterminate' tael in all government expenditures, budget estimates and tax payments. He failed in carrying out his plans because of the opposition in foreign diplomatic circles and the resistance of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service.¹⁶ He also tried to solicit a foreign loan to stabilize the Chinese currency but failed because of the outbreak of war in Europe. Liang resigned by the end of the year.¹⁷

On June 20, the *Ts'an-cheng yuan* (Council of State) was established under the chairmanship of Li Yuan-hung. Liang ch'i-ch'ao became a member of this new organization to which he proposed in October that compulsory education and compulsory military service be carried out in the country. However, the *Ts'an-cheng yuan* failed to adopt these measures.¹⁸

When Liang served as a member of the *Ts'an-cheng yuan*, he also was able to learn the details of Japan's Twenty-one Demands on China in January, 1915. He had proposed in 1899 that China and Japan should cooperate to protect the yellow people and in order to compete with other

races.¹⁹ But when Japan, with her Twenty-one Demands, threatened the integration of China, Liang became one of the outspoken leaders of the anti-Japanese movement. He wrote several articles to persuade the Japanese government to withdraw these unreasonable demands. Chinese nationalism and patriotism, aroused by Liang's arguments were so tremendous, in the winter and the following spring, that even Yuan Shih-kai who had hope of soliciting a loan from Japan, stiffened the resistance to the latter's threat. The Tokyo government had to modify its demands. Such being the case, Liang was accused of ingratitude by the Japanese press. He, in his replies, did not deny that he had received protection and financial support from the Japanese government for more than a decade when he was in exile in Japan, but he argued that he could not for this reason betray his own country. He also stated clearly that he argued from his own free convictions as any Japanese would do under the similar circumstances.²⁰

Also from his own free convictions, Liang withdrew his support from Yuan Shih-kai when he learned of Yuan's ambition to be an emperor. In the early spring of 1915 the monarchical movement was being carried on despite lack of support from the people. In January, Liang was suddenly invited by Yuan's son, Yuan K'o-ting, to dinner. He found Yuan's adviser, Yang Tu (Yang was to be the campaign manager for Yuan, the emperor) there also. During the conversation, the host enumerated the weaknesses of republicanism. It became obvious to Liang that his host wanted to change the national policy, was deeply interested in becoming the crown-prince of a new dynasty, and was seeking Liang's support. To the displeasure of the host, Liang explained the domestic and foreign dangers in such a

course. Liang anticipated disaster, resigned his post and moved his family to Tientsin. In his farewell letter to Yuan Shih-kai, Liang quoted an ancient classic to remind the President: "Rites, justice, incorruptibility and a sense of shame are the basic principles of an administration without which the government will perish."²¹ Then, Liang left for the south and spent most of his time in Canton and Shanghai.

In May and June, 1915, while Yuan himself still strongly denied the existence of any monarchical ambition, the signs of a dynasty in the making became increasingly evident. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao went to Peking with General Feng Kuo-chang, the governor of Kiangsu, to find out the inside story. Liang asked Yuan to make a public statement in plain words in order to halt the rumors. Yuan again unhesitatingly denied it before them, asserting that if the Chinese people compelled him to take up the throne, he would leave China to settle in England.²² After this assurance, Feng returned to his post, but Liang remained in the north.

In June, while Yuan denounced the rumors about a revival of the monarchy as completely groundless, his supporters, however, were eager for action. Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, an American professor and an authority on constitutional law who had been advisor to Yuan, presented Yuan with a memorandum recommending monarchy for China. His arguments were reproduced in a pamphlet by Yang Tu and spread abroad by the *Ch'ou-an hui* (Planning for Peace Society) organized in August and dedicated to the monarchical movement.²³ The name of this society implied that unless a monarchy was established, China might not have peace.

Their arguments stirred the boiling pot. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who had publicly expressed no opinion of Yuan since returning from Japan in

1912, decided now upon open opposition. A few days after the publication of Yang's pamphlet, Liang in the sanctuary of the Tientsin concessions, completed his critique of it under the title *I-tsai so-wei Kuo-ti wen-ti che* (How Strange The So-called Problem of The Form of Polity). Yuan, knowing of the article before it was published, sent a man to offer Liang 200,000 *yuan* in an attempt to prevent him from publishing it. This being declined, even though the messenger threatened Liang with banishment, Liang published the article in which he said:

What guarantee have those who argue in favor of a monarchical system that after the proposed change a constitution will be adopted and observed....? If they have none, then all that they are left with is a monarchy without a constitution. In other words, what we may have is not a constitutional but an autocratic empire. I do not understand how an autocracy can be a better alternative to this imperfect republic.²⁴

The conduct of a government, he maintained, had no necessary connection with its form.

Let us look back at the history of our Imperial Houses. It is littered with intrigue, contention, and corpses. This shows clearly that the factors which determine war and peace lie elsewhere than in the constitutional forms of a republic or a monarchy.²⁵

Furthermore,

A monarch depends on a kind of metaphysical power which is a product of history and of custom, to preserve his dignity. His dignity has inexplicable strength by which the peace and order of a country can be maintained. This is undoubtedly the most treasured quality in a monarch. But that dignity must never be blemished. Once blemished, it ceases to be dignity.²⁶

He cited the monarchies of Russia, Persia and Turkey as examples to scotch the idea that monarchy means stability while a republic, with its discontinuity in executive power, means chaos.²⁷ He did not think that it was wise to revive monarchy in China. Also in this article, he praised Yuan's

protestations of republicanism and affected to believe that a great gulf existed between Yuan and the *ch'ou-an hui*. He did so because he wished that Yuan would still draw back and abandon his imperial ambitions. Yuan paid no attention to Liang's arguments and the *Hung-hsien* reign was set to begin on January 1, 1916. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao tendered his resignation as a member of the *Ts'an-cheng yuan*, on the ground of indisposition, thus severing his last link with Yuan's administration.

On August 15, 1915, the day after the establishment of the *ch'ou-an hui*, Ts'ai Ao, who had received his political indoctrination from Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in Changsha in 1897-98 and had been military governor of Yunnan and therefore had great influence among the soldiers there, paid Liang a special visit to discuss his plans for opposition to Yuan. Liang told him that

My responsibility is to the press, and I must therefore write an article to protest, openly and with dignity, against Yuan's action. You are an important military man and you should be very careful to avoid Yuan's hatred and envy while you secretly try to fight against him.²⁸

Agreeing with Liang's statement, Ts'ai played along with Yuan for two months in Peking so that Yuan might not suspect him. In October, Ts'ai and his friends made all their plans at Liang's residence in Tientsin. Prior to Ts'ai's departure to Japan for medical treatment with Yuan's approval, Liang wrote to Yuan asking for a passport for a proposed trip to America. He did not go to America at all. Instead he left Tientsin on December 16 for Shanghai. Ts'ai Ao did not sail for Japan either. He arrived at Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province on Dec. 19, the day after Liang reached Shanghai. Liang stayed there for two months discussing the anti-Yuan campaign with Feng Kuo-chang,

and maintained communication with all important centers.²⁹

According to their plans formulated in Tientsin, the anti-monarchist Yunnan troops would march on to the Szechuan border on December 23 and that, twenty days later, Yunnan would make a public declaration of independence. But Liang in Shanghai felt now that continued secrecy was impossible, and in his telegram to Ts'ai Ao he urged immediate action. This was agreed upon. On December 23 an ultimatum demanding the abrogation of the Empire was sent by the Yunnan Government to the Emperor, Yuan Shih-kai. No reply came from Yuan after twenty-four hours, the deadline they set, had passed. Thus, Yunnan declared its independence.³⁰

After the National Protection Army launched its anti-Yuan expedition from Yunnan on January 1, 1916, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao wrote from Shanghai to Lu Yung-ting, governor of Kuangsi urging him to join the anti-monarchists.³¹ Late in February, Lu sent agents to invite Liang to Kuangsi and promised that he would join the revolt after Liang had arrived in his province. In order to win Lu over, Liang made his way south. He went first to Haiphong, Vietnam because Kuangtung was still loyal to Yuan Shih-kai. In order to avoid Yuan's agent, he did not take the railroad from Haiphong but crossed the mountains and the Chinese border into eastern Yunnan. On March 15 Liang and Lu telegraphed a new ultimatum to Yuan. When Yuan ignored it, Kuangsi declared its independence. A few other provinces had already thrown in with Yunnan.³²

The influence of the National Protection Army was constantly expanding; Yuan's hopes for its suppression grew dimmer and dimmer.

Without support from foreign sources, Yuan's only remaining chance was a compromise with the anti-monarchists. On March 22, the title of the reign, *Hung-hsien*, was formally discarded. His acceptance of the throne on December 12, 1915 was revoked. The year of 1916 resumed its notation as the fifth year of the Republic of China. He remained president of the Republic, appointed Hsu Shih-chang as Minister of State, Ts'ai-Ao to the Ministry for the Army, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to the Ministry of Justice.³³

Before long, Liang received a telegram from Hsu requesting a truce and a discussion of the problems which now existed. Hsu also asked Lu Yung-ting to bring about a compromise with Lung Chi-kuang, the *Tutu* (military governor) of Kuangtung. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, fearing that Lu might be confused, sent him a telegram urging him not to be swayed by Lung. Thus, Hsu's efforts were in vain. Liang and the leaders of the National Protection Army rejected the direct appeal for negotiation and refused to suspend this military operation. They insisted that Yuan should step down from his position.

In response to pressure from all sides, Lung chi-kuang formally declared Kuangtung's independence on April 6. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao did not trust him because there was not a single word of criticism of Yuan in his declaration. In a telegram to Lu Yung-ting from Lungchow, Liang said:

The position of Kuangtung is of great importance to the fate of the nation. If Lung still insists on his stand, we must make him surrender to us, and even the protection of his present position should not be thoughtlessly granted if he requests it.³⁴

In another telegram to T'ang Chueh-t'un, he stated: "Unless Yuan

abdicates, there is no room for mediation in Peking; unless Lung resigns, there can be no compromise in Kuangtung."³⁵ However, Lu Yung-ting did not wish to sever his relations with Lung Chi-kuang. Lung did his best to retain his position.

Near the end of April, the supreme military government of the National Protection Army was organized and represented by the four *Tutus* of Yunnan, Kweichow, Kuangtung and Kuangsi, and by Ts'ai Ao and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Liang was also made chief of staff of the Kuangtung and Kuangsi armies. He then drafted plans for a *Chun-wu yuan* (Military Council or Department of Military Affairs), to coordinate the activities of the anti-Yuan provinces. It was formally established on May 8 in which Liang was one of the councillors. Later, he was elected chairman of the political committee, that is, head of civil affairs in the anti-monarchist military government. While Yuan Shih-kai was resolving to resume warfare, the *Chun-wu yuan* of South China stated its minimum requirement for peace--the immediate resignation of Yuan. Other circumstances were favorable to them. Shensi, Hunan, Szechwan declared their independence in May.

Yuan's constant worry and his disgrace had made him ill. On April 24, Tuan Ch'i-jui was appointed Premier, to be fully responsible for governmental decisions; Yuan himself was thus apparently stripped of all power except the command of a bodyguard. Yuan's retirement was now certain. The struggle for the succession moved into a very delicate stage in May. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao received from Feng Kuo-chang a telegram arguing that since Yuan had torn up the Constitution, the Vice-President, like the President himself, had lost his office, and

consequently his claim to the higher rank. Liang was strenuously opposed to this view, for the main aim of the entire Anti-monarchy campaign was to protect the Constitution at any cost. In this Liang had the support of the insurgents who had previously persuaded the Diplomatic Corps in Peking to deal directly with the Vice-President instead of Yuan Shih-kai.³⁶ Liang sent a letter to Premier Tuan saying: "Your position today is similar to Yuan's in 1911. Yuan could not have solved the dangerous situation then, had the Manchus refused to abdicate. Likewise, you will not succeed in your assignment if Yuan does not go."³⁷ He also advised Tuan to support Li Yuan-hung the Vice-President. Although Yuan was unacceptable in any shape or form, Liang's object was neither to split China, nor to obliterate the whole central government for his own or anyone else's purposes. He was ready to recognize Li Yuan-hung as president in order to heal the breach between north and south.

Yuan's death on June 6, 1916, provided an automatic solution to the problem of his retirement. As some people in the North mourned his death, those in the South joyfully celebrated it. On Yuan Shih-kai, Liang made the following comment:

Yuan does not know the difference between a man and a beast. All he knows about human beings is that they fear weapons and love gold and it is by those two things that he rules the country. For four years there has been no political guidance in Peking only the ghostly shadow of a knife and a piece of gold... day in and day out, he has enticed people by waving a piece of gold in front of their eyes and has threatened them with a knife at their backs. By bribery and terror, he has enslaved our people.... For four years, there have not been any moral standards among the elite of our country. It can not be denied that seven or eight out of every ten of them are now thoroughly corrupt. Who is responsible for this? I do not hesitate a moment in saying that, it has been entirely

due to Yuan Shih-kai.... If his empire exists and continues to exist for many years to come, good will diminish and eventually perish and only evil will survive, bringing the entire Chinese nation to its lowest level.³⁸

War Lords

After Yuan Shih-kai's death, Li Yuan-hung succeeded him as President, as provided by the constitution. Li appointed Tuan Ch'i-jui as Premier and announced the restoration of the old constitution of 1912. and convoked the original parliament of 1913. In order to establish a rapprochement with Premier Tuan, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao induced T'ang Ch'i-yao, the commander-in-chief of the National Protection Army, to telegraph from Yunnan the order for dissolution of the *Chun-wu yuan*. Thus, the war against monarchism had ended, but the political situation in China was still in great chaos.

When Yuan Shih-kai died, Lung Chi-kuang immediately without consulting the *chun-wu yuan*, announced the cancellation of the independence of Kuomintang. Tuan Ch'i-jui tried to use Lung to fight against the Kuomintang by immediately appointing him *Tutu* and governor of Kuomintang. The people of Kuangtung were angry. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao also voiced his objection to Lung's prolonged stay in that province, but he did not want to see Kuangtung fall into the hands of the Kuomintang. He wished to make use of Lu Yung-ting. He therefore worked for the appointment of Lu. On July 6, Lu was named *Tutu* of Kuangtung.

Liang now had already established a bond between himself and Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui. The members of the *chin-pu tang* under Liang tried vigorously to cooperate with the faction of the *Peiyang* military group which was led by Tuan, thus causing a major split with the

Kuomintang. During the anti-Yuan campaign, the old *Kuomintang* and the *chin-pu tang* had presented in some forms a united front. After Yuan's death, the leaders of the *chin-pu tang* maintained that there should no longer be political parties and that they wanted no cabinet positions for themselves or for their party. When the parliament convened on August 1, 1916, which marked the second unification of North and South, the members of the *Chin-pu tang* split into two factions; the *Hsien-fa yen-chiu hui* (the Constitution Research Society) led by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; the *Hsien-fa ta'o-lun hui* (the Constitution Discussion Society). Later, when the old *Kuomintang* was reunified and became the dominant power, the two societies, under Liang's direction, united to form the later famous *Yeng-chiu hsi* (Research Clique). They still supported Premier Tuan until 1918 when the latter became able to lean on his own *Anfu* group.³⁹

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao reached Peking from the South on January 5, 1917. The political situation in the capital was deteriorating rapidly. Along with intrigues outside and inside parliament, there were conflicts between President Li's secretariat and Premier Tuan's cabinet. Liang's presence caused a great stir. Rumors had it that there would be a change in the cabinet, and that Liang would head one of the next ministries. There were also rumors in the air that even the parliament would be dissolved. Although he had some opinions on certain constitutional problems, such as the reform of the structure of the upper house, and the exclusion of the provincial system from the constitution, what Liang really intended to do at that time was to try to mediate a compromise settlement between President Li's

faction and Premier Tuan's following. Liang repeatedly declared that he had no intention to enter politics, but had decided to engage in intellectual and educational work. However, his open support of Tuan made him unpopular. Furthermore, Liang was not able to alter the actions of Tuan's military clique. Tuan wanted to control Li Yuan-hung as his puppet and eventually to grasp all the power of the president in his own hands.

War with Germany

At this moment occurred the problems of war against Germany. President Li, Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang, the majority of the *Tutus* many members of the parliament, such famous leaders not in the government as Sun Yat-sen, and also civic and commercial organizations were opposed to China's joining the Allied powers; but Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was strongly in favor of it. All the members of the *Yeng-chiu hsi* in the parliament supported him. Premier Tuan and the *Peiyang* warlords were also in favor of war with Germany.

Both Liang and Tuan now labored, against considerable opposition to bring China into the First World War on the Allied side, but they differed in motive. Liang's motive was to imitate the Italian statesman Cavour, who insisted on his country's participation in the Crimean War in order to enhance Piedmont's international position. Liang stated that the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany in 1897 had broken the peace of Asia. Thus, Germany was China's enemy and China should join the Allies against her in the interests of humanity and international law.⁴⁰ Tuan's intention was, however, to get Japanese money and weapons in order to strengthen his own power against the opposition in China.

The main diplomatic policy declaring war on Germany was approved by the parliament in March,⁴¹ but leaders both inside and outside the government were still divided on this matter. On March 26, 1917, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao wrote a letter to the cabinet asking for early declaration of war against Germany and Austria. His letter was unacceptable to several persons. Feng Kuo-chang telegraphed his objection to the government from Nanking.

In May the *Peiyang* warlords, favoring war with Germany, used a mob to pressure the parliament into a declaration, but without success. At this time, the anti-Tuan sentiment was accelerated by the publication, on May 18, of Tuan's secret connections with Japanese militarists. This stirred a majority of parliament to ask Premier Tuan to resign. The *Peiyang* warlords expressed support of Tuan by requesting the dissolution of the parliament by President Li. Li told them that he had no power to do so. On May 23, he dismissed Tuan from the post of premier. This order resulted in a rebellion by several *Peiyang* warlords. Upon hearing of the declaration of independence of eight provinces, President Li asked Liang Ch'i-ch'ao to come to Peking to mediate, but Liang replied that he had retired to live as a recluse on the seashore.

Peiyang Military Clique

President Li, under the pressure of warlords sought the mediation of General Chang Hsun. Chang secured the dissolution of the parliament in June and occupied Peking. With the support of K'ang Yu-wei he then announced the restoration of the Hsuan-tung emperor, Henry Pu-yi. This restoration lasted two weeks. The other warlords

joined Tuan Ch'i-jui in suppressing it. On July 14, Tuan entered Peking, accompanied by many important figures of the *yeng-chiu hsi*, including Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Feng Kuo-chang became the President. Tuan was re-appointed premier. Liang joined his new cabinet. This time he became Minister of Finance.

When Feng's administration and Tuan's cabinet were inaugurated the leaders of the *Yeng-chiu hsi* suggested a meeting of the *Lin-shih t'san i yuan* (the Provisional Senate). Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and others explained the reason for the need to organize the parliament as follows:

The Republic of China was overthrown by Chang Hsun in his restoration movement, and now the government has been entirely reorganized. According to the precedent of the first revolution of 1911, a provisional senate should be convened in order to draw up new regulations for the organization of the senate, as well as elections. A new parliament may then be opened.⁴²

Tuan and his followers, the *Peiyang* warlords, wholeheartedly supported his suggestion because the existence of the old parliament would prevent them from grabbing power. Sun Yat-sen and the *Kuomintang*, however, refused to accept, as legal, the dissolution of parliament by Li Yuan-hung. They organized the military government at Canton under the banner of 'protection of the constitution,' and claimed jurisdiction over all China. In his capacity as generalissimo of this government, Sun issued orders for the arrest of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and other northern leaders. Because Liang was a member of Tuan's cabinet, moreover, the *Kuomintang* leaders considered that the recent disastrous train of events had resulted from the motions of Liang and his *yeng-chiu hsi*.⁴³ Sun's orders, however, were ineffective in Peking. Hence, China was

split again. North and South once more fought each other.

As Minister of Finance in the Peking government, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao tried to revive his plan of 1914 for stabilization of the Chinese currency by a foreign loan, but he failed to get a loan of 20,000,000 from the banking combine of England, France, Russia and Japan. However, he succeeded in actually executing the reorganization of the Bank of China in November, 1917. It was important for Chinese finance because, from that year on, the policies of the bank were not effected by the changes in the administrations.⁴⁴ From 1917 to 1918 Tuan borrowed nearly two billion dollars from Japan. Part of this huge amount of money, now called the 'Nishihara loan', was loaned from August, 1917 to January, 1918, and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao participated in the negotiations. For the purpose of buying armaments, a special loan was received in November 1917, with Liang participating in the negotiations.

However, Liang's tenure of office was not very long. The struggle for power between President Feng Kuo-chang and Premier Tuan Ch'i-ju became much more severe than that between Tuan and Li Yuan-hung. On November 20, Tuan's resignation was accepted by Feng. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and several parliamentary members of the *Yeng-chiu hsi* followed Tuan and went out of office. When Tuan became premier again in March, 1918 (to October, 1918) he now made a military alliance with Japan and worked closely with a pro-Japanese group of politicians and with his own *An-fu* (Anhwei-Fukien) clique. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and many patriots began to protest that Tuan was selling China to the foreigners in order to build his own military power. Tuan and the

Peiyang militarists, now completely influenced by the An-fu clique, could no longer be reached by Liang's Yeng-chiu hsi. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, after this bitter lesson, finally withdrew from politics in frustration.

Liang's political life and his hopes came to an end, but he did not neglect his best opportunities to serve his country. Toward the end of 1918, Liang was appointed by the Peking government as adviser to the Chinese ambassadors to the United States, France and England, who comprised the official Chinese delegation which claimed a seat at the Paris Peace Conference. Before his departure for Europe, he made a speech in Shanghai pleading for the return of tariff autonomy to the Chinese. Liang also appealed to the principle of territorial integrity and administrative autonomy, for which, ostensibly, China finally declared war on the Entente. Once in Europe, while travelling in England, France, the Rhineland, and Belgium, Liang continued to express himself in similar fashion. In his statements which were reported by European newspapers, he maintained that foreign interference was responsible for China's chaotic situation. He stigmatized Japan above all as a robber neighbor. He also demanded

...the return to China of foreign leaseholds, shelving of the Boxer Indemnity obligation, abolition of extra-territoriality and other forms of privilege for foreigners, unification of railroads, and abrogation of agreements made under conditions of duress or collusion.⁴⁵

China's case at the Paris Peace Conference had not appeared too hopeless until April 22, 1919 when President Wilson of the United States began to show signs of wavering in the Council of Four. After knowing that no political concessions could be won for China, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao sent from Paris on April 24 a telegram to the

Kuo-min-wai-chiao-hsieh-hui (the Citizens' Diplomatic Association) in Peking opposing Chinese agreement to the peace treaty.⁴⁶

During travel in Europe, Liang had long thoughts about the nature and destiny of Western civilization. His faith in what the West could offer China seemed to have been deeply shaken by the First World War.⁴⁷ After returning home, Liang continued to plead China's case in the public press. On January 24, 1920, Obata Torikichi, the Japanese Minister in Peking, asked direct negotiations between China and Japan over the old Shantung question, which had remained unsolved after China refused to sign the peace treaty with Germany. The *An-fu* Clique planned to accept the proposal. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao opposed it. During the Washington Conference in 1921, when the Shantung problem was under consideration, Liang argued strongly for Chinese territorial integrity and administrative independence.⁴⁸ When, in 1925, the May 30th Incident in Shanghai and the following Shameen Incident in Canton aroused a new spirit of Chinese patriotism, Liang published several articles urging for gradual revision of the unequal treaties.⁴⁹ On June 7, he and six other distinguished leaders in the North issued a 'Tientsin Manifesto', calling for a free and fair investigation and a settlement by conciliation.⁵⁰

III. INTELLECTUAL AND EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

However, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in his last phase, since withdrawing from the political scene, had devoted more attention to intellectual and educational activities. He first taught at Tungnan University in Shanghai, then, the Research Institute of Tsinghua University in Peking. The *Shang-chih hsueh-hui* (The Aspiration Society), founded by Liang and

and other scholars, made great efforts to introduce Western culture. On September 5, 1920, Liang established the *chiang-hsueh shè* (the Society for Lectures on the New Learning) to sponsor public lectures by distinguished Chinese and foreign scholars. Liang and others invited John Dewey; Bertrand Russell; Paul Monroe, the American educator; Hans Driesch, the German philosopher and Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian philosopher-poet, to China to deliver public speeches as well as academic lectures.⁵¹ He also took an active role in the *Che-hsueh shè* (the Philosophical Society) which published the magazine *Che-hsueh* ("Philosophia"), through which the Western philosophy was introduced to the Chinese public. Liang also contributed several studies of ancient Chinese philosophy.⁵²

In the last decade of his life, Liang devoted himself to philosophical and classical studies. History also was one of his main concerns. Under the influence of new thought, Liang began in 1919 his work on the *cheng-li kuo-ku* (reorganization of the national heritage). His contribution was made in the study of Chinese historiography, Chinese cultural history, Chinese literary history, Mohism, and the history of the political thought of ancient China; and his summarized descriptions of the development of Chinese scholarship in the previous three centuries, were influential in the study of the subject. He reviewed critically the history of Buddhism in China. Liang also wrote several provocative articles on science and Western civilization which were very influential in China. He made two main points. On the one hand, although he did say that he only criticized the 'dream of the omnipotence of science', many of his readers obtained the

impression that he believed in the bankruptcy of science. On the other hand, he asserted the failure of Western civilization, which he thought was basically materialistic. Other articles reveal in effect the intention of Liang and his followers to promote a 'spiritual civilization of the East' based on Chinese and Indian cultures as the height of civilization.⁵³

In the few remaining years of his life, Liang was regarded as a sort of dean of scholars and intellectuals, a figure of commanding prestige, one of the Chinese most fitted to mingle with the international society of the learned. On October 26, 1926, when the Crown Prince of Sweden, a distinguished archaeologist, was welcomed to Peking by the Geological Society of China, the Peking Society of Natural History and Peking Union Medical College, it was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who gave the keynote address.⁵⁴

Both his rivals, Sun Yat-sen and his teacher K'ang Yu-wei passed away before him. The day after Sun died, on March 12, 1925, Liang called at Sun's home and extended sympathy to his family. When his old teacher died two years later, Liang himself made the funeral oration in which he praised K'ang as the great pioneer of reform but regretted his effort in 1917 to restore the last Manchu emperor.⁵⁵ Liang died on January 19, 1929. In his forty-six years he not only saw many tremendous political happenings---- the collapse of the Manchu Empire, the establishing of the Republic of China and its ordeal, the birth of Chinese Communism and the change of an ethos, but he also played a leading role in most of those happenings and changes.

CONCLUSION

The old, feeble and decadent China which was shaking as if about to fall in the late nineteenth century has become a young, vigorous, fiery and restless new nation. Although the controversy whether the change is good or bad for China, or even for the whole world, has not been settled, there is absolutely no doubt about that change. This change is the result of the influence of the whole of society. No one man or a few men have such power to make this tremendous transformation, but the first ones in modern times to advocate a complete rejuvenation of China were K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. In examining the trend and the direction of this change, one can not but attribute its leadership to Liang. There were many people who wanted to reform China in the nineteenth century. Li Hung-chang and Chang Chih-tung who each had great political influence in the Ch'ing Court, had the idea of reform, but achieved almost nothing. Ma Liang and Yen Fu who were men of high intellectual reputation also intended to advance China's culture but their actual achievements were slight. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's political power in the Ch'ing Court was not so great as Li's and Chang's. Liang's reputation in the literary circles was not so renowned as that of Ma and Yen. Yet it was Liang's continuous desperate cries for reform of the Chinese political system, general culture and education to which all Chinese responded. Why was Liang so effective? Mainly because he had an idea and he did everything to bring this idea to fruition. A constitutional form of government was his ideal and a democratic state for the Chinese people, its realization. Propaganda, petition and even at times revolution were regarded by him as necessary. If there was no concept of a constitutional monarchy, there could be no evolution of a

parliamentary system. The ideal was forerunner of the reality. Unlike the materialists Liang did not believe that existence determined thought.

Therefore, the political thought which Liang advanced had to be more daring and stimulating than that which existed in that period. Only then, would there be hope of its realization. If one would establish a constitutional form of government in a despotic era, one must not only discuss the introduction of a constitutional monarchy, but one must go beyond it to discuss democracy and even revolution. Although the people might object to all of these ideas, their opposition to the introduction of a constitutional monarchy would be much milder than their opposition to the other two. They would consider the introduction of a constitutional government. The success of the constitutional movement in all countries is more or less dependent on this method. In China, because there was no tradition of responsible political parties, the constitutional monarchy movement failed, but revolution and republicanism succeeded. Liang, unlike K'ang Yu-wei, did not oppose republicanism and revolution. It was his idea of rejuvenating the Chinese people which finally came true.

Historically, the Chinese generally preferred things old to things new.¹ However, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao named their party *Wei-hsin tang* ('To uphold the new' Party).² Although it has the meaning that new is derived from old, Liang put his whole heart into advocating the new. He regarded himself as a latter day *Chen Shè*³ among Chinese intellectuals. He gave himself a name---- *Hsin Shih Shih* (New historian), created new terms, advocated the establishment of a new form of government in China, called the Chinese people *new* people, named his newspaper *New People Magazine*. Thus, all people in China following him put the word *new* in front of every term. From then on, *new* almost

would mean 'good', and 'old' would mean 'bad'. Hence *new* youth, *new* thought, *new* literature, *new* society, *new* democracy, *new* education, *new* Shanghai, *new* East Asia and many other terms like these appeared everywhere in China.

However, one must re-examine Liang's first intention. Did he only want everything new? Did he regard old thoughts, old cultures, as worthless, to be abandoned completely? Not at all. One of the greatest achievements of Liang's life was to distill the quintessence of the old Chinese culture. Then Liang selected Western culture to nourish the new needs. But what to select? There must be a standard by which to measure and to determine what is good, or bad, and what should be adopted or what should be abandoned. Because Liang was a member of the Chinese gentry-scholar class, educated in the traditional classics, it was natural for him to consider and to measure everything from a Confucian point of view. Those portions of Western learning which he selected excluded Christianity and Marxism, but were generally commensurate with some latent concept of Confucianism.

Confucianism was not only his gauge for measuring Western culture but also the means for him to interpret it. Certain concepts in Western culture such as democracy, liberty and equality were metaphysical and were not easy to be interpreted in Chinese. Liang thus abandoned their original interpretation and tried to find their new interpretation in Confucianism. As to democracy, for example, he used the Mencian terms '*Min-wei-kwei* (People are first and of foremost importance)' and '*Tien-hsia-wei-kung* (All under heaven belongs to the people)' to explain it. Such being the case, Liang naturally abandoned many things that he could not interpret in terms of Confucianism. That he did not mention

the relation between God and the principle of liberty is a good example. He could not but abandon it because the Chinese have never had such a concept. Moreover, according to the method used by Liang to introduce and to interpret Western culture, democracy, liberty and other ideas became identical with the original concepts in the Chinese culture. It was much easier for the Chinese people to understand, to accept and to practice these foreign ideas in Liang's way. New ideas thus gradually spread in China. In centuries past, the Buddhist monks in China used this method to interpret the Buddhist scriptures, Liang succeeded by adopting this method.

Liang was not only a thinker and a political theorist but also an activist. He constantly challenged his own ideas with the new. He put his heart into his work enthusiastically. He named his study 'Yin-pin-shih (Ice-drinker's studio)' which indicated his dedication and zeal for learning. Zeal is the origin of motive power and also is the wellspring of a thousand changes. It can nourish one's will and faith, and is also an important element in religious favour. This zeal can be sublimated into a dauntless, fearless spirit. A Confucianist would accept martyrdom to fulfill this spirit. He should be fearless of death to preserve his virtue intact. When an emergency arrives, he should not ask other people to solve problems but put himself forward. As a result of his action, the people would be moved deeply by his sincerity, and would support him in realizing his ideas.

However, 'new' and 'zeal' are makeshift means in keeping with the times. To set that 'new is good' as a premise can not be established in logic. In politics, too much zeal would result in revolution and

dictatorship. A democratic system, on the contrary, is based on tolerance. If there is too much zeal, students would become restless and could not remain at their studies. In the last several decades, the Chinese political situation has been in great chaos because the people overlooked the importance of tolerance. Liang, at that time, advocated intensively 'new' and 'zeal' as methods in order to change the situation. But he also was a man who valued Chinese culture. He put certain limitations on the way of searching for the 'new'. He was dispassionate in mind. He also acted according to well laid plans. He worked hard but did not show his zeal very much. Those who accused him of indulging in everything new and strange and of wasting his efforts, missed the point.

Liang introduced Western learning into Chinese culture. After a few years of mixing those two, a kind of new culture emerged in China. The answer to the problem concerning the future of Chinese culture and its reform had been searched for by the Chinese intellectuals for several decades. Chang Chih-tung *et al* had advocated Chinese learning for the essence of Chinese civilization and Western learning for practical use. Hu Shih promoted complete Westernization. Other scholars had advocated Chinese learning as the foundation for reform. But only Liang solved this problem.

Liang's influence on Chinese culture is tremendous and his achievements are great. Throughout his life, what Liang wanted was to give his countrymen a constitution. He had been promoting this idea since 1898. He continued to lead the constitutional movement till 1925 when he drafted a 'Constitution for the Republic of China' and presented it to Tuan Ch'i-jui, then head of the Peking government. Liang's

constitutional movement failed only because of the Chinese situation.

Furthermore, he advocated patriotism and nationalism. He thought that K'ang Yu-wei's ideas of *ta-tung* (great or universal harmony) and *ko-jen-hsiu-yang* (individual discipline) were adequate but K'ang did not mention what the individual's attitude toward the nation should be. Liang's advocacy of nationalism succeeded where K'ang's failed. Since then, the Chinese have rejected love of emperor and developed love of country.

Liang also advocated national socialism in his article '*Hsin-ta-lu-yu-chi* (Journey in New Continent) written in 1903. He later changed it to democratic socialism in order to distinguish this idea from the political system then established in Germany and the Soviet Union during the 1920's.

Many people have regarded Liang as an opportunist because he was inconsistent in his advocacies. Certainly one can find contradictions in what he did in his later life to what he advocated in his early years. People who devote themselves to politics often express varying opinions in the changing periods of life regarding an issue from various angles. Liang's basic principle throughout his life was that he did not mind challenging his own ideas of today with his ideas of yesterday. He only altered his methods but never changed his aims.

Liang was a man who promoted reform, progress and modernization of China. Any one who has read Liang's anti-Manchu expression in his *Hsin-min tsung-pao* (New People's Magazine) and *Hsin-chung-kuo wei-lai chi* (The Future of New China) in *Hsin-hsiao shuo* (New Novels) will realize that Liang was the first to use the term *Ta-chung-hwa ming-chu-kuo* (Great

Chinese Democratic State). Judging from the terms that he used in *Hsin-min tsung-pao* such as independence, self-government and self-respect, Liang was doubtless the first man who promoted liberalism of the nineteenth century in China.

After the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, he understood clearly that the Ch'ing Court was unworthy of support, but he worried that the extension of internal chaos would result in foreign encroachment. He warned his countrymen of the danger that revolution would lead to the separation of Manchuria and Mongolia from China. Hence he advocated the introduction of a constitution in order to sustain the polity by political reform.

This idea led to a conflict of opinion between his followers and the revolutionaries. Liang and his followers were accused of protecting the Emperor, of being loyal to *Ta-lu* (the Tartar--the Manchus) and of using constitutional monarchy to preserve the powers of the emperor. However, Liang never ceased to emphasize the idea of a constitution. His aim was to extend people's rights by the introduction of a constitution which would lead to the eventual eclipse of the power of the emperor. There was not tradition of this in Chinese political thought. If Liang did not import from Europe the idea of a constitution, then where would the Chinese concept of a constitution and self-government come from? Liang and his comrades petitioned the government and various provincial assemblies to introduce a constitution. If the assemblies were not established in various provinces, then how could the election of provincial *Tutu* and governors be realized? The republicans contributed greatly to the success of the establishment of a republic in China. Liang and his constitution-alists also were contributory to the achievement. Liang never claimed this merit but devoted his strength to protect the republic. He was one

of the leaders to oppose Yuan Shih-kai's monarchist movement and Chang Hsun's restoration movement in order to sustain the foundation of the republic.

It is usually said that there were three heroes who contributed to the success of the establishment of modern Italy. Liang was doubtless one of the heroes who contributed to the success of the realization of republicanism in China. However, the revolutionaries could not forget the conflict of opinions between them and Liang and his followers. The revolutionaries have never extolled Liang's contribution to the establishment of the Republic of China.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

<i>Ch'ing-shih kao</i> (Draft History of the Ch'ing Dynasty)	CSK
<i>Kuang-hsu cheng-yao</i> (Important Political Events of the Kuang-hsu Reign)	KHCY
<i>Shih-hsueh nien-pao</i> (Historical Annual)	SHNP
<i>Kuang-hsu tung-hua hsu-lu</i> (Kuang-hsu Supplement to the Archival Records)	THL
<i>Wu-hsu pien-fa</i> (The Reform of 1898)	WHPF
<i>Yin-ping-shih ho-chi</i> (Collected Works and Essays of the Ice-Drinker's Studio);	YPSHC
<i>Chuan-chi</i> (Collected Works)	YPSHC-CC
<i>Wen-chi</i> (Collected Works)	YPSHC-WC
<i>Yin-ping-shih wen-chi</i> (Collected Essays of the Ice-Drinker's Studio)	YPSWC

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1

In his book *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of China*, Joseph Levenson translates *Cheng-wen she* as 'The Political Culture Association.' However, *wen* is '問' and not '文' and therefore, the correct translation should be 'The Political Information Association.'

2

YPSHC-WC, 33:51.

3

Liang named his study *Yin-pin-shih* (飲冰室) which implied that his thirst for knowledge was similar to other people's thirst for ice in a hot summer.

CHAPTER I

1

Hsieh Fu-chen, *Hsieh-Fu-Chen chu-shih erh-chi* (Diary of Hsieh Fu Chen in His Foreign Service, 1898), Vol. II., p. 4.

2

Feng Tsu-yu, *Chung-hua min-kuo k'ao kuo ch'ien ko-ming shih* (History of the Revolution before the Founding of the Republic; Taipei, 1954), 11: 307.

3

Chang Peng-yuan, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao yù Ch'ing-chi Ko-ming* (Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Revolution in the Ch'ing Period, Taipei, 1964), pp. 11-12; Ting Wen-chiang, *Liang Jen-Kung hsien-sheng nien-pu ch'ang-pien ch'u-kuo* (First Draft of the Chronological Biography of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Taipei, 1959), pp. 8-13.

4

Chang, pp. 31-34.

5

Ibid., p. 13; Ting, p. 15.

6

Chao Feng-t'ien, "K'ang Ch'ang-su hsien-sheng nien-pu kao (A Draft Chronological Sketch on the Life of K'ang Yu-wu)," *SHNP*, 2(1934), 189.

7

Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China* (Princeton, N.J., 1956), pp. 145-155.

8

WHPF, 2:2.

9

Chang, pp. 49-58; Wen Ching, *The Chinese Crisis From Within* (London, 1901), pp. 43-44; Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning* (New York, 1934), p. 53.

10

Ko Kung-chen, *Chung-kuo pao-hsueh shih* (A History of Chinese Journalism, Shanghai, 1928), p. 125.

11

WHPF, 4: 45-46; Chang, p. 68.

12

YPSHC, 57: 1B-2.

13

Ting, p. 44; Chang, pp. 72-73.

14

Ibid., pp. 73-78; Chang Chih-tung, *Chang Wen-hsiang Kung ch'uan-chi* (Complete Works of Chang Chi-tung; Peking, 1928), 218: 6-9.

15

Ibid.

16

Chang Peng-yuan, p. 31.

17

CSK, *pen-chi* section, 24: 7b; *THL*, 145:8.

18

KHCY, 24: 4-7.

19

Ting, p. 67.

20

For a detailed account of the Hundred Day's Reform, 1898, see *WHPF*; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi* (Record of the Coup d'état of 1898; Tokyo, 1898); Hou Wai-lu, chief ed.; *Wu-shü pien-fa liu-shih chou-nien lun-chi* (Collected Works on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Reform of 1898; Shanghai, 1958); Li, pp. 145-163.

21

CSK, *pen-chi*, 24: 10b.

22

Ibid., 24: 9b; 24: 10b.

23

For a detailed discussion of Liang's escape see Feng Tsu-vu, *Ko-ming i-shih* (Historical Reminiscences of the Revolution; Taipei, 1965) 1: 48.

24

Ibid., 1: 63.

25

Ibid., 1: 16.

26

Ibid., 1: 48.

27

Chang, p. 119; Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 78-80, 86-89.

28

Feng, *Ko-ming-i-shih*, I: 64-65; Chang, pp. 120-125.

29

Feng, II: 31-32.

30

Chang, pp. 128-129.

31

THL, 157: 5-5b.

32

YPSHC, 37-58.

33

Ibid., 37:64b.

34

Feng, I: 15-16; Chang, pp. 128-133.

35

YPSHC-WC, II: 19.

36

Chang, pp. 139-157; Ting, pp. 107-181.

37

YPSHC-WC, II:19.

38

Feng, I: 54.

39

R.S. Britton, *The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800-1912* (Shanghai, 1933), p. 119.

40

Chang, pp. 287-304; *YPSHC-WC*, 6:13.

41

Chang, Chapter VIII, pp. 253-319, "A Star of the Public Press," gives a detailed account of Liang's periodicals before the revolution of 1911 and their influence.

42

Chang, Chapter IV, pp. 81-118, "Civil Rights, Destruction, Revolution---Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Revolutionary Opinion."

43

For a detailed account of Liang's journey in North American

Continent and its influence on Liang see Liang's *Hsin-ta-lu yu-chi chie-lu* (A Summary of the Journey on New Continent; Taipei, 1957); Chang, pp. 163-182.

44

Li, p. 208.

45

YPSHC-WC, 20: 19-28.

46

Ibid., 23: 29-46.

47

Ibid., 23: 57-62.

48

Ibid., 24: 1-143.

49

Ibid., 25(a): 106-130.

50

Ibid., 27: 1-46.

51

Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Chung-kuo-cheng-chih shih-hsiang-shih* (History of Chinese Political Thought; Taipei, 1954), pp. 702-704.

52

Britton, p. 120; Chang, pp. 304-310.

53

Ibid., pp. 311-312.

54

Ibid., pp. 312-319.

55

YPSHC-WC, 44:1-2.

56

Li, p. 254.

57

Chang, p. 200.

CHAPTER II

1

YPSHC-CC, 22:185.

2

YPSHC-WC, 11: 17.

3

Kang began to write *Ta-tung Shu* at the age of 27 in 1884 and completed it in 1892. *Hsin-hsueh wei-ching kao* was completed in 1891. *Kung-tzu kai-chih kao* was completed in 1896. See Ting, p. 15; Hsiao, p. 718.

4

WHPF, 1: 436-437: 4-234.

5

Ibid., 2: 231-232.

6

Ibid., 1: 436-437; Chang, pp. 16-20; Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period*, tr. Immanuel C.Y. Hsu (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 1959), pp. 92-95.

7

Ibid., p. 93; *WHPF*, 4:45, 124-125.

8

Liang, *Ching-tai-hsueh-shu kai-lun*, p. 56.

9

The 'new text school' in the Ch'ing Dynasty started with Chuang Cheng-yu's book *Chun-chiu cheng tsi* (The Accurate Interpretation of The Spring and Autumn Annals) and was expended by such scholars as Liu Feng-lu, Wei Yuan, Kung Tsu-chen, Wang Kai-yun, and Liao Ping. Kang Yu-wei collected their ideas and formulated a theory from them. See Lin I, *Chung-kuo hsueh-shu shih-shiang ta-kang* (The General Outline of Chinese Intellectual Thought; Taipei, 1963), pp. 263-265.

10

Hsiao, p. 734.

11

YPSHC-WC. 3. 10-11.

12

K'ang yu wei, *Ch'ang-hsing hsueh-chih* (An Account of Study at ch'ang-hsing Alley), p. 16.

13

YPSHC-WC, 44(a): 28.

14

Liang, p. 57.

15

YPSHC-WC, 2:7.

16

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao extended the teachings of *Ta-tung* in the following thirteen points:

1. There would be no boundaries between nations. The world would be governed by one government and would be divided into several districts.
2. The head government and the governments of districts would be elected by the people.
3. There would be no family. A man and a woman would live together for no more than one year. They would change partners at a certain time.
4. The pregnant women would stay in the *Tai-chiao Yuan* (Institute for Pregnant Women). A new born child would be reared in the Institute for Children.
5. The children should attend kindergarten and schools at different levels according to their age.
6. When they grow up, they would be given jobs by the government in agriculture or in industry.
7. The sick would be taken care of in hospitals. The aged would stay in Nursing Institutes.
8. These institutes for pregnant women, children, the aged and hospitals would be the best organizations in these districts. Those who entered these institutes would obtain the best treatment.
9. Adults would serve in these institutes for several years.
10. Different kinds of public dormitories and public cafeterias would be established to serve the people according to their salaries.
11. Laziness and idleness would be the most serious causes for punishment.
12. Those who would make important contributions in intellectual circles or in the above-mentioned institutes would be granted special awards.
13. The deceased would be cremated. The crematorium would be located next to the fertilizer factory.
See Liang, p. 59.

17

Ibid., p. 60.

18

Ibid., p. 61.

19

Ibid., Ting, p. 29.

20

Liang, p. 61. Liang disagreed with K'ang on the mentioned views during this period because of his early study of the orthodox learnings and because of the influence of Hsia Chen-yu and Tan Ssu-tung. Both Hsia and Tan were Liang's close friends. Hsia was studying the learnings of 'new text school' and was one of the leaders of the anti-Hsün-tzu movement. Tan was studying Wang Fu-tzu's instructions and liked to discuss logic, metaphysics and economics. As soon as they became friends, Tan followed Liang to advocate *ta-tung*. Liang was also deeply influenced by Hsia and Tan.

21

YPSHC-WC, 11: 16.

22

Ibid., 11: 17.

23

Ibid., 6: 62. One can learn of K'ang's knowledge of Western thought from Liang's description of it in the *K'ang Nan-hai hsien-sheng chuan* (Biography of K'ang Yu-wei): "When I (K'ang) was in Hongkong and Shanghai, I saw the efficiency of the Westerners' colonization policy. Their policies in their colonies were so good, that, I thought that their policies must be even better in their own countries.... Therefore I bought and read all available European books that were translated into Chinese by the translation department of the Kiangnan Arsenal and by the Western churches. But all translations available at that time were primarily general works concerning technology, military tactics and medicine as well as books on the Christian religion. No one was concerned with political science or philosophy."

24

Ting, p. 19.

25

YPSHC-WC, 1: 124.

26

Ibid., 1: 67.

27

Ibid., 4: 81.

28

WHPF 1: 163-176; Tang Chih-chun *Wu-hsü pien-fa shih lun-ts'ung* (Collected Writings on the reform movement of 1898; Hankow, 1957), p. 57.

29

Ting, pp. 33, 40-41; Chang, pp. 67-68.

30

Ting, p. 29; Liang, *Intellectual Trends in the Ching Period*, pp. 102-107.

31

Su, pp. 4b - 5b.

32

Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West* (Cambridge; Harvard Univ. Press, 1954), p. 135.

33

Ibid.,

34

YPSHC, 1:109.

35

Ibid., 3: 9-10.

36

Ibid., Edmund S.K. Fung, "The T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang Revolt," *Papers on Far Eastern History*, I (March 1970), 70-114. (Dept. of Far Eastern History, The Australian National University).

37

WHPF, 1:400-406; 4: 395-396.

38

YPSHC, 2: 4-5; *SWP*, 26: 1a-b (May 12, 1897).

39

Ibid., *YPSHC*, 2: 4-5.

40

Liang, p. 68.

41

Ibid., p. 62.

42

William Langer, *An Encyclopedia of World History*, p. 889; Li Chien-nung, p. 121.

43

China had eighteen battleships and gunboats. Japan had only twelve. Li Fang-sheng, *Chung-kuo ching tai shih* (Modern History of China; Taipei, 1958), p. 445.

44

Wei-yuan, *Hai-kuo-tu-chih-shu*. p. 1.

45

Yang Yu-chun, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih shih-shiang shih* (History of Chinese Political Thought; Taipei, 1964), p. 308.

46

Liang, *Wu-hsü cheng-pien chi*, p. 2.

47

Ibid., p. 113.

48

Ibid., p. 126.

49

Ting, p. 21.

50

Chang, pp. 35-36.

51

WHPF, 4: 152.

52

Sun Yu, ed., *I-chiao ts'ung-pien* (Collection of Essays for the Upholding of Orthodoxy; Wuchang, 1898), p. 4a-b.

53

YPSHC-WC, 29: 38.

54

Ibid., 29: 2.

55

YPSHC, 1:62; *SWP*, 3b: 1-3b (Aug. 18, 1897).

56

Ibid., 18: 2b-3 (Feb. 22, 1897); *YPSHC*, 1:56, 3:3, 13.

57

Ibid., 1:4; *SWP*, 2:2 (Aug. 19, 1896).

58

YPSHC, 2:12.

59

Ibid., 2:13-17.

60

Ibid., 1:103-104; *SWP*, 5:3b-4 (Sept. 17, 1896).

61

Ibid., 5: 3b-4 (Sept. 17, 1896); *YPSHC*, 1: 103-104.

62

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, *Hsi-hsüeh-shu-mu-p'iao* (A Bibliography of Western learning), in *Chih-hsüeh-chai ts'ung-shu*, 1896), preface, pp. 3b-4.

63

Su, pp. 1-36; Chang, pp. 47-78.

64

YPSHC-WC, 6:53.

65

SWP, Vol. 6.

66

YPSHC-WC, 6: 52.

67

Ibid., 1:21, 24, 25.

68

Ibid., 1: 25.

69

Ibid., 2: 56.

70

Ibid., 1: 26.

71

Ibid., 1: 58.

72

Liang, p. 87-88.

73

YPSHC-WC, 1:29.

74

Ibid., 3: 21-22.

75

Ibid., 1: 17.

76

Ibid., 1: 28-29.

77

Ibid., 1: 29.

78

Ibid., 1: 14.

79

Ibid., 1: 19.

80

Ibid., 1: 44.

81

Ibid., 1: 36.

82

Ibid., 1: 50-55.

83

Ibid., 1: 35.

84

Ibid., 1: 34-37.

85

Ibid., 1: 37.

86

Ibid., 1: 40.

87

Ting, p. 35.

88

Ibid., p. 53.

89

YPSHC-WC, 2:1.

90

Ibid.

91

Ibid., 1: 14.

92

Ting, p. 32.

93

Ibid., pp. 32-33.

94

YPSHC-WC, 11: 16.

95

Ting, p. 37.

96

Ibid., p. 40.

97

Su Yu, *I-chiao tzung-pien fu-lu* (The Appendix to the Collection of Writings for Promoting Sacred Teachings; Wuchang, 1898), p. 4.

98

YPSHC-WC, 11: 18.

99

Su, p. 4.

100

Ibid., p. 5.

101

Liang, *Ching-tai hsueh-shu kai-lun*, p. 60. What K'ang preached was not the original Confucianism but the Confucianism formulated by him.

102

Liang, p. 61. Confucius' teachings of *ta-tung* preached by Liang was the Confucianism formulated in Liang's mind but not the original Confucianism.

103

YPSHC-WC, 3: 58-59.

104

Ibid., 1: 96.

105

Ibid., 1: 128.

106

Ibid., 1: 15.

107

Ibid., 1: 128.

108

Ibid.

109

Ibid., 1: 1, 9.

110

Ibid., 2: 7.

111

Su, p. 5.

- 112
Ibid.
- 113
Ibid.
- 114
YPSHC-WC, 3: 18.
- 115
Ibid.
- 116
Li-yün pien, Li Chi (The Book of Rites).
- 117
Liang, p. 68.
- 118
Ibid.
- 119
YPSHC-WC, 1: 94-95.
- 120
Ibid., 1: 94.
- 121
Ibid., 1: 96.
- 122
Joyce Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (Boston, 1921), p. 76ff.
- 123
T.V. Smith, *The Democratic Way of Life* (Chicago, 1926), pp. 3-12.
- 124
YPSHC-WC, 1: 10.
- 125
Ibid., 1: 80.
- 126
Ting, p. 44.
- 127
Kuo Ting-i, *Ching-tai chung-kuo shih-shih- erh-chi* (The Daily Record of Modern Chinese Historial Facts; Taipei, 1963), p. 974.
- 128
Ting, p. 43.

129

Liang, p. 62.

130

YPSHC-WC, 37: 69.

131

Su, p. 8-10.

132

Ting, p. 37-48; Kuo, p. 974.

133

YPSHC, 1: 77-92.

134

Ibid., 3: 41-48.

135

YPSHC-WC, 1: 81.

136

Ibid., 1: 79.

137

Ibid., 1: 78.

138

Ibid., 1: 79.

139

Ibid., 1: 77.

140

Ibid., 1: 77-78.

141

Ibid., 1: 83.

142

Ibid.

143

Ibid., 1: 80.

144

Ibid., 1: 83.

145

Ibid., 1: 81-82.

146
Ibid., 3: 11.

147
Ibid., 2: 48.

148
Ibid.

149
Ibid.

150
Ibid., 2: 49.

151
Ibid.

152
Ibid., 5: 36.

153
Ibid., 1: 80.

154
Ibid., 1: 81.

155
Ting, p. 44.

156
YPSHC-WC, 29:3.

157
Liang, p. 60.

158
Su, Vol. p. 8.

CHAPTER III

1

YPSHC-WC, 29: 2-3; Ting, p. 84.

2

YPSHC-WC, 6: 54.

3

Ibid.

4

Hsiao, Vol. 6, p. 753.

5

YPSHC-WC, 3: 73.

6

Ibid., 45: 16.

7

Ibid., 5: 62.

8

Ting, p. 89.

9

Ibid., p. 61; Liang, *Wu-hsu cheng-pien chi*, pp. 23, 27.

10

YPSHC-WC, 4: 69.

11

Ch'ing-i pao, Vol. 39.

12

YPSHC-WC, 3: 71.

13

Ibid., 4: 69.

14

Ibid., 5: 1.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid., 5: 3.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid., 5:2.

19

Ibid., 5:4.

20

Ibid., 5: 1.

21

Ibid., 5:4.

22

Ibid., 4: 69.

23

Ibid., 5: 2.

24

Ibid., 5: 5.

25

Ibid., 5: 6-7.

26

Ibid., 5: 6.

27

Ibid., 3: 76.

28

Ibid., 5: 36.

29

Ting, pp. 101, 130.

30

Ibid., p. 89.

31

YPSHC-WC, 5: 49; Liang, *Tsu yu shu*, p. 25.

32

Ting, p. 107.

33

Hsin-min tsung-pao, Vol. 89, p. 33.

34

Ting, pp. 140-142.

35

Ibid., p. 166.

36

Liang, *Ch'ing tai hsuen-shu kai lun*, pp. 65-66.

37

YPSHC-WC, 33: 52.

38

Ting, pp. 99-134.

39

Liang said that "I do not mind challenging my own ideas of today with those I had yesterday". See Hsiao, p. 734.

40

Ibid., p. 763.

41

Liang, *Tsu-yu shu*, p. 25; *YPSHC-WC*, 2: 52-53.

42

Ibid.,

43

Ibid.

44

The Boxers (義和團) were a lingering branch of the *Pei-lien chiao* (白蓮教 Religion of White Lotus). They claimed that they were not afraid of guns and knives, and advocated 'Fu-ch'ing mieh-yang (扶清滅洋). The support of Ch'ing to destroy the foreigners'.

The Empress Dowager summoned secretly their chief to the Court, gave him silver and called him and his followers *i-min* (義民 righteous people). In 1900, more than ten thousand Boxers entered the capital, Peking, burned the churches, slaughtered the missionaries, derailed the railways and cut telegraph wires. They also killed anyone who had foreign books, paintings and foreign goods. Prince Tuan (端王), ordered the

Imperial Troops in Kanshu (甘肅) to cooperate with the Boxers. They killed the secretary of the Japanese Embassy and Baron von Kettler, the German minister. The Empress Dowager also ordered the provinces to take an anti-foreign attitude. The result was the invasion by the Allied Troops of Eight Powers.

45

Ting, p. 147.

46

YPSHC-WC, 11: 31.

47

Ting, p. 157.

48

Ch'ing-i pao, Vol. 26.

49

YPSHC-CC, 4: 66-67.

50

YPSHC-WC, 5: 50.

51

YPSHC-CC, 4: 64-65.

52

Ibid., 4: 65.

53

Ibid.

54

Ibid., 93: 2.

55

YPSHC-WC, 9: 41.

56

Liang's letter to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, dated March 29, 1900.
See Feng, Vol. 1, pp. 44-50; Ting, p. 141.

57

YPSHC-WC, 5: 50.

58

Hsin-min shuo, p. 11; *YPSHC-WC*, 5: 51.

59

Ibid., 5: 51.

60

YPSHC-CC, 4: 66-67.

61

YPSHC-WC, 9: 42-43.

62

Ibid., 9: 42.

63

As one of the leaders of the *Pao-huang-hui* (the 'Protect-the-Emperor' Society) at this time Liang should be consistent in his belief in 'protect-the-emperor' and the introduction of a constitution, and should not mention *ke-ming*. At this time he had already clashed with the revolutionaries in ideology. That is why he was not willing to advocate *ke-ming*.

64

YPSHC-CC, 93:8.

65

Hsin chung kuo wei lai chi was published in *Hsin hsiao shou* (New Story), Vol. 2. *Hsin hsiao-shou* was a monthly magazine which started publication in October, 1902 and ceased to publish in September, 1905. Liang's purpose in establishing *Hsin hsiao shou* was to advocate *ke-ming*

YPSHC-WC, 29: 3.

66

Ibid.

67

YPSHC-CC, 4: 79.

68

Ibid., 4: 80.

69

YPSHC-WC, 13: 85.

70

Ting, p. 157; *YPSHC-WC*, 11: 46-47.

71

See the following chapter.

72

See the fourth section of last chapter; "On the Relationship Between the Han Chinese and the Manchus."

73

Ting, p. 157.

74

YPSHC-WC, 10: 10.

75

Ibid., 6: 20.

76

According to old Chinese saying, Yu (禹) dredged the nine rivers which saved the whole of China from floods. *YPSHC-WC*, 6: 20.

77

Ibid., 6: 19.

78

Ibid., 6: 20.

79

Ibid., 6: 20.

80

Ibid., 6: 20-21.

81

Ibid.; Pu Hsieh-feng, *Hsien-tai hsi-yang cheng-chih shih-chao Modern Western Political Thought*, Paipei, 1963), p. 166.

82

YPSHC-WC, 6: 22; 10: 24.

83

Ibid., 6: 22.

84

Ibid.

85

YPSHC-CC, 4: 18-20; *YPSHC-WC*, 4: 60.

86

Ibid., 10: 35.

87

See Aristotle's *Politics*, Book 1, Chapter i.

88

YPSHC-CC, 4: 16.

89

Ibid., 4: 16-17.

90

Ibid., 4: 17.

91

Ibid., 4: 17-18.

92

Ibid.

93

Ibid.

94

Liang's letter to his teacher K'ang Yu-wei dated October, 1902. Ting,
p. 157.

95

Liang, *Wu hsü cheng pien chi*, pp. 57-61.

96

Ibid.; *Tsu-yu shu*, p. 42.

97

Hsin-min shou, pp. 16-22.

98

YPSHC-WC, 5: 52.

99

Tsu-yu shu, p. 80.

100

YPSHC-CC, 4: 110-111.

101

YPSHC-WC, 14: 23.

102

YPSHC-CC, 89: 23-24.

CHAPTER IV

1

Hsin-min tsung pao, third year, Vol. I.

2

Johann Kasper Bluntschli (1808-1881), Swiss-German jurist and political theorist. His outstanding contribution, the *Lehre vom modernen Staat* (3 vol. 1875-76), was translated into French and English. English translation of its vol. 1 of 6th ed. as *Theory of the State* (Oxford, 1892) in which he treated the state as a (moral-spiritual personality) comparable to a human organism. The body of the state, its constitutional organization, is subject to the law of growth, decay and death; its soul, the national spirit, is embodied in the common language, customs and outlook of the people.

3

YPSHC-WC, 13: 85.

4

Ibid., 13: 85-86.

5

YPSHC-CC, 22: 134-135.

6

Ibid., 22: 60-65, 140-142.

7

Ibid., 22: 142.

8

Ibid., 22: 143-145.

9

Ibid., 22: 122-123.

10

Ibid., 22: 121-124.

11

YPSHC-WC, 29: 3.

12

Ibid., 14: 26.

13

Ibid., 19: 51-62.

14

Ibid., 17: 49-83.

15

Hsiao, p. 741.

16

YPSHC-WC, 29: 3.

17

Ting, pp. 89-90.

18

Dr. Sun Yat-sen's letter to Huang Chung-yang in Feng Tsu-yu,
Chung-hua min-kuo-k'ao-kuo-ch'ien ko-ming-shih, 1:47.

19

Stephen Chen, and Robert Payne, *Sun Yat-sen. A Portrait* (New York, 1946), pp. 64-65.

20

For a detailed account of the arguments and debates between Sun's followers and Liang's followers see Hao Yen-ping, "The Abortive Cooperation Between Reformers and Revolutionaries," *Paper on China*, Vol. 15 (Harvard Univ. 1961); Scalapino, R. and Schiffrin, H., "Early Socialist Currents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement, Sun Yat-sen versus Liang C'hi-Ch'ao," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol XVIII (May, 1959); Shiffrin, H., "Sun Yat-sen's Early Land Policy: The Origin and Meaning of Equalization of Land Rights," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XVI (August, 1957); Chang, Chapter V, pp. 119-160, "The Struggle between Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Revolutionary Party," pp. 207-241; "The Influence of the Debates between Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Revolutionary Party"; Jansen, pp. 19, 53, 75-79, 119.

21

Ibid.

22

Liang, "Further Discussion of the Gain and Loss from Racial Revolution and Political Revolution," *YPSHC*, 7:49.

23

Ibid., 7:43.

24

Liang, *Ch'ing tai hsüen shu kai lun*, p. 63.

25

Ting, p. 179.

26

Ibid., p. 181.

27

Ibid., p. 182.

28

Ibid., p. 185.

29

Ibid., pp. 185-186.

30

Ibid., p. 181.

31

Ibid., p., 159

32

Ibid., pp. 167-171.

33

See the first section of Chapter III: "Constitutional Monarchy."

34

Liang, pp. 65-66.

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Ibid.

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Ibid., 17: 31.

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Ibid., 13: 89; 17: 32.

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Hsiao, p. 752.

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82

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CHAPTER V

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Ibid., pp. 204-208, Goodnow's and Yang Tu's arguments were cited. Ting, p. 457.

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Ibid., 56: 15.

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Levenson, p. 189.

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Chow Tse-Tsung, p. 90; Ting, p. 557.

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53

For details of Liang's contribution see Liang's *Intellectual Trend in the Ch'ing Period*; Chow Tse-tsung's *The May Fourth Movement*; Teng and Fairbank's *China's Response to the West*; Fairbank and Liu's *Bibliographical Guide to Modern China*; Levenson's *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* and others.

54

Levenson, p. 191.

55

YPSHC, 44(a): 27-32.

CONCLUSION

1 The So-called *Hsin-cheng* (新政 new policy) and *Hsin-hsien* (新學 new learning) were really expressions of censure used by some scholars and politicians to disparage Wang Mang (王莽). However, Liang held Wang An-shih (王安石) in great esteem for the latter's tremendous contribution in reform in the Sung Dynasty.

Chu Hsi (朱熹 A.D. 1130-1200) famous commentator and writer of Sung Dynasty, placed the old learning and the new knowledge in a row and regarded them equally important. His commentary was the standard exposition of the Confucian classics. He promoted new things but never abandoned the old ones. Liang throughout his life followed Chu Hsi's method in pursuing studies.

2 K'ang and Liang named their party *Wei-hsin tang* (維新黨) derived the meaning from 'Chou-sui-chiu-pang chi-min-wei-hsin (周雖舊邦其命維新). Although Chou is an old dynasty its appointment--as a sovereign state--is new. See *Shang-shu* (尚書), the canons of Yao and Shun--the Book of History.

3 Chen Shê (陳涉) was a man of humble birth who led the first major revolt against Ch'in (秦) rule which paved the way for Liu Pang's (劉邦) success in establishing the Han Dynasty in 206 B.C.

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APPENDIX

Terms, Phrases, and Proper Names in

Transliteration and in Chinese

Ai-hsin-chio-lo 愛新覺羅

An-fu (Anwei-Fukien) 安福

Canton 廣州

Chang Chien 張謇

Chang Chih-tung 張之洞

Ch'ang-hsing hsüeh-chi (An Account of Study at Ch'ang-hsing Alley)
長興學記

Chang Hsun 張勲

Chang Ping-ling 章炳麟

Chang san shih 張三世

Changsha 長沙

Che-hsüeh shê (the Philosophical Society) 哲學社

Chekiang 浙江

Ch'en 辰

Ch'en Chi-t'ung 陳季同

Ch'en Pao-chen 陳寶箴

Ch'en Shao-po 陳少白

Chen She 陳涉

Cheng Chen-kung (Koxinga) 鄭成功

Chen-chih-hsueh ta-chia Pe-Lun-Chi-Li chih hsueh-shuo (The Theory of Political Scientist Bluntschli) 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說

Cheng chow 鄭州

Cheng-li kuo-ku (reorganization of the national heritage) 故國整理

Cheng-tung 正統

Cheng-wen shê (The Political Information Association) 政聞社

Cheng-wen she hsüan yen shu (Manifesto of the Political Information Association) 政聞社宣言書

Chi 齊

Chi (banner) 旗

Ch'iang hsueh hui (Society for the Study of National Strengthening) 強學會

Chiang-hsueh shê (Society for Lectures on the New Learning) 講學社

Chien Po-tsan 蔣伯贊

Ch'ien-t'ang Hsien 錢塘縣

Chih-li 直隸

Ch'in 秦

Chin-pu tang (the Progressive Party) 進步黨

Chin shih 進士

Ch'in Shih Huang (the first emperor of Ch'in Dynasty) 秦始皇

Ching-i pao (Pure Criticism Journal) 清議報

Ching-kao wo-kuo-kuo-min (Let Me Tell It Sincerely to My Countrymen)
敬告我國國民

Ching-tai chung-kuo shih-shih erh-chi 近代中國史事日誌

Ch'ing-tai hsueh-shu kai-lun (Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Court)
清代學術概論

Chou 周

Ch'ou-an hui (Planning for Peace Society) 善安會

Chou-sui-chiu-pang chi-min-wei-hsin (Although Chou is an old dynasty
its appointment--as a sovereign state-- is new) 周雖舊邦其命維新

Chu 楚

Chuan-chi (Collected Works) 專集

Chuan chiao (Missionary preachings or to preach the teachings of
Confucius) 傳教

Chuang Cheng yu 莊存與

Chü Hsi 朱熹

Chü-jen 舉人

Chu Ko-liang 諸葛亮

Chü luan (chaos) 據亂

Chü-luan shih (the age of chaos) 據亂世

Chü Yuan-chang 朱元璋

Chun-chio cheng-tsi 春秋正辭

Chun-chio chung-kuo i-ti pien hsü (Introduction to the Distinction Between China and I Ti in the Spring and Autumn Annals) 春秋中國禹狄辨序

Chun-wu yuan (Military Council or Department of Military Affairs) 軍務院

Chung kuo 中國

Chung-kuo kuo-hui chih-tu shih-i (Private Discussion of the Chinese Congressional System) 中國國會制度私議

Chung-kuo wei-hsin hui ('to uphold the new' Society) 中國維新會

Chung-wai chi-wen (The Chinese and Foreign Record) 中外紀聞

Chung wai kung pao (The Chinese and Foreign Public Daily) 中外公報

Court of Judicature and Revision 大理寺

Dairen 大連

Feng Kuo-chang 馮國璋

Fengtien 奉天

Feng Tsu-yu 馮自由

Fu (district) 府

Fu-yu-jen lun pao-chiao shu (Reply to friend on the subject of protection of Confucianism) 復友人論保教書

Han learning 漢學

Hans (the Chinese) 漢人

Hsi-cheng tsung shu (A Collection of Works of Western Politics) 西政叢書

Hsi-hsueh shu-mu-piao (Bibliography and Annotated Introduction Notes of Western Learning) 西學書目表

Hsi hu (West Lake) 西湖

Hsia 夏

Hsia Chen-yu 夏會佑

Hsia-wei-i yu chi (the Journey in Hawaii) 夏威夷遊記

Hsiang (a county school) 县

Hsiang-hsueh hsin pao (New Journal of Hunan Studies) 湘學新報

Hsiao-hsueh (primary school) 小學

Hsiao-kang (peaceful age) 小康

Hsieh Fu-chen 薛福成

Hsieh Fu-chen chu-shih erh-chi (Diary of Hsieh Fu-chen in His Foreign Service)

薛福成出使日記

Hsien (county) 縣

Hsien-cheng chien-shuo (To Speak Simply the Constitutional Form of Government)

憲政淺說

Hsien-fa ta'o-lun hui (The Constitution Discussion Society) 憲法討論會

Hsien-fa yen-chiu hui (the Constitution Research Society) 憲法研究會

Hsien-yu hui (Friends of the Constitution Society) 憲友會

Hsin-cheng (new policy) 新政

Hsin chung-kuo wei-lai-chi (the Future of New China) 新中國未來記

Hsin-hsiao shuo (New Novels) 新小說

Hsin-hsiao shuo pao (New Fiction) 新小說報

Hsin-hsueh (new learning) 新學

Hsin-hsueh wei-ching k'ao (An Inquiry into the Classics Forged During the Hsin Period)

新學偽經考

Hsin hui 新會

Hsin-min (new people or citizen) 新民

Hsin-min-chu-chu-i (New Democracy) 新民主主義

Hsin-min-shuo (on New People or Citizen) 新民說

Hsin-min tsung pao (New People's Magazine) 新民叢報

Hsin-ro-ma Chuan-chi (Story of New Rome) 新羅馬傳奇

Hsin shih shih (new historian) 新史氏

Hsin-ta-lu-yu-chi (Journey in New Continent) 新大陸遊記

Hsing-chung hui (Revive China Society) 興中會

Hsiu ts'ai 秀才

Hsiung Hsi-ling 熊希齡

Hsu 戌

Hsu (a district school) 序

Hsu Chi-yu 徐繼畲

Hsu Chien-yin 徐建寅

Hsu-ch'in 徐勤

Hsu Chun-mien 徐君勉

Hsu Shih-chang 徐世昌

Hsüan-tung 宣統

Hsüeh (a national school) 學

Hsüeh-hai tang (Hsüeh-hai school) 學海堂

Hsüeh-shiao tzung-lun (A General Summary of School System) 學校總論

Hsün Chih 順治

Hsün-tzu 菀子

Hu Han-min 胡漢民

Hu-kuang 湖廣

Hu Shih 胡適

Huang Chung-yang 黃宗仰

Huang Hsing 黃興

Huang Ke-chiang 黃克強

Huang Kung-tu 黃公度

Huang-ti (Yellow Emperor) 黃帝

Huang Tsun-hsien 黃遵憲

Hui 回

Hunan 湖南

Hunan shou-chiu tang (The Hunan Conservative Party) 湖南守舊黨

Hung hsien 洪憲

Hupeh 湖北

I 禺

I-chiao tsung-pien fu-lu 翼教叢編附錄

I-ku (suspicion of classics and ancient writings) 疑古

I ti 禺狄

I-tsai so-wei kuo-ti wen-ti che (How Strange the So-called Problem
of the Form of Polity) 異哉所謂國體問題者

Jehol 热河

Jen-cheng (a good administration) 仁政

Jen-kung hsien-sheng shih lioh (The Activities of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao)
任公先生事略

Jui 睿

Jung-lü 榮祿

Kai-min chuan-chi lun (On Enlightened Despotism) 開明專制論

Kang i 剛毅

K'ang Yu-wei 康有為

Ke-ming (revolution) 革命

Kei-ke (radical change) 改革

Kiangnan Arsenal 江南製造局

Kiangsu 江蘇

Kieu-chou-wan 膠州灣

Ko-jen-hsiu-yang (individual discipline) 個人休養

Ku-i-yuan-kao (Examination of the Ancient Parliamentary System)
古議院考

Kua-fen wei-yen (On the Danger of Dismemberment) 瓜分危言

Kuan Chung 管仲

Kuang-chih shu-chu (Wisdom-Extension Bookstore) 廣智書局

Kuanghsı 廣西

Kuanghsü 尖緒

Kuangtung 廣東

Kuei-hsueh hui (Kuangsi Study Society) 桂學會

Kung-ho chien-shē t'ao-lung hui (Association for Discussion of the Establishment of a Republic) 共和建設討論會

Kung-ho chu-chin hui (Association for Utmost Advancement of the Republic) 共和俱進會

Kung-ho tang (The Republican Party) 共和黨

Kung-ho ts'u-chin hui (Association for Promoting the Republic)
共和促進會

Kung-ho t'ung-it tang (Republic United Party) 共和統一黨

Kung Tsu-chen 龔自珍

Kung-tzu kai-chih k'ao (A Study of Confucius as Reform)
孔子改制考

Kung-yang 公羊

Kunming 昆明

Kuo-feng pao (National Spirit) 國風報

Kuo-min hsin-cheng shè (Society for a New National Government)
國民新政社

Kuo-min wai-chiao hsieh hui (Citizen's Diplomatic Association)
國民外交協會

Kuo Ting-i 郭廷以

Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) 國民黨

Kweichow 貴州

Li chi (the Book of Rites) 禮記

Li Chü-ping 李去病

Li Fang-sheng 李方生

Li-hsien-fa i (On the Introduction of a Constitution) 立憲法議

Li Hung-chang 李鴻章

Li Tuan-fen 李端棻

Li Yuan-hung 黎元洪

Li-yüan pien 禮運篇

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啓超

Liang Pao-ying 梁寶瑛

Liao Ping 廖平

Liautung 遼東

Lin Kuei 林圭

Lin-shih t'san-i-yuan 臨時參議院

Liu Feng-lu 劉逢祿

Liu Hsin 劉歆

Liu K'un-i 劉坤一

Liu Pang 劉邦

Lo Chai-tien 羅在田

Lu Hsiang-san 陸象山

Lu Hsun 旅順

Lu Yung-ting 陸榮廷

Lun cheng-fu chu jao kuo-hui chih fei (Discussion of the Evil of Government Interference in the National Assembly) 論政府阻繞國會之非

Lun chung-kuo chih chiang-ch'iang (China Will Become Strong)
論中國之將強

Lun pien-fa pi-chih ping man-han chih chiai shih (Reform Should Begin With the Elimination of the Distinction Between the Manchus and the Han Chinese)
論變法必自平滿漢之界始

Lung Chi-kuang 龍志剛

Ma Chien-chung 馬建忠

Ma Liang 馬亮

Manchu 滿州人

Mencius 孟子

Miao 苗

Min-chih (by the people) 民治

Min-chuan (people's rights) 民權

Min-chu tang (the Democratic Party) 民主黨

Min-hsieh hui (People's Association) 民協會

Min pao (the People's Tribune or the People) 民報

Min-pen (the people are the foundation of the state) 民本

Min-she (People's Society) 民社

Min-shiang (for the people) 民享

Min-tzu (nation or people) 民族

Min-tzu ching-shen (national spirit) 民族精神

Min-yu (of the people) 民有

Min wei kuei (people are first and of foremost importance) 民為貴

Ming Tai-chu 明太祖

Mo-Wang (the King of Devils) 魔王

Nan-hai chi-shih shou-yen (K'ang Yu-wei's Seventieth Birthday)
南海七十壽言

Nan-hsüeh hui (Society for Studies in the Southern Provinces) 南學會

Nien-fei 捫匪

Pao-chiao kung hui (Public Society for the Protection of Confucianism)
保教公會

Pao-huang hui (The Protect-the-Emperor Society) 保皇會

Peiyang 北洋

Pi Yung-nien 畢永年

Pien fa t'ung-i (A General Discussion of Reform) 變法通議

Pien ke (drastic change) 變革

Po-ai (love without distinction) 博愛

Po-ai chu-i (philanthropy) 博愛主義

Po huai (destruction of the empire) 破壞

Po-huai-chu-i (the need for destruction) 破壞主義

Po-shih ti-tsui (student of the national academy) 博士弟子

Pu chao 部曹

San shih (three ages) 三世

San-shih tzu-shu (Autobiography at Thirty) 三十自述

San-tung (three ancient dynasties) 三統

San yün 山戎

Shang-hai-kwan 山海關

Shang 商

Shang-chih hsueh-hui (the Aspiration Society) 尚志學會

Shanghai 上海

Shang-shu 尚書

Shang Yang 商鞅

Shansi 山西

Shantung 山東

Sheng Hsuan-huai 盛宣懷

Sheng-ping shih (the age of peace) 昇平世

Shensi 陝西

Shih-ai (self-love) 私愛

Shih-chiai-chu-i (internationalism) 世界主義

Shih-ke (An Interpretation of Revolution) 釋革

Shih-kuai 市僕

Shih-wu-hsueh-tang (Academy of Current Affairs) 時務學堂

Shih-wu hsueh-tang ta-chi ts'an chuan-hsu (The Introduction to the Remains of Notes at Shih-wu hsueh-tang) 時務學堂劄記殘卷序

Shih-wu pao (Current Affairs Journal) 時務報

Shih-wu pao kuan (Office of the Current Affair Journal) 時務報館

Shu chi shih 庶吉士

Shun 舜

Shuo-ch'un (Popular Movement) 說羣

Sun Te-ch'ang 孫德昌

Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙

Su Yu 蘇輿

Szechwan 四川

Ta-chung-hua min-chu kuo (Great Chinese Democratic State) 大中華民主國

Ta-hsüeh (college or university) 大學

Ta-lu (the Tartar--the Manchus) 鞍虜

Ta-tung (great peace or great harmony) 大同

Ta-tung shu (Book of Great Harmony) 大同書

T'ai-p'ing shih (the age of great peace) 太平世

Taipings 太平

Taku 大沽

T'an Ssu-t'ung 譚嗣同

T'ang Ch'i-yao 唐繼堯

T'ang Chueh-t'un 唐覺頓

T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang 唐才常

Ti 狄

Ti Chu-chin 狄楚青

T'ien-hsia-wei-kung (all under heaven belongs to the people)
天下為公

Tientsin 天津

Ting Wen-chiang 丁文江

Ts'ai Ao 蔡鍔

Ts'an-cheng yuan 參政院

Ts'ao K'un 曹琨

Tseng Lien 會廉

Tsinghua 清華

Tsu-min (people of a tribe) 族民

Tsung-chu ke-ming (racial revolution) 種族革命

Tuan Ch'i-jui 段祺瑞

T'ung-i-kung-ho tang (United Republican Party) 統一共和黨

T'ung-i tang (The Unification Party) 統一黨

Tung-nan 東南

T'ung-meng hui (United League) 同盟會

Tung-san tung 通三統

Tutu (military governor) 都督

Tze-jen nei-kuo shih-i (An Interpretation of the Responsible Cabinet)

責任內閣釋義

Tze-jen nei-kuo yu chen-chih chia (Responsible Cabinet and Politician)

責任內閣與政治家

Tzu-ch'iang (self-strengthening) 自強

Tz'u-hsi 慈禧

Wa-na 花剌

Wan-mu ts'ao-tang (Wan-mu School) 萬木草堂

Wang An-shih 王安石

Wang cheng (the perfect way of ancient rulers) 王政

Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛

Wang Fu-tzu 王夫之

Wang Kai-yün 王闔運

Wang Mang 王莽

Wang Ta-shi 汪大燮

Wang Wen-shao 王文韶

Wang Yang-ming 王陽明

Wei-hai-wei 衛海威

Wei-hsin (reform) 维新

Wei-hsin tang ('To Uphold the New' Party) 维新黨

Wei Yuan 魏源

Wen-chi (collected essays) 文集

Wo-ching-hou-so-i-pao-kuo-tze (What Should I Do For My Country From Now On)
吾今後所以報國者

Wu 吳

Wu Chi-ch'ing 吳季青

Wu Chih-yung 伍秩庸

Wu Hsiao-tsun 吳小村

Wu-hsüⁱⁱ cheng-pien (the Coup d'état of 1898) 戊戌政變記

Wu-hsüⁱⁱ-pien-fa (the reform of 1898) 戊戌變法

Wuchang 武昌

Yang chou shih erh chi (Teh Days in Yang Chou) 扬州十日記

Yang king pang (Pidgin) 洋涇濱

Yang Tu 楊塗

Yang-wu p'ai (Western-style experts) 洋務派

Yang-wu yün-tung (Westernization movement) 洋務運動

Yao 堯

Yeh-hsien 也先

Yen 燕

Yen fu 嚴復

Yeng-chiu hsi (research clique) 研究

Ying-huan chih-lüeh (An Outline of World Geography)瀛寰紀略

Yin-pin-shih-ho-chih-huan-chi (Collected Works of the Ice-Drinker's Studio) 飲冰室合集

Yin-pin-shih-ho-chi wen-chi (Collected Essays of the Ice-Drinker's Studio)
飲冰室合集文集

Yin-pin-shih-wen-chi (Collected Essays of the Ice-Drinker's Studio)
飲冰室文集

Yu 禹

Yuan K'o-ting 袁克定

Yuan Shih-kai 袁世凱

Yüeh 越

Yunnan 雲南

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